Standard Specification for Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Parachutes

SCOPE
1.1 This specification covers the design and manufacture requirements for deployable parachutes of small unmanned aircraft (sUA). This specification defines the design, fabrication, and test requirements of installable, deployable parachute recovery systems (PRS) that are designed to be integrated into an sUA to lessen the impact energy of the system should the sUA fail to sustain normal, stable safe flight.  
1.1.1 Compliance with this specification is intended to support an applicant in obtaining permission from a civil aviation authority (CAA) to fly an sUA over people.  
1.1.2 Parachute recovery systems that do not include all the minimum requirements of Section 5 and Section 6 of this specification shall not be referred to as meeting this specification.  
1.2 This specification is applicable to the design, construction, and test of deployable parachute recovery systems that may be incorporated into the system or structure, or both, of sUA seeking civil aviation authority (CAA) approval in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation.  
1.3 Units—The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are mathematical conversions to SI units that are provided for information only and are not considered standard.  
1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety, health, and environmental practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.  
1.5 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
14-Jun-2022
Drafting Committee
F38.01 - Airworthiness

Relations

Effective Date
01-Sep-2019
Effective Date
15-Feb-2016
Effective Date
15-Jan-2014
Effective Date
15-Jan-2014

Overview

ASTM F3322-22: Standard Specification for Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Parachutes establishes comprehensive requirements for the design, manufacture, and testing of parachute recovery systems (PRS) used on small unmanned aircraft (sUA). The primary goal is to ensure safety by reducing the impact energy in the event of a failure, supporting operators and manufacturers in obtaining approval from civil aviation authorities (CAA) to conduct flights over people.

This standard outlines essential criteria for the integration, construction, functionality, and ongoing maintenance of deployable sUAS parachute systems, facilitating both regulatory compliance and increased operational safety.

Key Topics

  • Design & Fabrication Requirements: Defines how parachute systems should be designed and fabricated for optimal integration and performance within the sUA platform.
  • Testing Protocols: Specifies comprehensive testing standards, including preflight/postflight inspections, deployment success criteria, and system resilience under various failure scenarios.
  • Documentation & Traceability: Requires that all key PRS components are serialized, tracked, and supported by detailed documentation to ensure traceability and accountability throughout the lifecycle.
  • Operational Limitations: Sets forth the environmental and technical limitations for safe parachute operation, including wind speed, temperature, altitude, and approved payload configurations.
  • Safety Features: Mandates the inclusion of features such as independent power sources, autonomous triggering systems (ATS), and flight termination systems (FTS) to minimize risks to people and property.
  • Maintenance & Inspection: Establishes guidelines for regular inspection, maintenance, and repacking to promote continued operational safety and compliance.

Applications

This ASTM parachute specification is especially relevant for:

  • sUAS Manufacturers & Integrators: Provides clear requirements and best practices for designing and implementing PRS in new or existing drone platforms.
  • Commercial Drone Operators: Supports compliance for operations over people or critical infrastructure by aligning parachute systems with regulatory requirements.
  • Regulatory Submissions: Facilitates preparation of documentation needed to obtain TSO, flight certificates, waivers, or permits from civil aviation authorities.
  • Safety-Critical Missions: Enhances the safety of drone missions in urban, industrial, or public environments, reducing the potential risk during emergency landings.
  • Quality Assurance Programs: Forms a foundation for internal quality control, supplier audits, and third-party verification of drone parachute systems.

Related Standards

Companies and organizations using or specifying ASTM F3322-22 should also consider these related standards for a comprehensive approach to sUAS airworthiness and operational safety:

  • ASTM F2908: Specification for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Manual (UFM) for a UAS.
  • ASTM F2909: Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Lightweight UAS.
  • ASTM F3003: Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS).
  • ASTM F3364: Practice for Independent Audit Program for Unmanned Aircraft Operators.
  • 14 CFR Part 107: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations for small unmanned aircraft systems.
  • MIL-STD-1629A: Procedures for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (where applicable to components of the parachute system).

These standards, when used in conjunction, contribute to a robust framework for ensuring the design, quality, and regulatory compliance of both the aircraft and its safety systems.


Keywords: ASTM F3322-22, sUAS parachute recovery system, small unmanned aircraft standards, drone parachute requirements, CAA compliance, drone safety standards, deployable parachute, drone airworthiness, PRS integration, drone flight over people.

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Frequently Asked Questions

ASTM F3322-22 is a technical specification published by ASTM International. Its full title is "Standard Specification for Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Parachutes". This standard covers: SCOPE 1.1 This specification covers the design and manufacture requirements for deployable parachutes of small unmanned aircraft (sUA). This specification defines the design, fabrication, and test requirements of installable, deployable parachute recovery systems (PRS) that are designed to be integrated into an sUA to lessen the impact energy of the system should the sUA fail to sustain normal, stable safe flight. 1.1.1 Compliance with this specification is intended to support an applicant in obtaining permission from a civil aviation authority (CAA) to fly an sUA over people. 1.1.2 Parachute recovery systems that do not include all the minimum requirements of Section 5 and Section 6 of this specification shall not be referred to as meeting this specification. 1.2 This specification is applicable to the design, construction, and test of deployable parachute recovery systems that may be incorporated into the system or structure, or both, of sUA seeking civil aviation authority (CAA) approval in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation. 1.3 Units—The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are mathematical conversions to SI units that are provided for information only and are not considered standard. 1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety, health, and environmental practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. 1.5 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.

SCOPE 1.1 This specification covers the design and manufacture requirements for deployable parachutes of small unmanned aircraft (sUA). This specification defines the design, fabrication, and test requirements of installable, deployable parachute recovery systems (PRS) that are designed to be integrated into an sUA to lessen the impact energy of the system should the sUA fail to sustain normal, stable safe flight. 1.1.1 Compliance with this specification is intended to support an applicant in obtaining permission from a civil aviation authority (CAA) to fly an sUA over people. 1.1.2 Parachute recovery systems that do not include all the minimum requirements of Section 5 and Section 6 of this specification shall not be referred to as meeting this specification. 1.2 This specification is applicable to the design, construction, and test of deployable parachute recovery systems that may be incorporated into the system or structure, or both, of sUA seeking civil aviation authority (CAA) approval in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation. 1.3 Units—The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are mathematical conversions to SI units that are provided for information only and are not considered standard. 1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety, health, and environmental practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. 1.5 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.

ASTM F3322-22 is classified under the following ICS (International Classification for Standards) categories: 49.025.60 - Textiles. The ICS classification helps identify the subject area and facilitates finding related standards.

ASTM F3322-22 has the following relationships with other standards: It is inter standard links to ASTM F2909-19, ASTM F2908-16, ASTM F2908-14, ASTM F2909-14. Understanding these relationships helps ensure you are using the most current and applicable version of the standard.

ASTM F3322-22 is available in PDF format for immediate download after purchase. The document can be added to your cart and obtained through the secure checkout process. Digital delivery ensures instant access to the complete standard document.

Standards Content (Sample)


