CEN/TR 14383-7:2009

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-november-2009
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Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part 7: Design and
management of public transport facilities
Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt und Gebäudeplanung - Teil 7: Planung
und Management von Anlagen und Einrichtungen des öffentlichen Personennahverkehrs
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception des bâtiments - Partie 7:
Conception et gestion des espaces dédiés au transport public
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TR 14383-7:2009
ICS:
03.220.01 Transport na splošno Transport in general
13.310 Varstvo pred kriminalom Protection against crime
91.020 Prostorsko planiranje. Physical planning. Town
Urbanizem planning
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

TECHNICAL REPORT
CEN/TR 14383-7
RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHER BERICHT
July 2009
ICS 03.220.01; 13.310; 91.040.20
English Version
Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part
7: Design and management of public transport facilities
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und
des bâtiments - Partie 7: Conception et gestion des Gebäudeplanung - Teil 7: Planung und Management von
espaces dédiés au transport public Anlagen und Einrichtungen des öffentlichen
Personennahverkehrs
This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 21 March 2009. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 325.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2009 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 14383-7:2009: E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

Contents Page
Foreword .3
Introduction .4
1 Scope .7
2 Normative references .7
3 Terms and definitions .7
4 Design and management processes for transport-dedicated areas .7
4.1 General .7
4.2 Organization of the contracting authority and the stakeholders .8
4.2.1 General .8
4.2.2 Contracting authorities .8
4.2.3 Contract partners .8
4.2.4 Specialists who bring their expertise to the project .8
4.2.5 Customers, commercial partners and staff .9
4.2.6 The project managers .9
4.3 The core stages of a project .9
4.4 Creating a new location . 10
4.5 Location management . 10
5 Analysis, actions and assessment: question-asking methods . 10
5.1 General . 10
5.2 Crime, antisocial behaviour and fear of crime . 11
5.3 General principles on security-related questioning . 11
5.4 Design strategies . 12
5.4.1 General . 12
5.4.2 Anticipation on location management. 12
5.4.3 Space usage . 12
5.4.4 Legibility . 14
5.4.5 Location compatibility with security measures . 15
5.5 Management strategies . 15
5.5.1 General . 15
5.5.2 Responsive location management policy . 15
5.5.3 Regulating space usage . 16
5.5.4 Legibility and orientation . 17
5.5.5 Location compatibility with security measures . 17
Annex A (informative) Types of crime against people (including staff) and buildings . 19
A.1 Offence against person . 19
A.1.1 Assault with physical violence (without theft) . 19
A.1.2 Assault without physical violence (without theft) . 19
A.1.3 Sexual assault . 19
A.1.4 Theft against person . 19
A.2 Assault against companies, properties and plants . 19
A.2.1 Assault against properties and plants by damage and /or destruction . 19
A.2.2 Theft against companies . 19
A.2.3 Threat . 20
A.2.4 Trespass . 20
A.3 Other offence relative to public transport rules and antisocial behaviour . 20
A.3.1 Behavioural offence . 20
A.3.2 Traffic offence . 20
Annex B (informative) Summary of the process . 21

Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 14383-7:2009) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention
of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The status of Technical Report (CEN/TR) was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare
experiences and to harmonise procedures.
This Technical Report is one of a series for the “Prevention of crime by urban planning and building design”,
that consists of the following Parts:
 Part 1: Definition of specific terms
 Part 2: Urban planning
 Part 3: Dwellings
 Part 4: Shops and offices
 Part 5: Petrol stations
 Part 8: Protection of buildings and sites against criminal attacks with vehicles
Introduction
The public transport system has to meet the citizen’s mobility needs under the most advantageous economic,
social and environmental conditions for the community. It is an instrumental factor in national unity and
solidarity, national defence, economic and social development, in balanced strategic land use planning and
sustainable development, and in driving international exchanges, particularly towards European partners.
In meeting these needs, it is equally important to comply with objectives on minimising or reducing risks,
accidents, nuisance (particularly sound pollution), pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions by implementing
measures designed to reinforce the application of the legal right of all public transport users, including
disabled or handicapped people, to move freely and to choose the means they wish to use, and to exercise
their legal entitlement to transport their property themselves or to commission the services of a company or
institution of their choice to do so.
