35.240.15 - Identification cards. Chip cards. Biometrics
ICS 35.240.15 Details
Identification cards. Chip cards. Biometrics
Identifikationskarten
Cartes d'identification. Cartes a puce. Biométrie
Identifikacijske kartice. Čipne kartice. Biometrija
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This document gives guidance relating to successful, secure and usable implementation of biometric enrolment processes, while indicating risk factors that organizations which use biometric technologies can address during procurement, design, deployment and operation. Much of this document is generic to many types of applications, e.g. from national scale commercial and government applications, to closed systems for in-house operations, and to consumer applications. However, the intended application and its purpose often have influence on the necessary enrolment data quality and are taken into account when specifying an enrolment system and process. This document specifies the differences in operation relating to specific types of application, e.g. where self-enrolment is more appropriate than attended enrolment. This document focuses on mandatory, attended enrolment at fixed locations. It ultimately consolidates information relating to better practices for the implementation of biometric enrolment capability in various business contexts including considerations of process, function (system), and technology, as well as legal/privacy and policy aspects. This document provides guidance on collection and storage of biometric enrolment data and the impact on dependent processes of verification and identification. This document does not include material specific to forensic and law enforcement applications.
- Technical specification48 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies test methods for testing conformity of a mobile driving licence (mDL) or an mDL reader to ISO/IEC 18013-5. This document specifies test methods for: — mDL on its interface to an mDL reader; — mDL reader on its interface to an mDL; — mDL reader on its (optional) interface to an issuing authority infrastructure. Test cases for an issuing authority infrastructure on its interface to an mDL reader are not included in this document. Test cases for the use of OpenID Connect (OIDC) by an mDL reader on its interface to an issuing authority infrastructure are not included in this document. This document only provides test cases for the use of WebAPI on this interface. This document only addresses the functional behaviour of an implementation under test (IUT) on its interface(s) in scope. It does not address: — the internal implementation of an IUT, such as a secure area in an mDL; — any functional requirements to an IUT not specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5, for example, requirements of a particular issuing authority; — non-functional aspects of the IUT, nor IUT interfaces not listed above, such as the interface from an issuing authority infrastructure to an mDL, used to provision mDL data.
- Technical specification58 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document establishes: — functional architecture of a Biometric System-on-Card (BSoC); — definition of Type ID-1 BSoC (ISO/IEC 7810 conformant) and Type ID-T BSoC (see ISO/IEC 18328-2:2021, Annex A) implementation of a BSoC; — sensor types in a BSoC; — requirements to a BSoC with respect to: — discriminative power (i.e. biometric accuracy criteria); — interfaces; — power supply options. — The following aspects are out of scope of this document (see ISO/IEC 24787-1): — off-card biometric comparison, storage-on-card; — on-card biometric comparison (sensor-off-card); — work-sharing implementations; — detailed specification and configuration of individual components. This document provides a functional architectural description of a BSoC and describes how the interfaces are mapped using existing commands and data structures from other International Standards.
- Standard7 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies mechanism for use of certification on trustworthiness of secure area that is defined in ISO/IEC 23220-1. This document aims at enabling secure area providers to describe capabilities and confidence level of secure area for verification by eID issuers or mobile eID Attestation service providers, or both. This document specifies: — list of elements describing capabilities and confidence level of a secure area; — structure and management for use of a certificate, affixed or not to the secure area, containing that list of elements. This document refers to existing standards and applicable industry specifications which partly address the trustworthiness related issue (e.g. DLOA specified in GlobalPlatform specification GPC_SPE_095[ REF Reference_ref_3 \r \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B0200000008000000100000005200650066006500720065006E00630065005F007200650066005F0033000000 ], MDS specified in FIDO Alliance specification[ REF Reference_ref_4 \r \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B0200000008000000100000005200650066006500720065006E00630065005F007200650066005F0034000000 ], and SAAO specified in ISO/IEC TS 23220-3), and aims to minimize the differences between them.
- Technical specification35 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
1.1 Objective
This document is intended for the use of breeder document issuing authorities both policymakers and technical, for having uniform formats that conform to printed as well as digital requirements of CEN member and associated states (including EU member states).
The objectives are:
a) provision of a common set of formats of breeder documents – printed and digital to be implemented by CEN member and associated states (including EU member states), with the extended objective of their acceptance internationally;
b) the focus is on having common recognizable formats as well as prevention of identity fraud, particularly related to the use of breeder documents to obtain national and international ID documents, such as passports, and residence permits.