This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
Designation:F3322 −22
Standard Specification for
Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Parachutes
This standard is issued under the fixed designation F3322; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope 2. Referenced Documents
1.1 This specification covers the design and manufacture 2.1 ASTM Standards:
requirements for deployable parachutes of small unmanned F2908 Specification for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Manual
aircraft (sUA). This specification defines the design, (UFM) for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
fabrication, and test requirements of installable, deployable F2909 Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Light-
parachute recovery systems (PRS) that are designed to be weight Unmanned Aircraft Systems
integrated into an sUA to lessen the impact energy of the F3003 Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Un-
system should the sUAfail to sustain normal, stable safe flight. manned Aircraft System (sUAS)
1.1.1 Compliance with this specification is intended to F3364 Practice for Independent Audit Program for Un-
support an applicant in obtaining permission from a civil manned Aircraft Operators
aviation authority (CAA) to fly an sUA over people.
2.2 Federal Standards:
1.1.2 Parachute recovery systems that do not include all the
14 CFR Part 107 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
minimum requirements of Section 5 and Section 6 of this
MIL-STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure
specification shall not be referred to as meeting this specifica-
Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
tion.
3. Terminology
1.2 This specification is applicable to the design,
construction, and test of deployable parachute recovery sys- 3.1 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
tems that may be incorporated into the system or structure, or
3.1.1 abstain, v—before starting a particular test method,
both, of sUA seeking civil aviation authority (CAA) approval the unmanned aircraft (UA) manufacturer or designated opera-
in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight
tor shall choose to enter the test or decline to perform the test
certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like docu- and any abstention shall be granted before the test begins.
mentation. 3.1.1.1 Discussion—The test form shall be clearly marked
as such, indicating that the manufacturer acknowledges the
1.3 Units—The values stated in inch-pound units are to be
omission of the performance data while the test method was
regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are
available at the test time.
mathematical conversions to SI units that are provided for
3.1.2 acceptable entanglement, n—interaction of the para-
information only and are not considered standard.
chute canopy, risers, or lines with the sUAthat does not reduce
1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the
the effectiveness of the parachute recovery system.
safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appro- 3.1.3 applicant/proponent, n—person or organization re-
sponsible for seeking the approval to operate and operating a
priate safety, health, and environmental practices and deter-
mine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. small unmanned aircraft (sUA).
3.1.3.1 Discussion—The applicant/proponent may be one of
1.5 This international standard was developed in accor-
dance with internationally recognized principles on standard- the following entities: manufacturer, operator, or original
equipment manufacturer (OEM).
ization established in the Decision on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recom-
3.1.4 autonomous triggering system, ATS, n—device or
mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical
components independent from any flight critical system of the
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
1 2
This specification is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee F38 on For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
UnmannedAircraftSystemsandisthedirectresponsibilityofSubcommitteeF38.01 contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM
on Airworthiness. Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
Current edition approved June 15, 2022. Published July 2022. Originally the ASTM website.
approved in 2018. Last previous edition approved in 2018 as F3322–18. DOI: Available from U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO), 732 N. Capitol St.,
10.1520/F3322-22. NW, Washington, DC 20401, http://www.gpo.gov.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
F3322−22
sUA that will detect and initiate parachute deployment upon 3.1.12 descent rate, n—final steady state rate of decreasing
detection of a critical failure of the sUA in flight. vertical altitude of the sUA at sea level conditions.
3.1.12.1 Discussion—It shall be noted that horizontal speed
3.1.5 ballistic ejection, n—ejection of the parachute recov-
and the calculation of horizontal impact should be considered
ery system into free air with the use of springs, pyrotechnic gas
based on the worst-case scenario but for the purpose of this
generators, or the use of inert gases or compressed air.
specification it is not used as a determining factor. The
3.1.5.1 Discussion—Hazardous materials laws (for air
horizontal impact can be influenced by the construction or
transportation, for proper handling, storage, etc.) may apply
deconstruction of the combination of wind or the pendulum
when using hazardous materials such as pyrotechnic devices,
effect, or both, both of which are greatly affected by the
cold gas generators, or compressed CO for a ballistic para-
direction of travel and orientation of the sUAin relation to the
chute.
PRS during deployment.
3.1.6 bill of materials, BOM, n—specific list of all compo-
3.1.13 energy measurement, n—Kinetic energy is calculated
nents defined by this specification that make up the parachute
as: KE = 1/2 mv . Whereas “m” equals sUAs takeoff mass and
recovery system.
“v” equals descent speed.
3.1.7 canopy filling/inflamation time, n—time from canopy
3.1.14 entanglement, n—unintended physical interaction of
(line) stretch to the first full open canopy position.
the parachute risers, lines, or canopy with the sUA during a
3.1.8 critical number motor failure, CNMF, n—number of
PRS deployment that compromises the functionality and effec-
motors required to remove an sUA from stable flight. The
tiveness of the PRS.
subject motors shall be adjacent to one another in cases in
3.1.15 fail box/orange wire, n—an independent system from
which more than one motor is being tested. In the case of an
the sUA that is not a normal component of the sUA during
odd number of motors, the number of “failure” motors shall be
operation and is used for introducing the various failure modes
rounded up to the next even number. If the integrator can
independently of the sUA, the PRS, and its FTS and ATS and
demonstrate that the sUA being tested with the PRS needs to
MTD of the PRS.
have thrust cut from more motors than defined in the example
3.1.16 false deployment, n—an unintentional deployment of
below in order to remove the aircraft from stable flight it is up
to the integrator to define the number of motors to reach the PRS by the ATS during stable flight.
CNMF. Refer to Section 6 for testing.
3.1.17 flight-critical system, n—system that, should it fail,
Examples of CNMF will cause the sUA to no longer maintain stable flight.
Examples of
4 Rotor 6 Rotor 8 Rotor
3.1.18 flight envelope, n—range of combinations of speed,
CNMF
Immediate Loss
direction of travel, altitude, roll, angle of attack, and so forth
Immediate Loss Immediate Loss
of Thrust on
of Thrust on one of Thrust on two
within which the sUA is able to be safely operated without
three adjacent
motor adjacent motors
exceeding its structural design load factor.
motors
3.1.19 flight termination system, FTS, n—device or compo-
3.1.9 critical number motor failure plus one, CNMF + 1,
n—number of motors required to remove an sUA from stable nents that will disable the propulsion system of the sUA.
flight plus one additional adjacent motor. Refer to Section 6 for
3.1.20 forebody, n—object connected to the parachute
testing.
canopy and accompanying drogue chutes, if applicable.
Examples of CNMF + 1
3.1.20.1 Discussion—The forebody shall be considered the
Examples of
4 Rotor 6 Rotor 8 Rotor sUA with any additional attachments (that is, parachute de-
CNMF + 1
ployment system, payload, electronics, propellers, and so
Immediate Loss
Immediate Loss Immediate Loss
of Thrust on
forth).
of Thrust on two of Thrust on four
three adjacent
adjacent motors adjacent motors
motors 3.1.21 full power failure/full power cut, n—sudden and
immediate loss of power function to the critical flight systems
3.1.10 declaration of compliance, n—mechanism for thor-
of the sUAsuch as motors, electronic speed controllers (ESC),
ough self-assessment and validation of compliance with this
and avionics.
specificationinwhichspecificreportingortestingprotocolsare
3.1.21.1 Discussion—Throttling down the motors is not the
not listed.
same as a full power cut in a test as the former gives the
3.1.10.1 Discussion—The integrator will keep documenta-
operator control and advance knowledge that loss of stable
tion to support any declarations of compliance. The following
flight is going to occur.
information shall be retained on file at the manufacturer’s
facility for as long as systems remain in service: (1) technical 3.1.22 inspection, n—technique based on visual or dimen-
data that defines the parachute recovery system’s installation in sional examination of an element; inspection is generally
the aircraft; (2) technical data that define the components, nondestructive and typically includes the use of sight, hearing,
assemblies, and fabrication of the system; and (3) engineering smell,touch,andtaste,simplephysicalmanipulation,mechani-
analyses and test data prepared for qualification with this cal and electrical gauging, and measurement.
specification.
3.1.23 integrator, n—entity responsible for the integration
3.1.11 demonstration, n—a practical exhibition of how the of all the various parachute components, the sUA, and the
PRS or components, or both, work. testing of the entire system.
F3322−22
3.1.23.1 Discussion—The integrator could also be the para- 3.1.32 parachute, n—any aerodynamic deceleration device
chute recovery system manufacturer or the sUA manufacturer. designedtoslowthedescentofsUAwhennotunderstablesafe
The integrator may also work with other named third parties to flight.
delegate various tasks. Tasks the integrator has are: (1)
3.1.33 parachute manual (PM), n—the minimum material
selection and integration of the parachute components, para-
provided from the manufacturer to the operator/owner of the
chutedeploymentdevice,andanyotherelectronicsneeded;(2)