The success if this kind of service hinges on:
− the strength of social ties in public transport areas, which are in fact a community resource (respect for
others, for community values, voluntary sharing of community resources, respect for rule of law, etc.);
− the efficiency of the production facilities (integrity of the technical and financial assets, the physical
protection provided by the transport, a regular and reliable quality service, etc.), which are by definition a
source of regular contact with the population and are thus embedded in the urban fabric.
Any unruly, aggressive or assaultive behaviour will by its very nature have a negative knock-on effect on
public trust in the service. More generally, public trust can be eroded by an environment left to degrade (dirt,
poor lighting, graffiti, etc.) and by repeated unruliness. The erosion of public trust can foster avoidance
behaviour from customers (drop in traffic) and staff (strikes, skipping ticket checks, etc.) alike. Crime often
also targets the production facilities (equipment, buildings, infrastructure, information systems, etc.), thus
causing financial losses, equipment breakdowns, service delays, malfunctioning customer service devices, or
even generating traffic safety risks (accidents, derailments, etc.).
Hence, crime, whether carried out or perceived, threatens the fundamental policy issues of any public
transport system, i.e. public trust and efficient production facilities, with significant economic and social
consequences.
Crime problems require action, on the individuals involved, on the organizations and structures that manage
community activity, and on the locations housing the activity.
Pre-planning for, or “designing-out”, crime and disorder often adds little or no additional cost to the project, but
can save large amounts of money in the long run. Returning to a location to “retro-fit” crime prevention
measures is always more expensive than designing the location properly in the first place.
All public transport systems in industrialized countries face these same issues. There are numerous examples
of where public transport companies have undertaken crime prevention actions, many of which have entailed
heavy funding. We can now draw upon a significant pool of experience and best practices. Indeed, public
transport facilities are fast developing towards intermodal services and expanding out to European scale. This
has prompted the need to draft a set of risk analysis procedures complete with guidelines.
Developments in problem orientation
Recent trends in mass transport project characteristic have to be taken in account, before identifying
appropriate recommendations for the design, the management and the planning process.
Below, four trends in mass transport project characteristic are discerned.
Trend 1: More and more huge and multifunctional mass public transport projects
Railway stations in big cities and at airports, in order to fulfil their desired function as “multiservice areas” often
become “mega structures” where all kind of functions are integrated: transport, shopping and leisure. The
transport function is just one of the other present functions of the whole structure.
In order to emphasize its huge size and importance, architects of these mega structures often propose
impressive, challenging forms and constructions. These structures become regional or even national icons.
However, to structures of this kind, special points of attention apply for security design and management.
These points are:
− their huge size make people feel get lost soon if the concept of the structure is complex, the orientation
on passenger routes towards the goal is limited, and the signage is incomplete;
− different functions in the same structure mean different proprietors and different managers; if the
demarcation of the areas (what belongs to whom) is not clearly defined, if managers use different rules for the
public, different security systems (every function its own surveillants and CCTV system) the management of
the total structure will not as effective as it could be and should be;
− big structures are more different to connect to their environment properly; there is a greater danger that
they become and remain isolated, internally oriented blocks, which often make an unfriendly impression to
their direct environment. From the outside, you mainly see blind walls and huge car parks;
− different functions mean different opening times when it is not possible to close off the not-in-service parts
(for example the shopping mall in the late evening) and offer alternative routes to transport passengers, the
latter will have to walk long routes through scary, unsurveilled corridors
− different functions have different peak hours; but if more functions have a peak at the same time of the
day and all corridors have to be designed on this maximum flow of visitors, these corridors will be far too big
for the silent hours and the visitors will feel lost there.
This document give recommendations for not only regular and simple transport facilities, but also
recommendations that take into account the specific design and management attention points as mentioned
for the complex multifunctional mega structures.
Trend 2 : More and more underground structures
In former times, underground structures formed a minority and existed only in huge metropoles. Nowadays,
underground projects become more and more common.