1.2 Human dimension of identity management
Each country’s identity management system also provides a framework for observing and protecting many of the human rights embodied in international declarations and conventions. Depending on the provisions in place, the system can ensure that citizens can exercise a wide range of rights, such as rights to property, privacy, freedom of movement and free choice of place of residence, as well as access to social services such as education, healthcare and social security. In states with more advanced technological infrastructure, population registration provides the basis for the establishment of a number of citizen-oriented computerized services, also known as e-services and e-government. Identity management is also central to prevention of discrimination in exercising guaranteed rights.
The identity management infrastructure provides the backbone for a functioning and viable state by securing civil, population and tax registers, as well other systems such as healthcare benefits, voter lists and the issuance of travel and identity documents based on verifiable identities. Such flaws may become visible during elections, where shortcomings in voter lists can affect confidence in the election process. In essence, a secure identity management system can be seen as the foundation, a root level, that is able to then feed into and help numerous other branches of key state services function effectively and accurately (OSCE, 2017, p.13) [27].
1.3 Security dimension of identity management
One of the key elements of a secure environment for cross-border travel is that the travel documents used by visitors meet international standards in terms of security of the document itself and security in that the document reflects the genuine identity of its holder. Similarly, the systems for issuing travel documents need to be linked to identity management systems to streamline decision-making processes, preferably through modernized systems that reflect developments in document security technology. As entries in registers or officially issued identification documents provide access to specific services, criminal networks are constantly looking for possible gaps in identity management systems to obtain genuine documents under fabricated or stolen identities. Documents obtained as result of gaps in identity management have enabled criminals to target business entities and cause significant financial losses through the use of genuine documents issued to non-existent identities (OSCE, 2017, p.14) [27].
Both legal and illegal immigration breeder docs are regularly used to determine an identity if no MRTD or eMRTD is presented. An identity which will be printed on an eRP, Foreigners ppt, Refugees travel doc etc. unless other supportive evidence of identity is provided.
Organized crime has not overlooked this and fraudulently obtained or falsified travel documents are regularly presented to hide the true identity.
Since a significant portion of the world’s population cannot reliably prove their identity, they rely on verbally presented identities and/or supportive breeder documents when registering in another country.
Asylum applicants who...
- Technical specification69 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document establishes a methodology to evaluate the resistance of BSs to morphing attacks, including multiple identity attacks. The document is limited to image-based morphing attacks. The term "image-based" includes modalities such as face, iris and finger image data. The document establishes: — a definition of biometric sample modifications and manipulation with a specific focus on manipulations that constitute a multiple identity attack. This can be, for instance, an enrolment attack with face image morphing; — a methodology to measure the morphing attack potential of a morphing method. The document also describes how morphing algorithms can be used for system evaluation.
- Standard16 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
1.1 Objective
This document is intended for the use of breeder document issuing authorities both policymakers and technical, for having uniform formats that conform to printed as well as digital requirements of CEN member and associated states (including EU member states).
The objectives are:
a) provision of a common set of formats of breeder documents – printed and digital to be implemented by CEN member and associated states (including EU member states), with the extended objective of their acceptance internationally;
b) the focus is on having common recognizable formats as well as prevention of identity fraud, particularly related to the use of breeder documents to obtain national and international ID documents, such as passports, and residence permits.
1.2 Human dimension of identity management
Each country’s identity management system also provides a framework for observing and protecting many of the human rights embodied in international declarations and conventions. Depending on the provisions in place, the system can ensure that citizens can exercise a wide range of rights, such as rights to property, privacy, freedom of movement and free choice of place of residence, as well as access to social services such as education, healthcare and social security. In states with more advanced technological infrastructure, population registration provides the basis for the establishment of a number of citizen-oriented computerized services, also known as e-services and e-government. Identity management is also central to prevention of discrimination in exercising guaranteed rights.
The identity management infrastructure provides the backbone for a functioning and viable state by securing civil, population and tax registers, as well other systems such as healthcare benefits, voter lists and the issuance of travel and identity documents based on verifiable identities. Such flaws may become visible during elections, where shortcomings in voter lists can affect confidence in the election process. In essence, a secure identity management system can be seen as the foundation, a root level, that is able to then feed into and help numerous other branches of key state services function effectively and accurately (OSCE, 2017, p.13) [27].