sUA that discusses topics such as instructions and procedures
installation of the parachute recovery system on the sUA and
for inspection, maintenance, re-pack along with any PRS
working with the sUA manufacturer to integrate the system
limitations in regard to operational or environmental limita-
properly; (3) pulling together all the various component
tions and approved payloads.
specifications to be sure they meet the requirements called out
3.1.34 parachute maximum dynamic shock load, MDSL,
in this specification; and (4) performing and coordinating with
n—maximum opening shock load force the parachute is rated
a test facility all the various flight tests called out in this
for under any condition.
specification.
3.1.35 parachute recovery system, PRS, n—summation of
3.1.24 manual triggering device, MTD, n—device or com-
the components of a parachute recovery system that work to
ponent that can initiate deployment of the parachute recovery
reduce descent velocity.
systematthediscretionoftheremotepilotincommand(RPIC)
3.1.36 pilot chute, n—smaller parachute than the main
independent of the ATS.
canopy that is connected to the main canopy.
3.1.25 manufacturer, n—entity responsible for the creation
3.1.36.1 Discussion—The main purpose of the pilot chute is
of the various components of the parachute recovery system.
to be deployed before the main canopy to pull the main canopy
3.1.25.1 Discussion—These can consist of the parachute,
out of a container into free air to produce full canopy.The need
parachute ejection device, flight termination system, parachute
for a pilot chute is determined by either the parachute manu-
deployment controller, or other components. There can be any
facturer or the parachute recovery system integrator.
number of manufacturers.
3.1.37 Remote-Pilot-In-Command (RPIC)—thepersonwho:
3.1.26 mean time between critical failure, MTBCF, n—there
(1) has final authority and responsibility for the operation and
are two criteria for reliability that are relevant for parachute
safety of the flight; (2) has been designated as pilot-in-
recovery systems: (1) MTBCF for positive activation—the
command before or during the flight.
probability that the parachute recovery system including its
3.1.38 “shall” versus “should” versus “may”, v—useofthe
ATSandFTSwillopentheparachuteincaseofemergencyand
word “shall” implies that a procedure or statement is manda-
(2) MTBCF for false positive event—the probability that the
tory and shall be followed to comply with this specification,
parachute recovery system will deploy unintentionally.
“should” implies recommended, and “may” implies optional at
3.1.27 minimum deployable altitude, MDA, n—difference in
the discretion of the supplier, manufacturer, or operator.
altitude from the point of failure to the point of stabilized sUA
3.1.38.1 Discussion—Since “shall” statements are
descent under parachute; is airframe/speed dependent and
requirements, they include sufficient detail needed to define
certified through testing in Section 6.
compliance (for example, threshold values, test methods,
3.1.28 minimum flight altitude, MFA, n—minimum altitude
oversight, and reference to other standards). “Should” state-
above ground level of the sUA in cases in which a parachute
ments are provided as guidance towards the overall goal of
recovery system is used for flight over people. The MFA shall
improving safety and could include only subjective statements.
be defined per the results of testing in Section 6.
“Should” statements also represent parameters that could be
used in safety evaluations and could lead to development of
3.1.29 opening shock load, n—this is the maximum load
future requirements. “May” statements are provided to clarify
force under any conditions that occurs on the main parachute
acceptability of a specific item or practice and offer options for
during the process of the parachute opening.
satisfying requirements.
3.1.30 operational environment, v—all allowed environ-
3.1.39 snatch force, n—when using a pilot chute for para-
mental conditions (temperature operating range, humidity
chute deployment, snatch force is the highest peak force
range, dust and other debris tolerances, and so forth) that the
needed to extract the parachute and risers from the holding
manufacturer will define in the environmental envelope for
canister/bay to deploy full canopy.
operation/use for the product life of the parachute recovery
system.
3.1.40 stabilized descent, n—the integrator shall determine
the fall speed of the sUAwhen the PRS has deployed based on
3.1.31 packing/parachute packing, v—process of folding
the sUA maximum takeoff weight. The descent is considered
and condensing the main canopy, connected cables, and other
stabilized when the vertical descent rate is within 10 % of the
attached mechanisms to fit in a design compartment of the
integrator’s specified fall speed at sea level conditions.
aircraft to hold the parachute.
3.1.31.1 Discussion—The packing process shall be done in 3.1.41 supplier, n—any entity engaged in the design and
production of components used on an sUA.
such a fashion to allow for full deployment and acceptable
opening behavior in the event of parachute deployment. 3.1.41.1 Discussion—When the supplier is not the
Parachutepackingproceduresshallbedefinedbytheparachute manufacturer,thesuppliercanonlyensurethatthecomponents
manufacturer in the PM. comply with accepted consensus standards.
F3322−22
3.1.42 testing task or task, n—activities well defined and and measurement techniques that shall be provided by the
specified according to an identified metric or an identified set manufacturer of the parachute recovery system to the operator/
of metrics for testing sUA parachute recovery systems and
owner of the sUA.
operators to perform for the sUA’s parachute recovery system
5.1.6 The manufacturer shall define in the PM the process
capabilities to be evaluated.
for preflight/post flight inspection of the parachute recovery
system.
3.1.43 trial, n—numberusedtoidentifyatestwithinaseries
of repetitions that an sUA is required to succeed in a standard
5.2 Installation Design—Each integrator of an sUAdeploy-
verification method for the results to meet the required statis-
able parachute recovery system shall provide a general PM
tical significance.
with documentation described in 3.1.33. The PM shall be used
for all instructions and procedures for installation, arming,
4. Applicability
disarming, and maintenance of the parachute recovery system.
4.1 In this specification, designers and manufacturers of The parachute recovery system shall be pre-packed and re-
deployable parachutes for sUAshall find design references and packed per 5.2.1.
criteria to use in designing, manufacturing parachutes, and
5.2.1 Parachute recovery systems approved for flight over
parachute deploying systems with the intent of lessening the
people will be provided to the operator with the parachute
impactenergyofthesUAintheinstancethatthesUAisunable
pre-packed by the integrator or an authorized and approved
to sustain operational flight.
third party. The integrator will approve third-party parachute
packers. The integrator will specify both in the PM and on the
5. Design Standards for Deployable Parachutes
parachute recovery system the service life of the packed
parachute before it needs to be recertified, repacked, or
5.1 General:
replaced.
5.1.1 This section provides design criteria for deployable
5.2.2 All components of the parachute recovery system
parachutes of sUA with the expectation that parachutes de-
shall be protected against loss of strength in service as a result
signedusingthisspecificationaredesignedtolessentheimpact
of normal wear, operational environment, corrosion,
energy of the descending system for the purpose of enabling
contamination, and abrasion.
operations over people and persons not intended as part of the
flight operations of the sUA.
5.3 Parachute Component Design Safety Factors:
5.1.1.1 The designers or manufacturers, or both, of the
5.3.1 The parachute manufacturer shall provide a specifica-
parachute recovery system may design the parachute recovery
tion called maximum dynamic shock load (MDSL). The
system to orient the sUA so that the sUA under canopy-aided
MDSL is used to qualify a parachute as being suitable for use
descentisinanorientationthatexposestheleastrisktopersons
at a given calculated opening shock load for the sUA and the
on the ground.
given maximum deployment velocity. This is determined by a
5.1.2 The manufacturer may produce a parachute recovery
combination of measured and rated material strengths and
system for an sUA that is limited to the number of deploy-
measured strength of key canopy components such as the
ments. If the parachute recovery system is designed for a
bridle, canopy shroud line connection break strength, and other
limited number of uses per a designated flight envelope, the
critical parachute components in line from the bridle up to the
manufacturer shall define the number of deployments before
canopy. The component having the lowest aggregated break
replacement is required in the PM.
strength of the parachute is the measured break strength. This
5.1.2.1 Key components of the parachute recovery system
value is then divided by two to give MDSL. The resulting
shallbeserializedbythemanufacturer,sotheycanbetracedto
MDSL will be ⁄2 the measured strength of the parachute.
the end user (operator). Key information that should be kept by
Appendix X1 shows an example of an MDSLcalculation done
the manufacturer may include date of manufacture, product
with OSCALC.
revision, and any quality assurance (QA) inspection informa-
5.3.2 For main canopy parachutes, the parachute
tion. Key components include: parachute, deployment device,
manufacturer-specified MDSL shall meet or exceed the calcu-
deployment controller (electronics, FTS, ATS, MTD, and so
lated expected maximum opening force calculated for a given
forth), and other key components. Records shall be kept on
parachute recovery system as integrated into an sUA at
customer or integrator sales and the serial numbers of the
maximum deployment velocity.
components delivered.
5.3.3 For all main risers (shock cords) of the parachute
5.1.3 The parachute shall be sized to reduce residual energy
package, the design factor shall be based on the nominal
of the sUA and may be combined with other energy reduction
strength of the materials used and the calculated maximum
components such as airbags (including any attachments, para-
opening forces per 5.3.1.
chute deployment system, payload, electronics, propellers, and
so forth) with an attached parachute recovery system.
5.4 Main Canopy Design—The main canopy dimensions
5.1.4 The PRS shall be designed to deploy successfully
and rate of descent shall be calculated using the following
withinthefullflightperformanceenvelopeofthesUAoncethe
variables and equations:
sUA reaches its minimum deployable altitude.
5.4.1 Main Canopy Nominal Diameter Equation:
5.1.5 This specification provides the minimum testing cri-