In existing urban areas, only very little space is available for expansion of buildings and railway facilities. The
space required is only available under the surface. Engineers and architects have to look more and more to
underground solutions. Underground structures, however, are critical to safety. This applies to fire safety
(escape routes are longer and carry on more in the vertical dimension) but also to security. Especially the
perception of security is at stake: “the deeper, the more sensitive” one could say. To reach the same level of
security perception in underground structures, designers have to perform twice as well as in normal buildings.
Trend 3 : More and more stations and transfer points in the outskirts of town
With the expansion of the public transportation networks in urban areas (train, metro, tramway, buses) more
and more stations, not only simple metro stations but also important regional transfer points, are being located
in the outskirts of town.
These are often unpleasant areas: in the middle of an industrial zone and/or near a noisy highway.
Designers have to look to special solutions to make people feel comfortable in these kind of places, when
walking to and from the station/bus station, or when waiting for the connecting train/bus.

Trend 4 : More and more separation between public and private space
Historically, the spaces devoted to transport facilities have been open spaces: train and bus stations, regular
lines for road, maritime stations, etc. In practice, all those facilities that did not have the role of international
border were of an open and public character. Today, some of these spaces still belong to the field of the
public space, but the standard becomes more and more to establish two distinguished spaces: the public area
and the private area. The public area serves as an area of access for the control (public space) and the
private area serves as ‘safe area’. From a point of view of formal surveillance and effective support in
emergency cases, this separation may be a favourable condition. The separation between public and private
areas has, however, also negative consequences.
The most important consequence is the limitation of the individual rights of the users. Only allowed persons (in
the possession of the travel ticket) have right to the restricted safe areas. Thus, these private spaces are not
contributing any more to ‘urban integration’ (= all spaces for all functions for all people). From this former
consequence, another consequence, very relevant for the crime prevention subject, follows: persons without
allowance to enter the private zones, all have to be concentrated in the (little) space remaining public. In
addition, a third consequence, related to the former: not all functions, like restaurants and shops, are suitable
for both types of space (the private or the public). That means: separation of functions has to be made. This
separation may lead to a lower degree of ‘urban integration’.
The fact that spaces become more and more separated, influences the design of safe transport facilities
related to the prevention of conventional criminality:
− It supposes the restriction of use of the restricted private space
− It means the transport facilities spaces are seen as spaces of risk
− It adds technical and technological problems in the design
− It introduces new security questions and new challenges for the pursuit of the same degree of ‘urban
integration’ as before the separation.
Trend 5 : More and more concerns for poorly staffed or unstaffed stations in the countryside
In the period the European train systems were built (1850-1900), trains were the only available long distance
travelling facility. Every small village along the line was connected and got its own staffed station.
For several reasons the transport authorities have reduced or totally taken away the staff. The buildings are
relatively expensive to maintain and may also be neglected by the transport authorities who are inclined to
concentrate on maintenance and problem solving in bigger stations.
Result is often an increase in feeling of insecurity of the passengers (still) using these small stations.
Worst-case scenario is the total closing down of the station due to further reduction of the passenger amount
and/or increasing maintenance cost.
This document deals with measures to be taken in order to guarantee the long-term maintenance and security
of small countryside stations. This is especially important in respect of the revival of the regional train systems,
which can be seen already in some of the European countries.
The growing concerns push the European countries to different solutions depending on the political context:
restaffing, CCTV, alarm system, etc.

1 Scope
This document sets out guidelines to the methods of assessing the exogenous and endogenous risks of crime
and/or perceived insecurity and proposes measures designed to preclude or reduce these risks. The objective
is to strengthen the overall security of land-based public transport, such as : bus stop, bus station, train
station, train stops/halts, modal interchanges, open access underground and tramway systems, controlled
access underground and tramway systems, taxi ranks, station car parks, river bus terminals, bicycle parking
facilities.
This document does not cover terrorism or the revenue vehicles themselves. It covers the areas that are
dedicated to mass transit and open to the public.
The core document focus is on the security of passenger spaces, in respect also of security aspects.
The document applies to existing public transport facilities as well as new public transport facilities.
2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.