1.3 Security dimension of identity management
One of the key elements of a secure environment for cross-border travel is that the travel documents used by visitors meet international standards in terms of security of the document itself and security in that the document reflects the genuine identity of its holder. Similarly, the systems for issuing travel documents need to be linked to identity management systems to streamline decision-making processes, preferably through modernized systems that reflect developments in document security technology. As entries in registers or officially issued identification documents provide access to specific services, criminal networks are constantly looking for possible gaps in identity management systems to obtain genuine documents under fabricated or stolen identities. Documents obtained as result of gaps in identity management have enabled criminals to target business entities and cause significant financial losses through the use of genuine documents issued to non-existent identities (OSCE, 2017, p.14) [27].
Both legal and illegal immigration breeder docs are regularly used to determine an identity if no MRTD or eMRTD is presented. An identity which will be printed on an eRP, Foreigners ppt, Refugees travel doc etc. unless other supportive evidence of identity is provided.
Organized crime has not overlooked this and fraudulently obtained or falsified travel documents are regularly presented to hide the true identity.
Since a significant portion of the world’s population cannot reliably prove their identity, they rely on verbally presented identities and/or supportive breeder documents when registering in another country.
Asylum applicants who...
- Technical specification69 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document specifies security block (SB) formats (see ISO/IEC 19785-1) registered in accordance with ISO/IEC 19785-2 as formats defined by the Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) biometric organization ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37. This document also specifies registered SB format identifiers. NOTE The SB format identifier is recorded in the standard biometric header (SBH) of a patron format (or defined by that patron format as the only available SB format). The general-purpose SB format specifies whether the biometric data block (BDB) is encrypted or the SBH and BDB have integrity applied (or both). The general-purpose SB format can include ACBio instances (see ISO/IEC 24761). This SB provides all necessary security parameters, including those used for encryption or integrity. This document does not restrict the algorithms and parameters used for encryption or integrity, but it provides for the recording of such algorithms and parameter values. This document does not cover profiling to determine what algorithms and parameter ranges can be used by the generator of an SB for a particular application area, and hence what algorithms and parameter ranges have to be supported by the user of an SB. The second SB format is more limited but simpler. In particular, it cannot contain ACBio instances and does not support encryption of the BDB. The general-purpose SB format in XML provides for specification of whether the BDB is encrypted or the SBH and BDB have integrity applied (or both).
- Standard20 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies and publishes registered Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) patron formats defined by the CBEFF patron ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, and specifies their registered CBEFF patron format types (see ISO/IEC 19785-1) and resulting full ASN.1 OIDs. See Annex A for rules on how patron formats are defined using CBEFF data elements.
- Standard142 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document defines requirements and provides guidance on:
• capturing of facial images to be used for verification or identification purposes in applications based on reference images in identity or similar documents and traveller or visa databases;
• capturing of fingerprint images to be used for verification or identification purposes in applications based on reference images in identity or similar documents and traveller or visa databases;
• data quality maintenance for biometric data captured by/for verification or identification applications;
• data authenticity maintenance for biometric data captured by/for verification or identification ap-plications.
This document addresses the following aspects which are specific for biometric data capturing:
• biometric data quality and interoperability assurance;
• data authenticity assurance;
• morphing and other presentation attacks and biometric data injection attacks;
• accessibility and usability;
• recognition algorithms and their evaluation;
• privacy and data protection;
• optimal process design.
The following aspects are out of scope:
• other aspects of IT security;
• data capturing for ID document enrolment purposes, e.g. passport or ID card enrolment.
- Technical specification30 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document establishes conformance testing for the requirement described in ISO/IEC 24787-2, which is: — work-sharing on-card biometric comparison. Measuring the performance of on-card biometric comparison algorithms such as error rates or speed is not within the scope of this document.
- Standard6 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document augments the capabilities of the mobile driving licence (mDL) standardized in ISO/IEC 18013-5 with the following additional functionality: — presentation of a mobile driving licence to a reader over the internet.
- Technical specification42 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document establishes conformance testing for the requirements described in ISO/IEC 24787-1, which are: — framework for on-card biometric comparison, both in sensor-off-card systems and as part of Biometric System-on-Card; — security policies for on-card biometric comparison. Measuring the performance of on-card biometric comparison algorithms such as error rates or speed is not within the scope of this document.
- Standard19 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document establishes requirements and recommendations for the design format and data content of a drone or UAS remote pilot and remote crew licence, encompassing both visual human-readable features and machine-readable technologies. By establishing a common basis, this document aims to standardize drone or UAS remote pilot and remote crew licence without impeding the efforts of individual national or regional drone or UAS-related authorities. NOTE Not all jurisdictions require drone or UAS remote pilot and remote crew licences.