teria for the installed performance according to the methods D 5 = S ⁄π ft or m (1)
~~ ! !~ !
O O
F3322−22
where: 5.7.1 The opening of the parachute housing should be
designed in such a way that, upon deployment, the parachute
D = nominal diameter of the parachute that is calculated by
O
recovery system and connected risers shall not be caught on,
the total canopy surface area; S ; and
O
damaged, or cut by blemishes, burrs, sharp edges, and any
S = total canopy surface area but shall not include vent
O
other defects that may cause interferences with proper
holes and other openings seen in the canopy that are a
2 2
deployment/inflation of the parachute recovery system. The
part of the design (ft or m ).
parachute, risers or attachment lines, and lead lines shall be
5.4.2 Main Canopy Rate of Descent Calculation (at Sea
protected from abrasion during ejection/release and shall not
Level):
entangle into the sUA in a manner that would render the
parachute and sUA unable to descend at the defined descent
vc 5 = 2W ⁄ S C D ρ ft/s or m/s (2)
@~ ! ~ ~ ! !#~ !
O T O O O
rate.
where:
NOTE 1—Although use of a FTS is required, there may be residual
WT = total measured weight of the sUAS and parachute
energy in recently killed motors that leave spinning propellers or “pin-
assembly (that is, parachute, risers, deployment
wheeling” propellers that create a hazard for parachute canopies and
system, holding canister, and so forth) (pounds or
risers. Care shall be taken to avoid propellers or other control surfaces of
Newtons);
the sUA.
C(D ) = parachute drag coefficient related to S ; measures
O O
5.7.2 The main canopy may be extracted with the aid of a
the efficiency of drag force produced by the main
pilot chute. If the main canopy is designed to be deployed with
canopy area; and
3 3 the aid of a pilot chute, then:
ρ = sea level air density (slugs/ft or kg/m ). For
O
5.7.2.1 The pilot chute shall be held to the same design
calculation,thenominalvaluetobeusedis0.00238
3 3
criteria seen in 5.3 – 5.7.
slg/ft (1.225 kg/m ) at sea level and 59 °F (15 °C).
5.7.2.2 The pilot chute shall be designed not to interfere
5.4.3 Main Canopy Rate of Descent Calculation (at a
with the deployment process of the main canopy once the
Specific Altitude):
canopy has been extracted into free air unless the manufacturer
has specified other intended uses for the pilot chute during
vc 5 = 2 W ⁄ S C D ρ ·1= ρ ⁄ ρ 0 ft/s or m/s (3)
@~ ! ~ ~ ! !# ~ !~ !
T O O O
descent.
where:
5.7.3 The main canopy may be extracted with the aid of a
ρ = air density at a specific altitude; the air density measured
ballistic ejection system. If the main canopy is designed to be
above an altitude of 1000 ft (305 m) MSLshall be taken
deployed with the aid of a ballistic system, then:
into account when calculating the descent velocity of an
5.7.3.1 The ballistic ejection system shall be controlled in
sUA in parachute-assisted return to earth (slugs/ft or
3 such a manner as to not create a fire on the sUA.
kg/m ).
5.7.3.2 The ballistic ejection system electronic signaling
5.5 Glide Slope and Vertical Velocity:
shall not interfere with the main electronic system of the sUA
5.5.1 The integrator may design the parachute deployment
and shall not be affected by the expected operating environ-
system to glide the sUA through descent.
ment (high-intensity irradiated field (HIRF) environment con-
5.5.2 For parachute operation using passive fill of the
siderations).
canopy (non-high energy active inflation), the parachute manu-
5.7.3.3 If the parachute risers and harnesses connect to the
facturer should specify the filling distance of the canopy.
sUA via the parachute ejection device, then the material
Optional filling time can be provided and is rated at a specified
strength of the ballistic ejection system attachment to the sUA
velocity at canopy opening. These can be determined using the
and attachment points of the ballistic system shall be designed
filling distance of parachute canopy equation:
to be two times greater than the maximum opening shock load
sf 5nD (4) as calculated in 5.3.1. In any case, the connection strength of
P
theparachuteejectiondevicetothesUAshallbestrongenough
where:
to accommodate the recoil force of the ballistic system when
sf = filling distance of the parachute canopy;
discharging the parachute and risers.
D = parachute diameter at full inflation (ft or m); and
P
5.7.4 The integrator shall supply placards or labels for the
n = dimensionless fill constant defined by the type of main
exterior such that these placards or labels can be seen by first
parachute canopy design used.
responders at accident or incident sites.
5.6 Risers/Attachment Lines:
5.7.4.1 Scope—These placards or labels are to provide a
5.6.1 The riser(s) attachment point shall be placed on the
visual warning to rescue or other personnel at the scene of an
sUA so not to interfere with engine or propellers during
accident or incident in the event that the sUA involved is
in-flight operations or during deployment of the parachute.
equipped with a ballistically deployed emergency parachute
5.6.2 The risers and other attachment lines shall not induce
recovery system.
friction due to poor parachute packing to the rest of the canopy
5.7.4.2 Installation and Size of Placard or Label—The
system during opening of the canopy.
parachute integrator shall permanently install the warning
5.7 Designs and Precautionary Remarks for Deployment of placards or labels on the parachute recovery system in a
Main Canopy: manner as specified below. For placards or labels that are
F3322−22
in the PM that states when the motors are running and a critical failure
required to be attached to the airframe, the sUAoperator holds
occurs when the sUAis on the ground or on take-off/landing, that theATS
responsibility for visual placement of placards specified by this
will allow the PRS to deploy which may present a ballistic/projectile
specification.
hazard to personnel if they are in close proximity to the sUAduring those
(1) Danger Placard—A triangular placard or label in
phases of flight.
which each side is at least 80 % the diameter of the largest
5.8.3.1 In the event of a deployment the PRS shall record
circle encompassed by the largest projected surface shape of
the descent rate (descent rate shall be recorded as time vs
the PRS.
altitude) and the method of deployment (ATS or MTD).
(2) The danger placard shall be placed adjacent to the
5.8.4 To prevent propellers from injuring people on the
parachuteegresspointforenclosedsUAinwhichtheparachute
ground after a deployment the PRS shall also include a Flight
recovery system may not be visible from the exterior. The
Termination System (FTS).
integrator may include a QR code that leads to a web page that
5.8.4.1 The FTS shall activate at the time of or before
includes all the relevant information.
parachute deployment is initiated.
(3) The danger placard shall have the word “DANGER”
5.8.4.2 The FTS shall be either an electronic device that
and provide contact information for rescue personnel to seek
help from the manufacturer and the type of ballistic deploy- interrupts the power, control signals to the motors, or a
ment device (see proposed placard in Appendix X2). mechanical device that physically stops the motors/propellers.
(4) A danger placard shall be applied directly on any
5.8.5 The parachute recovery system shall be equipped with
ballistic extraction device on aircraft that do not have the
a manual triggering device (MTD) if the PRS is intended to be
parachute recovery system inside the sUA airframe. This
used on an sUA that is manually operated by an RPIC.
placard or label will warn rescue personnel in the event the
5.8.5.1 The manufacturer may include a downlink system
ballistic device becomes separated from the sUA airframe at
that allows the parachute recovery system to communicate to
impact. Appendix X2 contains an example of such labeling.
the RPIC.
5.7.4.3 Label Size and Color—All placards or labels shall
5.8.5.2 If the PRS is intended for use on an autonomous
follow the coloration methods described in the following.
aircraft, the applicant may choose to omit the inclusion of an
(1) Danger Placard—Danger placards or labels shall be
MTD and it’s respective functionality.
printed with a red border with white letters (or reverse type)
5.9 Maintenance and Continued Operational Safety Expec-
and a descriptive graphic element (see proposed placard in
tations:
Appendix X2).
(2) Identification Placard—Identificationplacardsorlabels 5.9.1 Parachute Manual—The manufacturer shall provide a
shall be printed with a black border with orange letters parachute manual when providing the parachute recovery
surrounding an orange center with a descriptive graphic system to the operator of the sUA. The minimum contents of
element (see proposed placard in Appendix X2). the parachute manual shall include the following topics here in
(3) External placards or labels shall be printed using a this specification.
reflective background material for enhanced visibility in low
5.9.1.1 Installation Procedures—The manufacturer shall
light or obscured conditions.
prescribe instructions for the proper installation of the para-
chute recovery system for each UAS make/model. These
5.8 Electronic System Considerations:
instructions should follow the structure and content prescribed
5.8.1 All parachute recovery system electronics shall have a
for UFM Supplements by Specification F2908.
dedicated power source, such as a battery or capacitor, inde-
5.9.2 Inspection Intervals and Criteria:
pendent from the sUA’s power supply(s). During a failure, this
power source shall have enough energy to supply properly all
5.9.2.1 Intervals—The manufacturer shall define in the PM
connected electronics throughout a failure detection and de- the number or schedule or both of periodic inspection intervals
scent. The independent power source may harvest charging
that the owner/operator shall inspect the installed parachute
power from the sUA. recovery system.
5.8.2 All parachute recovery system electronics shall not
5.9.2.2 Criteria—The manufacturer may offer inspection
interfere with operations of the sUA during normal flight or
services to the operator for the defined inspection intervals. If
cause a false deployment. The parachute recovery system
the manufacturer allows for the operator/owner of the para-
electronics may override the sUA’s systems in the case that the
chute recovery system to do their own inspections, the inspec-
sUA can no longer sustain safe flight.
tioncriteriashallbedefinedinthePMwithfullexplanationsof
5.8.3 The parachute recovery system shall be equipped with
how to recognize defects that could hinder normal operation.
an autonomous triggering system (ATS) independent from any
5.9.3 Maintenance Procedures:
flight critical system of the sUA to deploy the parachute
5.9.3.1 Defects—If the operator/owner of the parachute is to
recovery system when a malfunction of the sUA is detected.