EN 14383-1:2006 — Prevention of crime — Urban planning and building design — Part 1: Definition of
specific terms.
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in EN 14383-1:2006 apply.
4 Design and management processes for transport-dedicated areas
4.1 General
This section proposes that:
− the crime prevention input in transport related projects should follow a conventional “project management”
approach, with a system of stages in which all effective stakeholders are identified and engaged;
− creating or refitting a transport location, and day-to-day transport facility management are considered as
two separate projects, where the former leads on to the latter. However, it is essential that wherever possible
details of the proposed usage and operational methods to be adopted at the location are made available
during the planning stage. In this way, advice from crime prevention specialists is likely to be more effective
when the transport location becomes operational.
Safety planning and safety assurance for a transport-dedicated area can be run through in conventional
project management stages. However, the stakeholders involved, the questions posed and the available
policy resources will be different according to whether the project is location design or location management.
This is why the document goes on to cover the safety assurance process separately for these two project
formats.
The present section details the stakeholders (4.2) and stages (4.3 and 4.4) of the respective processes, while
the following sections focus on the content of these processes, i.e. diagnostic methods and guidelines in
terms of an action plan.
The term design is understood to cover intelligence work, projecting ahead and producing the structures,
functions and use patterns of the location to be created or, in the case of an existing location, revised. The
design of transport-dedicated spaces has as much overlap with 'refurbishment' or re-engineering (location
features, definition or redefinition of location uses, etc.) as with 'new' projects or projects that need to be
created (meeting new expectations, advance planning for other uses, etc.).
The term location management is understood to cover location operation, maintenance and leverage and
generally all the functions concerning the life and use of the location.
These two mutually complementary approaches together form a project sequence. Sustainable location
design is centered on understanding how the location will evolve over time in order to ensure simple, efficient
location management. In turn, location management provides the feedback necessary to fuel ideas for the
developments that will need to be planned.
4.2 Organization of the contracting authority and the stakeholders
4.2.1 General
Transport-dedicated locations are complex environments, which means that project sponsorship and the
stakeholders need to be defined from the outset.
Generally speaking, the contracting authority expresses functional needs (or surveys their customers on the
subject), releases resources, defines the project and selects project managers. The contracting authority also
monitors that there is consistency and continuity in the choices and decisions made. The contracting authority
shall be set up and organised so that it can fulfil these responsibilities, and shall be clearly identified by all
partners in the operation. It may be led to evolve to fit project needs and (or) if the stakeholders so required,
at some stage between the early project drafting phases (preliminary study, business analysis) and the initial
project definition.
The topic dealt with here, namely the security of public transport facilities, is a multidimensional issue that
raises a number of complex problems. It therefore ties in multidisciplinary cross-sector approaches, and with
this kind of project that requires end-to-end partnership-based work efforts, one of the conditions for success
is system consistency throughout. Indeed, these approaches enrol a large number of parties. The families of
stakeholders are listed below.
4.2.2 Contracting authorities
The redesign of a transport location will inevitably involve a range of participants. This will include (but not be
limited to) the principal contracting authority (national, regional or local government or transport authority),
along with private or public sector contributors (including commercial partners and operators).
4.2.3 Contract partners
The main partners involved in the decision process are:
− the decision-maker, who is the contract partners;
− national, regional or local government authorities, private or public sector business, including commercial
partners and private or public transport operators.
These partners shall meet as a project group, where each partner has a specific role.
4.2.4 Specialists who bring their expertise to the project
One of the keys to the success of the project relies on the confrontation of several approaches and
professional expertise. It is therefore important to build around the project a multi-disciplinary team of
specialists able to address the both the legal, technical, economic, architectural issues and the political,
psycho-sociological and social issues.
On the other hand, it may be difficult to manage a large team of experts over the planning of a project of
moderate size and complexity.
The project leader should thus analyze beforehand the specific implications and stakes of the project in order
to build the team of experts around a minimal core group including at least the responsible body, the
customers, the designers and the security specialists, intervention forces (e.g. firefighters, medical emergency
services, etc.)
For large projects or complex locations (e.g. difficult social environment), the project leader is strongly advised
...