- Standard35 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document defines requirements and provides guidance on:
• capturing of facial images to be used for verification or identification purposes in applications based on reference images in identity or similar documents and traveller or visa databases;
• capturing of fingerprint images to be used for verification or identification purposes in applications based on reference images in identity or similar documents and traveller or visa databases;
• data quality maintenance for biometric data captured by/for verification or identification applications;
• data authenticity maintenance for biometric data captured by/for verification or identification ap-plications.
This document addresses the following aspects which are specific for biometric data capturing:
• biometric data quality and interoperability assurance;
• data authenticity assurance;
• morphing and other presentation attacks and biometric data injection attacks;
• accessibility and usability;
• recognition algorithms and their evaluation;
• privacy and data protection;
• optimal process design.
The following aspects are out of scope:
• other aspects of IT security;
• data capturing for ID document enrolment purposes, e.g. passport or ID card enrolment.
- Technical specification30 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document establishes requirements on implementations that quantify how a face image’s properties conform with those of canonical face images, for example those specified in ISO/IEC 39794-5:2019, Clause D.1, for three use-cases: 1) collection of reference samples for ID documents; 2) sample system enrolment; and 3) probes for instantaneous response. This document also establishes terms and definitions for quantifying face image quality and specifies methods for quantifying the quality of face images. This document does not establish requirements on: — assessing the quality of pairs or sequences of images; NOTE This document establishes requirements for software that inspects exactly one image. This document does not establish requirements for software that compares two or more images (such as biometric recognition). However, the computations of this document can be applied separately to each image in a pair or sequence. — assessing the quality of 3D captures; — encodings of face image quality data; — performance evaluation of face image quality assessment algorithms. The use cases within scope of this document primarily address the assessment of images from data capture subjects who consent to processing of their biometric data, or for whom biometric capture is operationally authorized.
- Standard63 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies the abstract data model for breeder document data and the specific encodings of this abstract data model used in the CEN breeder document framework.
The abstract data model is a semantic description of the birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificate data, independently from their specific encoding. This abstract data model is extensible for further standardized and proprietary data of birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificates as well as for other types of breeder documents.
This abstract data model is technology agnostic, i.e. it is applicable for paper-based, server-based, and hardware-based breeder documents as well as further breeder document designs and technologies.
The specific encodings of this abstract data model comprise the encodings to be used for the machine readable technologies specified in part 3 of the framework as well as the encoding of human readable breeder document data. These encodings are used in the birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificate profiles specified in part 4 of the framework.
- Technical specification25 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Standard15 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document defines test methods which are specific to proximity cards and objects, proximity coupling devices and proximity extended devices, defined in ISO/IEC 14443-1, ISO/IEC 14443-2, ISO/IEC 14443-3 and ISO/IEC 14443-4. NOTE Test methods defined in this document are intended to be performed separately. A given proximity card or object, proximity coupling device or proximity extended device, is not required to pass through all the tests sequentially. The conformance test plan defined in Annex O specifies the list of tests required for each part of the ISO/IEC 14443 series.
- Standard240 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides recommendations and requirements for the design, development, use and maintenance of biometric identification systems involving passive capture subjects, including pre- and post-deployment evaluation. While the emphasis is on surveillance systems, this document is also applicable to other types of biometric identification systems involving passive capture subjects, regardless of biometric characteristic or sensing technology. This includes systems involving passive capture of subjects where some capture subjects enrolled voluntarily. This document does not apply to biometric verification systems and biometric identification systems only involving capture subjects deliberately taking part in the capture. This document does not define specific services, platforms or tools.
- Standard30 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides guidance on usage of biometrics in breeder documents, in particular regarding
- encoding of biometric reference data;
- data quality maintenance for biometric reference data;
- data authenticity maintenance for biometric reference data; and
- privacy preservation of biometric reference data.
This document addresses advantages and disadvantages of biometric modes, in particular regarding
- verification performance;
- privacy impact;
- feasibility of biometric acquisition considering the age of the capture subjects;
- limits of validity and need for updating biometric reference data.
The following aspects are out of scope:
- format and structure of breeder documents;
- general security aspects, which are covered in CEN/TS 17489-1 [1].
- Technical report18 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document provides an overview on:
- Definitions on Biometric Data Injection Attack,
- Biometric Data Injection Attack use case on main biometric system hardware for enrolment and verification,
- Injection Attack Instruments on systems using one or several biometric modalities.