do their own inspections of the system, the manufacturer shall
NOTE 2—TheATS can be integrated as part of the flight critical systems define maintenance procedures for the operator/owner to fix
of the sUA instead of being an independent system if the integrator can
common defects impeding operation. If a defect found by the
demonstrate that the level of the sUA’s system integrity is commensurate
operator/owner is not covered in the PM or is too extensive for
with industry standards recognized by the governing CAA for flight
the operator/owner to repair on their own, the manufacturer
critical systems.
shallprovideinformationinthePMonhowtheoperator/owner
NOTE 3—If the ATS does not have a physical or electronic safety to
prevent deployment while on the ground, then a warning shall be present may return the parachute recovery system to the manufacturer
F3322−22
for proper corrections or suggestions on following steps the 6.2.2 Facility—Givename(s)oflaboratoryortestsitewhere
operator/owner may take for a replacement parachute recovery the test is to be conducted.
system.
6.2.3 Location—Give name(s) of country, city, and state in
5.9.3.2 Repacking—For parachute recovery systems ap- which the test facility is located.
proved for flight over people the repacking method will be
6.2.4 Event/Sponsor—Give a description of the party re-
omitted from the PM and the manufacturer shall provide
sponsible for the test. If an event warrants the test, then a
direction to the operator/owner in the PM on how to send the
description of the event and purpose of test during the event
parachute or parachute recovery system, or both, properly to
shall be documented.
the manufacturer for repacking.
6.2.5 sUAS Make/Model—If the PRS is designed to work
5.9.3.3 Environmental Operating Limitations—Any envi-
with a single sUA model, the sUAS model identification
ronmental factors that are outside of the functional capabilities
name/number and manufacturer name shall be documented. If
ofthePRSshallbeclearlydefinedinthePM,includingbutnot
the PRS is designed to work with several sUA models, each
limited to: wind speed, temperature, humidity, altitude, and
sUA model identification name/number and associated manu-
precipitation.
facturer name shall be documented.The PRS shall be designed
(1) Altitude/environment considerations shall be incorpo-
per airframe and the integrator will list in the PM known
rated into the flight envelope of the PRS. Hot weather, high
configurations that the PRS is intended to work with. The
elevation, or heavy payload considerations, or combinations
integratormaylistinthePManyconfigurationsoftheairframe
thereof,shallbetakenintoaccountwhendefiningtheoperation
thatthePRSisknownnottoworkwith.APRScertifiedforone
limitations of the PRS and the manufacturer shall make these
type of sUA shall not be certified on another airframe without
considerations known in the PM.
proper testing as defined in this specification. If the proposed
5.9.3.4 Approved Payloads—The manufacturer shall list
aircraft is to be used for flight over people, then the PRS shall
approved payloads and mounting locations for those payloads.
meet all applicable standards for flight over uninvolved third
In addition, the manufacturer shall list boundaries for max and
parties.IfthePRSisdesignedtoworkwithasinglesUAmodel
minimum take-off weight.
or controller, or both, for manual triggering, the sUA model
5.9.4 Materials:
identification name/number and manufacturer name shall be
5.9.4.1 Fungus-proof Materials—Materials that are nutri-
documented. If the PRS is designed to work with several sUA
ents for fungi shall not be used where it is practical to avoid
modelsorcontrollers,orboth,formanualtriggering,eachsUA
them.Where such material is used and not hermetically sealed,
model or controller, or both, identification name/number and
they shall be treated with a fungicidal agent acceptable to the
associated manufacturer name shall be documented.
procuring activity; however, if they will be used in a hermeti-
6.2.6 Organization—Givethenameoftheorganizationwith
cally sealed enclosure, fungicidal treatment will not be neces-
which the operator is associated; it could be the manufacturer
sary.
of the PRS, manufacturer of the sUA, or the owner of the sUA.
Also, provide full contact information of the organization (that
6. Testing Standards of Deployable Parachutes
is, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and so forth).
6.2.7 Environment—Conditions, under which the test will
6.1 General:
be conducted, including the light level, temperature, humidity,
6.1.1 Testing Responsible Party—The responsible party for
pressure altitude, and, if outside, the wind conditions. The test
testing the sUA with the PRS is the integrator. As defined in
sponsor has the authority to specify these conditions.
3.1.23, the integrator could also be the parachute manufacturer,
6.2.8 Trial Number—Give the numerical sequence of the
operator, or the sUA manufacturer. The integrator can work
test being recorded. No trial number shall be reused in
with the parachute manufacturer and the sUA manufacturer to
subsequent trials of the same parachute/sUAS configuration. If
tailor a test plan that covers the required items in this section.
an sUA is tested for the first time, the trial number is 1 when
6.1.2 Examination of the Product—Each PRS shall be
the results are recorded. If the sUA is tested again, the trial
inspected by a designated representative of the Third Party
number is 2 when the results are recorded on a separate test
Testing Agency (TPTA) as defined in 6.3.1 to determine
form and so on for each subsequent trial. If the sUA is tested
compliance with the requirements specified herein with respect
with no results recorded, the trial number shall reflect a
to materials and markings that would satisfy safety require-
scenario in which “No Results Recorded” is documented and a
ments of this specification. A bill of materials (BOM) of the
description of why results were not recorded shall be provided,
individual components in the full PRS shall be provided to the
and testing can continue with the next sequential trial number.
TPTA. The PRS presented to the TPTA for testing shall be
wholly representative in materials, marking, construction and
6.3 Third-Party Testing Agency (TPTA):
operational functionality of the final product of the PRS.
6.3.1 Third-Party Testing Agency (TPTA)—The TPTA shall
6.2 Pre-Test Information Collection: be a third-party agency or CAA approved delegate that
6.2.1 Date and Time of Test—Give the testing date and time oversees testing per this specification and produces a report
at which the test was started and completed; the test methods, containing the documentation and results of testing. This party
when explicitly specified, can allow the tasks or repetitions to is responsible for instigating failure modes during testing and
be distributed into multiple days. In the instance that testing collecting test data. The TPTAwill provide the name or names
occurs over multiple days, the date and time of each test shall of individuals from the TPTA participating in the trails and
be recorded. testing locations used for testing.
F3322−22
NOTE 4—For a PRS that is compliant with this specification to be used
6.4.1.2 Any failure of the PRS during any of the ATS trials
as part of an application to obtain permission from a CAA to fly an sUA
requires a root cause analysis, appropriate design or procedural
over people in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight
changes to prevent reoccurrence, and subsequent restart of all
certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation, the
ATS trials in the testing matrix. This also applies to MTD
TPTA should be an entity that is recognized by the governing CAA in
which the operations are to take place. deployments that experience unacceptable entanglement.
6.3.1.1 Instigation of Failure Commands—In all failure 6.4.1.3 If the root cause analysis determines that a design
scenarios, the failure command for the sUAshall be concealed change is required, such as in the event of unacceptable
from the RPIC, therefore avoiding anticipation of the test. The entanglement,asubsequentrestartisrequiredofalltrialsinthe
PRS signal for deployment, whether it is via a manual
testing matrix from 0.
triggering device (MTD) or automatic (ATS), shall be con-
6.4.1.4 Testing shall be performed with five of the ten tests
ceived reactively to the instigated failure. In other words, the
being performed at the minimum takeoff weight (MinTOW)
sending of the deployment signal cannot be anticipatory to the
with the PRS and the remaining five tests being performed at
impending failure.
maximum takeoff weight (MaxTOW) with a manufacturer
approved payload configuration.
NOTE 5—Rigging of the failure can be performed by the PRS integrator
at the approval of the TPTA.
6.4.1.5 Unless otherwise specified, a minimum of two tests
6.3.1.2 Independence of Failure Modes from the PRS— by manual deployment (MTD) and tests by automatic deploy-
Instigation of failure modes for testing shall be done indepen- ment (ATS) for a total of ten tests of each failure scenario shall
dently of the sUA, the PRS, and its FTS and ATS via the use be conducted with no failure.
of a fail box or orange wire.
6.4.1.6 A properly simulated payload with correct CG may
6.3.2 TPTA Report—The integrator shall have the TPTA
be substituted for a real payload in the maximum weight tests.
produce a report on the results of the trials.
6.4.1.7 MTD deployments will have a minimum 2 s delay
6.3.3 Minimum Contents of the TPTA Report—The report
after the failure mode is initiated before the PRS is deployed.
produced by the TPTA shall clearly demonstrate the proven
This delay will be timed and can be accomplished by either a
functionality of the PRS and include but not be limited to, the
manual trigger or timed delay of the ATS.
bill of materials (BOM) for the PRS that was tested, the
6.4.1.8 If the applicant completes the MTD deployments
minimum deployable altitude rating, as calculated in 6.4.3.9;
with a timed delay of the ATS, these tests are considered ATS
the average rate of decent of the PRS, cumulative of all trials;
trials in the event of a failure of the PRS, and a subsequent
and the results of all trials performed and related testing
restart is required of all trials in the testing matrix from 0.
documentation pursuant to 6.3.4 and 6.4.
6.4.1.9 Exemptions to failure of a test.
6.3.4 Results by Videotaping—All trails shall be docu-
mented by means of a continuous video recording that covers 6.4.1.10 Human Error—If a failure of a test occurs, the
failure of the test will not count as a failure if the failure is
the aircraft takeoff, deployment of the PRS, and the landing
after deployment. found to be human error.
6.3.5 Commencement of Trial—The TPTA shall verbally
6.4.1.11 A root cause analysis must be conducted, and
declare the start of each test, and the time and date shall be
appropriate procedural changes to prevent reo
...