This document provides guidance on:
- System for the detection of Injection Attack Instruments (defined in 3.12),
- Appropriate mitigation risk of Injection Attack Instruments,
- Creation of test plan for the evaluation of Injection Attack Detection system (defined in 3.9).
If presentation attacks testing is out of scope of this document, note that these two characteristics are in the scope of this document:
- Presentation Attack Detection systems which can be used as injection attack instrument defence mechanism and/or injection attack method defence mechanism. Yet, no presentation attack testing will be performed by the laboratory to be compliant with this document (out of scope).
- Bona Fide Presentation testing in order to test the ability of the Target Of Evaluation to correctly classify legitimate users.
The following aspects are out of scope:
- Presentation Attack testing (as they are covered in ISO/IEC 30107 standards),
- Biometric attacks which are not classified as Type 2 attacks (see Figure 1),
- Evaluation of implementation of cryptographic mechanisms like secure elements,
- Injection Attack Instruments rejected due to quality issues.
- Technical specification37 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document specifies the abstract data model for breeder document data and the specific encodings of this abstract data model used in the CEN breeder document framework.
The abstract data model is a semantic description of the birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificate data, independently from their specific encoding. This abstract data model is extensible for further standardized and proprietary data of birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificates as well as for other types of breeder documents.
This abstract data model is technology agnostic, i.e. it is applicable for paper-based, server-based, and hardware-based breeder documents as well as further breeder document designs and technologies.
The specific encodings of this abstract data model comprise the encodings to be used for the machine readable technologies specified in part 3 of the framework as well as the encoding of human readable breeder document data. These encodings are used in the birth, marriage / partnership, and death certificate profiles specified in part 4 of the framework.
- Technical specification25 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document provides descriptions and analyses of current practices on multimodal and other multibiometric fusion, including (as appropriate) references to more detailed descriptions. This document contains descriptions and explanations of high-level multibiometric concepts to aid in the explanation of multibiometric fusion approaches including: multi-characteristic-type, multi-instance, multi-sensorial, multialgorithmic, decision-level and score-level logic.
- Technical report22 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document establishes requirements for the development of biometric solutions for verification and identification processes for secure access without physical contact with any device at any time. The solutions acquire biometric characteristics that are captured while the data subjects are in motion to verify or identify the individuals requiring access, thus controlling access using contactless biometrics.
- Technical specification15 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides an overview on:
- Definitions on Biometric Data Injection Attack,
- Biometric Data Injection Attack use case on main biometric system hardware for enrolment and verification,
- Injection Attack Instruments on systems using one or several biometric modalities.
This document provides guidance on:
- System for the detection of Injection Attack Instruments (defined in 3.12),
- Appropriate mitigation risk of Injection Attack Instruments,
- Creation of test plan for the evaluation of Injection Attack Detection system (defined in 3.9).
If presentation attacks testing is out of scope of this document, note that these two characteristics are in the scope of this document:
- Presentation Attack Detection systems which can be used as injection attack instrument defence mechanism and/or injection attack method defence mechanism. Yet, no presentation attack testing will be performed by the laboratory to be compliant with this document (out of scope).
- Bona Fide Presentation testing in order to test the ability of the Target Of Evaluation to correctly classify legitimate users.
The following aspects are out of scope:
- Presentation Attack testing (as they are covered in ISO/IEC 30107 standards),
- Biometric attacks which are not classified as Type 2 attacks (see Figure 1),
- Evaluation of implementation of cryptographic mechanisms like secure elements,
- Injection Attack Instruments rejected due to quality issues.
- Technical specification37 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document describes potential applications of biometrics in identity management systems used for medical and healthcare purposes. It provides feedback from healthcare practitioners on the advantages, disadvantages, risks and priority of implementing certain use cases of healthcare with biometrics. For those use cases, information related to the selection of biometric type and associated measures related to security and privacy protection is provided to system designers. The document concentrates on aspects of the subject which apply to the good management of healthcare services for patients who need monitoring, treatment and care in hospitals, clinics or at home, but can be incapacitated. It does not cover the measurement and interpretation of symptoms and biological data for the purposes of medical treatment or research. The document is intended to be useful for the management of public and private healthcare systems anywhere in the world, and to commercial providers of identity management services and equipment. It is also potentially relevant to regulatory stakeholders addressing issues of privacy and legality, and the assessment of potential vulnerabilities in biometrics and identity management systems applied in the healthcare sector.