This document is not an ASTM standard and is intended only to provide the user of an ASTM standard an indication of what changes have been made to the previous version. Because
it may not be technically possible to adequately depict all changes accurately, ASTM recommends that users consult prior editions as appropriate. In all cases only the current version
of the standard as published by ASTM is to be considered the official document.
Designation: F3322 − 18 F3322 − 22
Standard Specification for
Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Parachutes
This standard is issued under the fixed designation F3322; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope
1.1 This specification covers the design and manufacture requirements for deployable parachutes of small unmanned aircraft
(sUA). This specification defines the design, fabrication, and test requirements of installable, deployable parachute recovery
systems (PRS) that are designed to be integrated into aan sUA to lessen the impact energy of the system should the sUA fail to
sustain normal, stable safe flight. Compliance with this specification is intended to support an applicant in obtaining permission
from a civil aviation authority (CAA) to fly a sUA over people.
1.1.1 Compliance with this specification is intended to support an applicant in obtaining permission from a civil aviation authority
(CAA) to fly an sUA over people.
1.1.2 Parachute recovery systems that do not include all the minimum requirements of Section 5 and Section 6 of this specification
shall not be referred to as meeting this specification.
1.2 This specification is applicable to the design, construction, and test of deployable parachute recovery systems that may be
incorporated into the system or structure, or both, of sUA seeking civil aviation authority (CAA) approval in the form of technical
standard orders (TSO), flight certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation.
1.3 Units—The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are
mathematical conversions to SI units that are provided for information only and are not considered standard.
1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility
of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety, health, and environmental practices and determine the applicability of
regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.5 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization
established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued
by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
2. Referenced Documents
2.1 ASTM Standards:
F2908 Specification for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Manual (UFM) for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
F2909 Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems
F3003 Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS)
This specification is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee F38.01 on
Airworthiness.
Current edition approved Sept. 1, 2018June 15, 2022. Published September 2018July 2022. Originally approved in 2018. Last previous edition approved in 2018 as
F3322–18. DOI: 10.1520/F3322-18.10.1520/F3322-22.
For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM Standards
volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on the ASTM website.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
F3322 − 22
F3364 Practice for Independent Audit Program for Unmanned Aircraft Operators
2.2 Federal Standards:
14 CFR Part 107 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
MIL-STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
3. Terminology
3.1 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
3.1.1 abstain, v—before starting a particular test method, the unmanned aircraft (UA) manufacturer or designated operator shall
choose to enter the test or decline to perform the test and any abstention shall be granted before the test begins.
3.1.1.1 Discussion—
The test form shall be clearly marked as such, indicating that the manufacturer acknowledges the omission of the performance data
while the test method was available at the test time.
3.1.2 acceptable entanglement, n—interaction of the parachute canopy, risers, or lines with the sUA that does not reduce the
effectiveness of the parachute recovery system.
3.1.3 applicant/proponent, n—person or organization responsible for seeking the approval to operate and operating a small
unmanned aircraft (sUA).
3.1.3.1 Discussion—
The applicant/proponent may be one of the following entities: manufacturer, operator, or original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
3.1.4 autonomous triggering system, ATS, n—device or components independent from any flight critical system of the sUA that
will detect and initiate parachute deployment upon detection of a critical failure of the sUA in flight.
3.1.5 ballistic ejection, n—ejection of the parachute recovery system into free air with the use of springs, pyrotechnic gas
generators, or the use of inert gases or compressed air.
3.1.5.1 Discussion—
Hazardous materials laws (for air transportation, for proper handling, storage, etc.) may apply when using hazardous materials such
as pyrotechnic devices, cold gas generators, or compressed CO for a ballistic parachute.
3.1.6 bill of materials, BOM, n—specific list of all components defined by this specification that make up the parachute recovery
system.
3.1.7 canopy filling/inflamation time, n—time from canopy (line) stretch to the first full open canopy position.
3.1.8 critical number motor failure, CNMF, n—number of motors required to remove aan sUA from stable flight. The subject
motors shall be adjacent to one another in cases in which more than one motor is being tested. In the case of an odd number of
motors, the number of “failure” motors shall be rounded up to the next even number. If the integrator can demonstrate that the sUA
being tested with the PRS needs to have thrust cut from more motors than defined in the example below in order to remove the
aircraft from stable flight it is up to the integrator to define the number of motors to reach CNMF. Refer to Section 6 for testing.
Examples of CNMF
Examples of CNMF 4 Rotor 6 Rotor 8 Rotor
Immediate Loss of Thrust on a Immediate Loss of Thrust on a Immediate Loss of Thrust on a
minimum of one or more motors minimum two adjacent motors minimum of three adjacent motors
Immediate Loss of Thrust on one Immediate Loss of Thrust on two Immediate Loss of Thrust on three
motor adjacent motors adjacent motors
3.1.9 critical number motor failure plus one, CNMF + 1, n—number of motors required to remove an sUA from stable flight plus
one additional adjacent motor. Refer to Section 6 for testing.
Available from U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Publishing Office (GPO), 732 N. Capitol St., NW, Washington, DC 20401-0001,
http://www.access.gpo.gov.20401, http://www.gpo.gov.
F3322 − 22
Examples of CNMF + 1
Examples of CNMF + 1 4 Rotor 6 Rotor 8 Rotor
Immediate Loss of Thrust on two Immediate Loss of Thrust on three Immediate Loss of Thrust on four
adjacent motors adjacent motors adjacent motors
3.1.10 declaration of compliance, n—mechanism for thorough self-assessment and validation of compliance with this
specification in which specific reporting or testing protocols are not listed.
3.1.10.1 Discussion—
The integrator will keep documentation to support any declarations of compliance. The following information shall be retained on
file at the manufacturer’s facility for as long as systems remain in service: (1) technical data that defines the parachute recovery
system’s installation in the aircraft; (2) technical data that define the components, assemblies, and fabrication of the system; and
(3) engineering analyses and test data prepared for qualification with this specification.
3.1.11 demonstration, n—a practical exhibition of how the PRS or components, or both, work.
3.1.12 descent rate, n—final steady state rate of decreasing vertical altitude of the sUA at sea level conditions.
3.1.12.1 Discussion—
It shall be noted that horizontal speed and the calculation of horizontal impact should be considered based on the worst-case
scenario but for the purpose of this specification it is not used as a determining factor. The horizontal impact can be influenced
by the construction or deconstruction of the combination of wind or the pendulum effect, or both, both of which are greatly affected
by the direction of travel and orientation of the sUA in relation to the PRS during deployment.
3.1.13 energy measurement, n—Kinetic energy is calculated as: KE = 1/2 mv . Whereas “m” equals sUAs takeoff mass and “v”
equals descent speed.
3.1.14 entanglement, n—unintended physical interaction of the parachute risers, lines, or canopy with the sUA during a PRS
deployment that compromises the functionality and effectiveness of the PRS.
3.1.15 fail box/orange wire, n—an independent system from the sUA that is not a normal component of the sUA during operation
and is used for introducing the various failure modes independently of the sUA, the PRS, and its FTS and ATS and MTD of the
PRS.
3.1.16 false deployment, n—an unintentional deployment of the PRS by the ATS during stable flight.
3.1.17 flight-critical system, n—system that, should it fail, will cause the sUA to no longer maintain stable flight.
3.1.18 flight envelope, n—range of combinations of speed, direction of travel, altitude, roll, angle of attack, and so forth within
which the sUA is able to be safely operated without exceeding its structural design load factor.
3.1.19 flight termination system, FTS, n—device or components that will disable the propulsion system of the sUA.
3.1.20 forebody, n—object connected to the parachute canopy and accompanying drogue chutes, if applicable.
3.1.20.1 Discussion—
The forebody shall be considered the sUA with any additional attachments (that is, parachute deployment system, payload,
electronics, propellers, and so forth).
3.1.21 full power failure/full power cut, n—sudden and immediate loss of power function to the critical flight systems of the sUA
such as motors, electronic speed controllers (ESC), and avionics.
3.1.21.1 Discussion—
Throttling down the motors is not the same as a full power cut in a test as the former gives the operator control and advance
knowledge that loss of stable flight is going to occur.
3.1.22 inspection, n—technique based on visual or dimensional examination of an element; inspection is generally nondestructive
and typically includes the use of sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste, simple physical manipulation, mechanical and electrical
gauging, and measurement.
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3.1.23 integrator, n—entity responsible for the integration of all the various parachute components, the sUA, and the testing of
the entire system.
3.1.23.1 Discussion—
The integrator could also be the parachute recovery system manufacturer or the sUA manufacturer. The integrator may also work
with other named third parties to delegate various tasks. Tasks the integrator has are: (1) selection and integration of the parachute
components, parachute deployment device, and any other electronics needed; (2) installation of the parachute recovery system on
the sUA and working with the sUA manufacturer to integrate the system properly; (3) pulling together all the various component
specifications to be sure they meet the requirements called out in this specification; and (4) performing and coordinating with a
test facility all the various flight tests called out in this specification.
3.1.24 manual triggering device, MTD, n—device or component that can initiate deployment of the parachute recovery system at
the discretion of the remote pilot in command (RPIC).(RPIC) independent of the ATS.
3.1.25 manufacturer, n—entity responsible for the creation of the various components of the parachute recovery system.
3.1.25.1 Discussion—
These can consist of the parachute, parachute ejection device, flight termination system, parachute deployment controller, or other
components. There can be any number of manufacturers.
3.1.26 mean time between critical failure, MTBCF, n—there are two criteria for reliability that are relevant for parachute recovery
systems: (1) MTBCF for positive activation—the probability that the parachute recovery system including its ATS and FTS will
open the parachute in case of emergency and (2) MTBCF for false positive event—the probability that the parachute recovery
system will deploy unintentionally.
3.1.27 minimum deployable altitude, MDA, n—difference in altitude from the point of failure to the point of stabilized sUA descent
under parachute; is airframe/speed dependent and certified through testing in Section 6.
3.1.28 minimum flight altitude, MFA, n—minimum altitude above ground level of the sUA in cases in which a parachute recovery
system is used for flight over people. The MFA shall be defined per the results of testing in Section 6.
3.1.29 opening shock load, n—this is the maximum load force under any conditions that occurs on the main parachute during the
process of the parachute opening.
3.1.30 operational environment, v—all allowed environmental conditions (temperature operating range, humidity range, dust and
other debris tolerances, and so forth) that the manufacturer will define in the environmental envelope for operation/use for the
product life of the parachute recovery system.
3.1.31 packing/parachute packing, v—process of folding and condensing the main canopy, connected cables, and other attached
mechanisms to fit in a design compartment of the aircraft to hold the parachute.
3.1.31.1 Discussion—
The packing process shall be done in such a fashion to allow for full deployment and acceptable opening behavior in the event
of parachute deployment. Parachute packing procedures shall be defined by the parachute manufacturer in the PM.
3.1.32 parachute, n—any aerodynamic deceleration device designed to slow the descent of sUA when not under stable safe flight.
3.1.33 parachute manual (PM), n—the minimum material provided from the manufacturer to the operator/owner of the sUA that
discusses topics such as instructions and procedures for inspection, maintenance, re-pack along with any PRS limitations in regard
to operational or environmental limitations and approved payloads.
3.1.34 parachute maximum dynamic shock load, MDSL, n—maximum opening shock load force the parachute is rated for under
any condition.
3.1.35 parachute recovery system, PRS, n—summation of the components of a parachute recovery system that work to reduce
descent velocity.
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3.1.36 pilot chute, n—smaller parachute than the main canopy that is connected to the main canopy.
3.1.36.1 Discussion—
The main purpose of the pilot chute is to be deployed before the main canopy to pull the main canopy out of a container into free
air to produce full canopy. The need for a pilot chute is determined by either the parachute manufacturer or the parachute recovery
system integrator.
3.1.37 Remote-Pilot-In-Command (RPIC)—the person who: (1) has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety
of the flight; (2) has been designated as pilot-in-command before or during the flight.
3.1.38 “shall” versus “should” versus “may”, v—use of the word “shall” implies that a procedure or statement is mandatory and
shall be followed to comply with this specification, “should” implies recommended, and “may” implies optional at the discretion
of the supplier, manufacturer, or operator.
3.1.38.1 Discussion—
Since “shall” statements are requirements, they include sufficient detail needed to define compliance (for example, threshold
values, test methods, oversight, and reference to other standards). “Should” statements are provided as guidance towards the
overall goal of improving safety and could include only subjective statements. “Should” statements also represent parameters that
could be used in safety evaluations and could lead to development of future requirements. “May” statements are provided to clarify
acceptability of a specific item or practice and offer options for satisfying requirements.
3.1.39 snatch force, n—when using a pilot chute for parachute deployment, snatch force is the highest peak force needed to extract
the parachute and risers from the holding canister/bay to deploy full canopy.
3.1.40 stabilized descent, n—the integrator shall determine the fall speed of the sUA when the PRS has deployed based on the sUA
maximum takeoff weight. The descent is considered stabilized when the vertical descent rate is within 10 % of the integrator’s
specified fall speed at sea level conditions.
3.1.41 supplier, n—any entity engaged in the design and production of components used on aan sUA.
3.1.41.1 Discussion—
When the supplier is not the manufacturer, the supplier can only ensure that the components comply with accepted consensus
standards.
3.1.42 testing task or task, n—activities well defined and specified according to an identified metric or an identified set of metrics
for testing sUA parachute recovery systems and operators to perform for the sUA’s parachute recovery system capabilities to be
evaluated.
3.1.43 trial, n—number used to identify a test within a series of repetitions that aan sUA is required to succeed in a standard
verification method for the results to meet the required statistical significance.
4. Applicability
4.1 In this specification, designers and manufacturers of deployable parachutes for sUA shall find design references and criteria
to use in designing, manufacturing parachutes, and parachute deploying systems with the intent of lessening the impact energy of
the sUA in the instance that the sUA is unable to sustain operational flight.
5. Design Standards for Deployable Parachutes
5.1 General:
5.1.1 This section provides design criteria for deployable parachutes of sUA with the expectation that parachutes designed using
this specification are designed to lessen the impact energy of the descending system for the purpose of enabling operations over
people and persons not intended as part of the flight operations of the sUA.
5.1.1.1 The designers or manufacturers, or both, of the parachute recovery system may design the parachute recovery system to
orient the sUA so that the sUA under canopy-aided descent is in an orientation that exposes the least risk to persons on the ground.
5.1.2 The manufacturer may produce a parachute recovery system for aan sUA that is limited to the number of deployments. If
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the parachute recovery system is designed for a limited number of uses per a designated flight envelope, the manufacturer shall
define the number of deployments before replacement is required in the PM.
5.1.2.1 Key components of the parachute recovery system shall be serialized by the manufacturer, so they can be traced to the end
user (operator). Key information that should be kept by the manufacturer may include date of manufacture, product revision, and
any quality assurance (QA) inspection information. Key components include: parachute, deployment device, deployment
controller (electronics, FTS, ATS, MTD, and so forth), and other key components. Records shall be kept on customer or integrator
sales and the serial numbers of the components delivered.
5.1.3 The parachute shall be sized to reduce residual energy of the sUA and may be combined with other energy reduction
components such as airbags (including any attachments, parachute deployment system, payload, electronics, propellers, and so
forth) with an attached parachute recovery system.
5.1.4 The PRS shall be designed to deploy successfully within the full flight performance envelope of the sUA once the sUA
reaches its minimum deployable altitude.
5.1.5 This specification provides the minimum testing criteria for the installed performance according to the methods and
measurement techniques that shall be provided by the manufacturer of the parachute recovery system to the operator/owner of the
sUA.
5.1.6 The manufacturer shall define in the PM the process for preflight/post flight inspection of the parachute recovery system.
5.2 Installation Design—Each integrator of aan sUA deployable parachute recovery system shall provide a general PM with
documentation described in 3.1.303.1.33. The PM shall be used for all instructions and procedures for installation, arming,
disarming, and maintenance of the parachute recovery system. The parachute recovery system shall be pre-packed and repacked
per 5.2.1.
5.2.1 Parachute recovery systems approved for flight over people will be provided to the operator with the parachute pre-packed
by the integrator or an authorized and approved third party. The integrator will approve third-party parachute packers. The
integrator will specify both in the PM and on the parachute recovery system the service life of the packed parachute before it needs
to be recertified, repacked, or replaced.
5.2.2 All components of the parachute recovery system shall be protected against loss of strength in service as a result of normal
wear, operational environment, corrosion, contamination, and abrasion.
5.3 Parachute Component Design Safety Factors:
5.3.1 The parachute manufacturer shall provide a specification called maximum dynamic shock load (MDSL). The MDSL is used
to qualify a parachute as being suitable for use at a given calculated opening shock load for the sUA and the given maximum
deployment velocity. This is determined by a combination of measured and rated material strengths and measured strength of key
canopy components such as the bridle, canopy shroud line connection break strength, and other critical parachute components in
line from the bridle up to the canopy. The component having the lowest aggregated break strength of the parachute is the measured
break strength. This value is then divided by two to give MDSL. The resulting MDSL will be ⁄2 the measured strength of the
parachute. Appendix X1 shows an example of an MDSL calculation done with OSCALC.
5.3.2 For main canopy parachutes, the parachute manufacturer-specified MDSL shall meet or exceed the calculated expected
maximum opening force calculated for a given parachute recovery system as integrated into aan sUA at maximum deployment
velocity.
5.3.3 For all main risers (shock cords) of the parachute package, the design factor shall be based on the nominal strength of the
materials used and the calculated maximum opening forces per 5.3.1.
5.4 Main Canopy Design—The main canopy dimensions and rate of descent shall be calculated using the following variables and
equations:
5.4.1 Main Canopy Nominal Diameter Equation:
D 5= S ⁄π ft or m (1)
~~ ! !~ !
O O
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where:
D = nominal diameter of the parachute that is calculated by the total canopy surface area; S ; and
O O
S = total canopy surface area but shall not include vent holes and other openings seen in the canopy that are a part of the design
O
2 2
(ft or m ).
5.4.2 Main Canopy Rate of Descent Calculation (at Sea Level):
vc 5= 2 W ⁄ S C D ρ ft/s or m/s (2)
@~ !~ ~ ! !#~ !
O T O O O
where:
WT = total measured weight of the sUAS and parachute assembly (that is, parachute, risers, deployment system, holding
canister, and so forth) (pounds or Newtons);
C(D ) = parachute drag coefficient related to S ; measures the efficiency of drag force produced by the main canopy area; and
O O
3 3 3 3
ρ = sea level air density (slugs/ft or kg/m ). For calculation, the nominal value to be used is 0.00238 slg/ft (1.225 kg/m )
O
at sea level and 59°F (15°C).
3 3 3 3
ρ = sea level air density (slugs/ft or kg/m ). For calculation, the nominal value to be used is 0.00238 slg/ft (1.225 kg/m )
O
at sea level and 59 °F (15 °C).
5.4.3 Main Canopy Rate of Descent Calculation (at a Specific Altitude):
= =
vc 5 @~2 W !⁄~S C ~D ! ρ !#·1 ~ρ ⁄ ρ 0!~ft/s or m/s! (3)
T O O O
where:
ρ = air density at a specific altitude; the air density measured above an altitude of 1000 ft (305 m) MSL shall be taken into
3 3
account when calculating the descent velocity of a sUA in parachute-assisted return to earth (slugs/ft or kg/m ).
ρ = air density at a specific altitude; the air density measured above an altitude of 1000 ft (305 m) MSL shall be taken into
3 3
account when calculating the descent velocity of an sUA in parachute-assisted return to earth (slugs/ft or kg/m ).
5.5 Glide Slope and Vertical Velocity:
5.5.1 The integrator may design the parachute deployment system to glide the sUA through descent.
5.5.2 For parachute operation using passive fill of the canopy (non-high energy active inflation), the parachute manufacturer
should specify the filling distance of the canopy. Optional filling time can be provided and is rated at a specified velocity at canopy
opening. These can be determined using the filling distance of parachute canopy equation:
sf 5 nD (4)
P
where:
sf = filling distance of the parachute canopy;
D = parachute diameter at full inflation (ft or m); and
P
n = dimensionless fill constant defined by the type of main parachute canopy design used.
5.6 Risers/Attachment Lines:
5.6.1 The riser(s) attachment point shall be placed on the sUA so not to interfere with engine or propellers during in-flight
operations or during deployment of the parachute.
5.6.2 The risers and other attachment lines shall not induce friction due to poor parachute packing to the rest of the canopy system
during opening of the canopy.
5.7 Designs and Precautionary Remarks for Deployment of Main Canopy:
5.7.1 The opening of the parachute housing should be designed in such a way that, upon deployment, the parachute recovery
system and connected risers shall not be caught on, damaged, or cut by blemishes, burrs, sharp edges, and any other defects that
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may cause interferences with proper deployment/inflation of the parachute recovery system. The parachute, risers or attachment
lines, and lead lines shall be protected from abrasion during ejection/release and shall not entangle into the sUA in a manner that
would render the parachute and sUA unable to descend at the defined descent rate.
NOTE 1—Although use of a FTS is required, there may be residual energy in recently killed motors that leave spinning propellers or “pin-wheeling”
propellers that create a hazard for parachute canopies and risers. Care shall be taken to avoid propellers or other control surfaces of the sUA.
5.7.2 The main canopy may be extracted with the aid of a pilot chute. If the main canopy is designed to be deployed with the aid
of a pilot chute, then:
5.7.2.1 The pilot chute shall be held to the same design criteria seen in 5.3 – 5.7.
5.7.2.2 The pilot chute shall be designed not to interfere with the deployment process of the main canopy once the canopy has
been extracted into free air unless the manufacturer has specified other intended uses for the pilot chute during descent.
5.7.3 The main canopy may be extracted with the aid of a ballistic ejection system. If the main canopy is designed to be deployed
with the aid of a ballistic system, then:
5.7.3.1 The ballistic ejection system shall be controlled in such a manner as to not create a fire on the sUA.
5.7.3.2 The ballistic ejection system electronic signaling shall not interfere with the main electronic system of the sUA and shall
not be affected by the expected operating environment (high-intensity irradiated field (HIRF) environment considerations).
5.7.3.3 If the parachute risers and harnesses connect to the sUA via the parachute ejection device, then the material strength of
the ballistic ejection system attachment to the sUA and attachment points of the ballistic system shall be designed to be two times
greater than the maximum opening shock load as calculated in 5.3.1. In any case, the connection strength of the parachute ejection
device to the sUA shall be strong enough to accommodate the recoil force of the ballistic system when discharging the parachute
and risers.
5.7.4 The integrator shall supply placards or labels for the exterior such that these placards or labels can be seen by first responders
at accident or incident sites.
5.7.4.1 Scope—These placards or labels are to provide a visual warning to rescue or other personnel at the scene of an accident
or incident in the event that the sUA involved is equipped with a ballistically deployed emergency parachute recovery system.
5.7.4.2 Installation and Size of Placard or Label—The parachute integrator shall permanently install the warning placards or labels
on the parachute recovery system in a manner as specified below. For placards or labels that are required to be attached to the
airframe, the sUA operator holds responsibility for visual placement of placards specified by this specification.
(1) Danger Placard—A triangular placard or label in which each side is at least 80 % the diameter of the largest circle
encompassed by the largest projected surface shape of the PRS.
(2) The danger placard shall be placed adjacent to the parachute egress point for enclosed sUA in which the parachute recovery
system may not be visible from the exterior. The integrator may include a QR code that leads to a web page that includes all the