- Technical specification25 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies test methods for testing conformity of a mobile driving licence (mDL) or an mDL reader to ISO/IEC 18013-5. This document specifies test methods for: — mDL on its interface to an mDL reader; — mDL reader on its interface to an mDL; — mDL reader on its (optional) interface to an issuing authority infrastructure. Test cases for an issuing authority infrastructure on its interface to an mDL reader are not included in this document. Test cases for the use of OIDC by an mDL reader on its interface to an issuing authority infrastructure are not included in this document. This document only provides test cases for the use of WebAPI on this interface. This document only addresses the functional behaviour of an implementation under test (IUT) on its interface(s) in scope. It does not address: — the internal implementation of an IUT, such as a secure area in an mDL; — any functional requirements to an IUT not specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5, for example, requirements of a particular issuing authority; — non-functional aspects of the IUT, nor IUT interfaces not listed above, such as the interface from an issuing authority infrastructure to an mDL, used to provision mDL data.
- Technical specification58 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies data objects and encoding rules of generic eID-Systems in terms of building blocks for mobile document system infrastructures, and standardizes generic data models for data exchanges between mdoc apps and verification applications. This document is applicable to entities involved in specifying, architecting, designing, testing, maintaining, administering, and operating a mobile eID-System in parts or as a whole.
- Technical specification24 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies considerations that can be of use to implementers and developers that elect to participate in work around updates to ISO/IEC TS 18013-7. These considerations are intended to support the improvements, to maximize backward compatibility and to, at minimum, maintain the security and privacy properties already embodied in ISO/IEC TS 18013-7.
- Technical report3 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document augments the capabilities of the mobile driving licence (mDL) standardized in ISO/IEC 18013-5 with the following additional functionality: — presentation of a mobile driving licence to a reader over the internet.
- Technical specification39 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document establishes requirements for estimating and reporting on performance variations observed when cohorts belonging to different demographic groups engage with biometric enrolment and recognition systems. In this context, performance refers to failure-to-enrol rate, failure-to-acquire rate, shifts in comparison score, recognition error rates, and aspects of response and processing time (throughput). This document is applicable to the following: — demographic group membership; — using phenotypic measures; — reporting on tests; — stating statistical uncertainty estimates; — operational thresholds settings; — equitability; — procurement agency activities. This document also provides terms and definitions to be used when reporting performance variation across demographic groups. This document is applicable to: — technology evaluations of algorithms, subsystems and systems; — scenario evaluations of systems; — operational evaluations of fielded systems. Application of this document does not require detailed knowledge of a system’s algorithms but it does require specific knowledge of the demographic characteristics for the population of interest.
- Standard25 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
ISO/IEC 29794-4:2017 establishes - terms and definitions for quantifying finger image quality, - methods used to quantify the quality of finger images, and - standardized encoding of finger image quality, for finger images at 196,85 px/cm spatial sampling rate scanned or captured using optical sensors with capture dimension (width, height) of at least 1,27 cm × 1,651 cm.
- Standard60 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides guidance on usage of biometrics in breeder documents, in particular regarding
- encoding of biometric reference data;
- data quality maintenance for biometric reference data;
- data authenticity maintenance for biometric reference data; and
- privacy preservation of biometric reference data.
This document addresses advantages and disadvantages of biometric modes, in particular regarding
- verification performance;
- privacy impact;
- feasibility of biometric acquisition considering the age of the capture subjects;
- limits of validity and need for updating biometric reference data.
The following aspects are out of scope:
- format and structure of breeder documents;
- general security aspects, which are covered in CEN/TS 17489-1 [1].
- Technical report18 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 61406-2:2024 complements IEC 61406-1 by providing additional requirements for those cases where data elements are encoded within the Structured Identification Link string with standardized syntax and semantics.
In addition, this document covers cases where the uniqueness relates to product types/models or lots/batches. The default assumption is that the Identification Link identifies unique objects such as unique serialized products, assets, persons or packages, unless otherwise identified.
- Standard39 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document defines: — dimensions of a type ID-1 Biometric System-on-Card (BSoC) and type ID-T BSoC; — position and capture area of the biometric capture device according to the needs of the biometric modality; — minimum requirements to a BSoC with respect to: — mechanical durability; and — human-machine interface and ergonomics. This document is not applicable to other on-card devices such as an electronic display or a keypad.
- Standard14 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 61406-2:2024 complements IEC 61406-1 by providing additional requirements for those cases where data elements are encoded within the Structured Identification Link string with standardized syntax and semantics. In addition, this document covers cases where the uniqueness relates to product types/models or lots/batches. The default assumption is that the Identification Link identifies unique objects such as unique serialized products, assets, persons or packages, unless otherwise identified.
- Standard39 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document describes the history and purpose of biometrics, the various biometric technologies in general use today (for example, fingerprint recognition, face recognition and iris recognition) and the architecture of the systems and the system processes that allow automated recognition using those technologies. It provides information on the application of biometrics in various business domains, such as border management, law enforcement and driver licencing. It also provides information on the societal and jurisdictional considerations that are typically taken into account in biometric systems. Additionally, this document provides guidance on the use of the International Standards that underpin the use of biometric recognition systems.
- Standard44 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides requirements for a biometric comparison methodology suitable for the on-card environment. In particular, it establishes the work-sharing on-card biometric comparison techniques that require an intensity exceeding the capabilities of integrated circuit cards (ICCs). This document does not establish — architectures of biometric comparison using an ICC, — on-card biometric comparison, both in sensor-off-card systems and as part of biometric system-on-card, — security policies for on-card biometric comparison, — requirements for off-card biometric comparison, — requirements for biometric system-on-card (defined in the ISO/IEC 17839 series), or — modality-specific requirements for storage and comparison.
- Standard4 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document provides requirements and general principles and specifications for a biometric comparison methodology suitable for the on-card environment. This document establishes — architectures of biometric comparison using an ICC, — on-card biometric comparison, both in sensor-off-card systems and as part of biometric system-on-card, and — security policies for on-card biometric comparison. This document does not establish — requirements for off-card biometric comparison, — requirements for biometric system-on-card (defined in the ISO/IEC 17839 series), — work-sharing on-card biometric comparison (defined in ISO/IEC 24787-2), or — modality-specific requirements for storage and comparison.
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This document establishes the following items for any or all biometric sample types as necessary: — terms and definitions that are useful in the specification and use of quality measures; — purpose and interpretation of biometric quality scores; — motivation for developing biometric sample datasets for the purpose of quality score normalization; — format for exchange of quality assessment algorithm results; — methods for aggregation of quality scores; — methods for evaluating the efficiency of quality assessment algorithms. The following are outside the scope of this document: — specification of minimum requirements for sample, module, or system quality scores; — standardization of quality assessment algorithms; — assessment of utility of biometric samples or references for human examiners.
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IEC 61406-2:2024 complements IEC 61406-1 by providing additional requirements for those cases where data elements are encoded within the Structured Identification Link string with standardized syntax and semantics.
In addition, this document covers cases where the uniqueness relates to product types/models or lots/batches. The default assumption is that the Identification Link identifies unique objects such as unique serialized products, assets, persons or packages, unless otherwise identified.
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This document specifies cryptographic functions of the drone/unmanned aircraft system (UAS) security module. The drone/UAS security module is a security device that serves as a container for the drone/UAS pilot license, drone/UAS operator license, and other personal identification. It provides storage space for storing optional elements and has the capability of cryptographic functions including integrity validation, authentication and data encryption.
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This Technical Report provides an overview of the current deployment of biometric systems within Europe. It addresses the challenges that are being faced, in order to detect the current needs for improving the specifications for the implementation and deployment of biometric systems. This Technical Report considers all kind of deployments, from border control to ad-hoc services. As most of the deployed systems are based on the use of fingerprints or face recognition, this Technical Report will focus on these two biometric modalities, from the system integrator and interoperability points of view.
Identity documents, in terms of production, structure, interoperability, etc., are out of the scope of this TR. The TR is focused on the performance at system level.
The current European legislative initiatives around this topic (e.g., Entry/Exit System, framework for interoperability between EU information systems, etc.) need a robust framework study about the availability of standard technologies to improve interoperability in biometric products around the European Union.
By showing these needs, a set of recommendations for future standardization works is provided.
From a methodological perspective, the report gathers information of different entities with this classification:
- Capture/enrolment of biometrics including the quality assurance and the generation of feature or biometric models from the images.
- Best practices and guidelines to use biometrics in Europe.
- Data Quality environment using biometrics in European networks.
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This document applies to situations in which such data is recorded on or transported by patient healthcards compliant with the physical dimensions of ID-1 cards defined by ISO/IEC 7810.
This document specifies the basic structure of the data contained within the medication data object, but does not specify or mandate particular data sets for storage on devices.