relevant information.
(3) The danger placard shall have the word “DANGER” and provide contact information for rescue personnel to seek help from
the manufacturer and the type of ballistic deployment device (see proposed placard in Appendix X2).
(4) A danger placard shall be applied directly on any ballistic extraction device on aircraft that do not have the parachute
recovery system inside the sUA airframe. This placard or label will warn rescue personnel in the event the ballistic device becomes
separated from the sUA airframe at impact. Appendix X2 contains an example of such labeling.
5.7.4.3 Label Size and Color—All placards or labels shall follow the coloration methods described in the following.
(1) Danger Placard—Danger placards or labels shall be printed with a red border with white letters (or reverse type) and a
descriptive graphic element (see proposed placard in Appendix X2).
(2) Identification Placard—Identification placards or labels shall be printed with a black border with orange letters surrounding
an orange center with a descriptive graphic element (see proposed placard in Appendix X2).
(3) External placards or labels shall be printed using a reflective background material for enhanced visibility in low light or
obscured conditions.
5.8 Electronic System Considerations:
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5.8.1 All parachute recovery system electronics shall have a dedicated power source, such as a battery or capacitor, independent
from the sUA’s power supply(s). During a failure, this power source shall have enough energy to supply properly all connected
electronics throughout a failure detection and descent. The independent power source may harvest charging power from the sUA.
5.8.2 All parachute recovery system electronics shall not interfere with operations of the sUA during normal flight. flight or cause
a false deployment. The parachute recovery system electronics may override the sUA’s systems in the case that the sUA can no
longer sustain safe flight.
5.8.3 The parachute recovery system shall be equipped with an autonomous triggering system (ATS) independent from any flight
critical system of the sUA to deploy the parachute recovery system when a malfunction of the sUA is detected.
NOTE 2—The ATS can be integrated as part of the flight critical systems of the sUA instead of being an independent system if the integrator can
demonstrate that the level of the sUA’s system integrity is commensurate with industry standards recognized by the governing CAA for flight critical
systems.
NOTE 3—If the ATS does not have a physical or electronic safety to prevent deployment while on the ground, then a warning shall be present in the PM
that states when the motors are running and a critical failure occurs when the sUA is on the ground or on take-off/landing, that the ATS will allow the
PRS to deploy which may present a ballistic/projectile hazard to personnel if they are in close proximity to the sUA during those phases of flight.
5.8.3.1 In the event of a deployment the PRS shall record the descent rate (descent rate shall be recorded as time vs altitude) and
the method of deployment (ATS or MTD).
5.8.4 To prevent propellers from injuring people on the ground after a deployment the PRS shall also include a Flight Termination
System (FTS).
5.8.4.1 The FTS shall activate at the time of or before parachute deployment is initiated.
5.8.4.2 The FTS shall be either an electronic device that interrupts the power, control signals to the motors, or a mechanical device
that physically stops the motors/propellers.
5.8.5 The parachute recovery system shall be equipped with a manual triggering device (MTD).(MTD) if the PRS is intended to
be used on an sUA that is manually operated by an RPIC.
5.8.5.1 The manufacturer may include a downlink system that allows the parachute recovery system to communicate to the RPIC.
5.8.5.2 If the PRS is intended for use on an autonomous aircraft, the applicant may choose to omit the inclusion of an MTD and
it’s respective functionality.
5.9 Maintenance and Continued Operational Safety Expectations:
5.9.1 Parachute Manual—The manufacturer shall provide a parachute manual when providing the parachute recovery system to
the operator of the sUA. The minimum contents of the parachute manual shall include the following topics here in this
specification.
5.9.1.1 Installation Procedures—The manufacturer shall prescribe instructions for the proper installation of the parachute recovery
system for each UAS make/model. These instructions should follow the structure and content prescribed for UFM Supplements
by Specification F2908.
5.9.2 Inspection Intervals and Criteria:
5.9.2.1 Intervals—The manufacturer shall define in the PM the number or schedule or both of periodic inspection intervals that
the owner/operator shall inspect the installed parachute recovery system.
5.9.2.2 Criteria—The manufacturer may offer inspection services to the operator for the defined inspection intervals. If the
manufacturer allows for the operator/owner of the parachute recovery system to do their own inspections, the inspection criteria
shall be defined in the PM with full explanations of how to recognize defects that could hinder normal operation.
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5.9.3 Maintenance Procedures:
5.9.3.1 Defects—If the operator/owner of the parachute is to do their own inspections of the system, the manufacturer shall define
maintenance procedures for the operator/owner to fix common defects impeding operation. If a defect found by the operator/owner
is not covered in the PM or is too extensive for the operator/owner to repair on their own, the manufacturer shall provide
information in the PM on how the operator/owner may return the parachute recovery system to the manufacturer for proper
corrections or suggestions on following steps the operator/owner may take for a replacement parachute recovery system.
5.9.3.2 Repacking—For parachute recovery systems approved for flight over people the repacking method will be omitted from
the PM and the manufacturer shall provide direction to the operator/owner in the PM on how to send the parachute or parachute
recovery system, or both, properly to the manufacturer for repacking.
5.9.3.3 Environmental Operating Limitations—Any environmental factors that are outside of the functional capabilities of the PRS
shall be clearly defined in the PM, including but not limited to: wind speed, temperature, humidity, altitude, and precipitation.
(1) Altitude/environment considerations shall be incorporated into the flight envelope of the PRS. Hot weather, high elevation,
or heavy payload considerations, or combinations thereof, shall be taken into account when defining the operation limitations of
the PRS and the manufacturer shall make these considerations known in the PM.
5.9.3.4 Approved Payloads—The manufacturer shall list approved payloads and mounting locations for those payloads. In
addition, the manufacturer shall list boundaries for max and minimum take-off weight.
5.9.4 Materials:
5.9.4.1 Fungus-proof Materials—Materials that are nutrients for fungi shall not be used where it is practical to avoid them. Where
such material is used and not hermetically sealed, they shall be treated with a fungicidal agent acceptable to the procuring activity;
however, if they will be used in a hermetically sealed enclosure, fungicidal treatment will not be necessary.
6. Testing Standards of Deployable Parachutes
6.1 General:
6.1.1 Testing Responsible Party—The responsible party for testing the sUA with the PRS is the integrator. As defined in
3.1.203.1.23, the integrator could also be the parachute manufacturer, operator, or the sUA manufacturer. The integrator can work
with the parachute manufacturer and the sUA manufacturer to tailor a test plan that covers the required items in this section.
6.1.2 Examination of the Product—Each PRS shall be inspected by a designated representative of the Third Party Testing Agency
(TPTA) as defined in 6.3.1 to determine compliance with the requirements specified herein with respect to materials and markings
that would satisfy safety requirements of this specification. A bill of materials (BOM) of the individual components in the full PRS
shall be provided to the TPTA. The PRS presented to the TPTA for testing shall be wholly representative in materials, marking,
construction and operational functionality of the final product of the PRS.
6.2 Pre-Test Information Collection:
6.2.1 Date and Time of Test—Give the testing date and time at which the test was started and completed; the test methods, when
explicitly specified, can allow the tasks or repetitions to be distributed into multiple days. In the instance that testing occurs over
multiple days, the date and time of each test shall be recorded.
6.2.2 Facility—Give name(s) of laboratory or test site where the test is to be conducted.
6.2.3 Location—Give name(s) of country, city, and state in which the test facility is located.
6.2.4 Event/Sponsor—Give a description of the party responsible for the test. If an event warrants the test, then a description of
the event and purpose of test during the event shall be documented.
6.2.5 sUAS Make/Model—If the PRS is designed to work with a single sUA model, the sUAS model identification name/number
and manufacturer name shall be documented. If the PRS is designed to work with several sUA models, each sUA model
identification name/number and associated manufacturer name shall be documented. The PRS shall be designed per airframe and
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the integrator will list in the PM known configurations that the PRS is intended to work with. The integrator may list in the PM
any configurations of the airframe that the PRS is known not to work with. A PRS certified for one type of sUA shall not be certified
on another airframe without proper testing as defined in this specification. If the proposed aircraft is to be used for flight over
people, then the PRS shall meet all applicable standards for flight over uninvolved third parties. If the PRS is designed to work
with a single sUA model or controller, or both, for manual triggering, the sUA model identification name/number and manufacturer
name shall be documented. If the PRS is designed to work with several sUA models or controllers, or both, for manual triggering,
each sUA model or controller, or both, identification name/number and associated manufacturer name shall be documented.
6.2.6 Organization—Give the name of the organization with which the operator is associated; it could be the manufacturer of the
PRS, manufacturer of the sUA, or the owner of the sUA. Also, provide full contact information of the organization (that is, address,
telephone number, e-mail address, and so forth).
6.2.7 Environment—Conditions, under which the test will be conducted, including the light level, temperature, humidity, pressure
altitude, and, if outside, the wind conditions. The test sponsor has the authority to specify these conditions.
6.2.8 Trial Number—Give the numerical sequence of the test being recorded. No trial number shall be reused in subsequent trials
of the same parachute/sUAS configuration. If aan sUA is tested for the first time, the trial number is 1 when the results are recorded.
If the sUA is tested again, the trial number is 2 when the results are recorded on a separate test form and so on for each subsequent
trial. If the sUA is tested with no results recorded, the trial number shall reflect a scenario in which “No Results Recorded” is
documented and a description of why results were not recorded shall be provided, and testing can continue with the next sequential
trial number.
6.3 Third-Party Testing Agency (TPTA):
6.3.1 Third-Party Testing Agency (TPTA)—The TPTA shall be a third-party agency or CAA approved delegate that oversees testing
per this specification and produces a report containing the documentation and results of testing. This party is responsible for
instigating failure modes during testing and collecting test data. The TPTA will provide the name or names of individuals from
the TPTA participating in the trails and testing locations used for testing.
NOTE 4—For a PRS that is compliant with this specification to be used as part of an application to obtain permission from a CAA to fly aan sUA over
people in the form of technical standard orders (TSO), flight certificates, flight waivers, flight permits, or other like documentation, the TPTA should be
an entity that is recognized by the governing CAA in which the operations are to take place.
6.3.1.1 Instigation of Failure Commands—In all failure scenarios, the failure command for the sUA shall be concealed from the
RPIC, therefore avoiding anticipation of the test. The PRS signal for deployment, whether it is via a manual triggering device
(MTD) or automatic (ATS), shall be conceived reactively to the instigated failure. In other words, the sending of the deployment
signal cannot be anticipatory to the impending failure.
NOTE 5—Rigging of the failure can be performed by the PRS integrator at the approval of the TPTA.
6.3.1.2 Independence of Failure Modes from the PRS—Instigation of failure modes for testing shall be done independently of the
PRS sUA, the PRS, and its FTS and ATS.ATS via the use of a fail box or orange wire.
6.3.2 TPTA Report—The integrator shall have the TPTA produce a report on the results of the trials.
6.3.3 Minimum Contents of the TPTA Report—The report produced by the TPTA shall clearly demonstrate the proven functionality
of the PRS and include but not be limited to, the bill of materials (BOM) for the PRS that was tested, the minimum deployable
altitude rating, as calculated in 6.4.2.96.4.3.9; the average rate of decent of the PRS, cumulative of all trials; and the results of all
trials performed and related testing documentation pursuant to 6.3.4 and 6.4.
6.3.4 Results by Videotaping—All trails shall be documented by means of a continuous video recording that covers the aircraft
takeoff, deployment of the PRS, and the landing after deployment.
6.3.5 Commencement of Trial—The TPTA shall verbally declare the start of each test, and the time and date shall be recorded per
6.2.1. The TPTA may declare the start of the test after the aircraft is airborne. Per 6.3.1.1, in all failure scenarios, the failure
command for the sUA shall be concealed from the RPIC, therefore avoiding anticipation of the test.
F3322 − 22
NOTE 6—It is suggested that the Applicant and TPTA work together to d
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