The purpose of this document is for cards to provide information to other health professionals and to the patient or its non-professional caregiver.
It can also be used to carry a new prescription from the prescriber to the dispenser/pharmacy in the design of its sets.
Medication data include the following four components:
— medication notes: additional information related to medication and the safe use of medicines by the patient such as medication history, sensitivities and allergies;
— medication prescriptions: to carry a new prescription from the prescriber to the dispenser/pharmacy;
— medication dispensed: the records of medications dispensed for the patient;
— medication references: pointers to other systems that contain information that makes up medication prescription and the authority to dispense.
The following topics are beyond the scope of this document:
— physical or logical solutions for the practical functioning of particular types of data cards;
— how the message is processed further “downstream” of the interface between two systems;
— the form which the data takes for use outside the data card, or the way in which such data is visibly represented on the data card or elsewhere.
NOTE Not only does the definition of “medicinal products” differ from country to country, but also the same name can relate to entirely different products in some countries. Therefore, it is important to consider the safety of the patient when the card is used across borders.
This document describes and defines the Medication data objects used within or referenced by patient-held health data cards using UML, plain text and Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN.1).
This document does not describe nor define the common objects defined within ISO 21549-2.
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The ISO/IEC 30137 series is applicable to the use of biometrics in VSSs (also known as closed circuit television or CCTV systems) for a number of scenarios, including real-time operation against watchlists and in post-event analysis of video data. In most cases, the biometric mode of choice will be face recognition, but this document also provides guidance for other modalities, such as gait recognition. This document: — defines the key terms for use in the specification of biometric technologies in a VSS, including metrics for defining performance; — provides guidance on the selection of camera types, placement of cameras, image specification, etc., for the operation of a biometric recognition capability in conjunction with a VSS; — provides guidance on the composition of the gallery (or watchlist) against which facial images from the VSS are compared, including the selection of appropriate images of sufficient quality, and the size of the gallery in relation to performance requirements; — makes recommendations on data formats for facial images and other relevant information (including metadata) obtained from video footage, used in watchlist images, or from observations made by human operators; — establishes general principles for supporting the operator of the VSS, including user interfaces and processes to ensure efficient and effective operation, and highlights the need to have suitably trained personnel; — highlights the need for robust governance processes to provide assurance that the implemented security, privacy and personal data protection measures specific to the use of biometric technologies with a VSS (e.g. internationally recognizable signage) are fit for purpose, and that societal considerations are reflected in the deployed system. This document also provides information on related recognition and detection tasks in a VSS, such as: — estimation of crowd densities; — determination of patterns of movement of individuals; — identification of individuals appearing in more than one camera; — use of other biometric modalities such as gait or iris; — use of specialized software to infer attributes of individuals, e.g. estimation of gender and age; — interfaces to another related functionality, e.g. video analytics to measure queue lengths or to provide alerts for abandoned baggage.
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This document describes and defines the basic structure of the identification data objects held on healthcare data cards, but it does not specify particular data sets for storage on devices.
This document does not apply to the detailed functions and mechanisms of the following services (although its structures can accommodate suitable data objects elsewhere specified):
— security functions and related services that are likely to be specified by users for data cards depending on their specific application, e.g. confidentiality protection, data integrity protection and authentication of persons and devices related to these functions;
— access control services;
— the initialization and issuing process (which begins the operating lifetime of an individual data card, and by which the data card is prepared for the data to be subsequently communicated to it according to this document).
Therefore, this document does not cover:
— physical or logical solutions for the practical functioning of particular types of data card;
— the forms that data take for use outside the data card, or the way in which such data are visibly represented on the data card or elsewhere.
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This document is a profile that specifies requirements for testing biometric presentation attack detection (PAD) mechanisms on mobile devices with local biometric recognition and on biometric modules integrated into mobile devices. The profile lists requirements from ISO/IEC 30107-3 that are specific to mobile devices. It also establishes requirements that are not present in ISO/IEC 30107-3. For each requirement, the profile defines an “Approach in PAD Tests for Mobile Devices”. For some requirements, numerical values or ranges are provided in the form of best practices. This profile is applicable to mobile devices that operate as closed systems with no access to internal results, including mobile devices with local biometric recognition as well as biometric modules for mobile devices. This document is not applicable to mobile devices with solely remote biometric recognition. The attacks considered in this document take place at the capture device during the presentation and collection of biometric characteristics. Any other attacks are outside the scope of this document.
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