CEN/TS 13763-27:2003

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-december-2003
Eksplozivi za civilno uporabo – Detonatorji in zakasnilniki – 27. del: Definicije,
metode in zahteve za elektronske sisteme za aktiviranje
Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays - Part 27: Definitions, methods and
requirements for electronic initiation systems
Explosivstoffe für zivile Zwecke - Zünder und Verzögerungselemente - Teil 27:
Definitionen, Verfahren und Anforderungen an elektronische Zündsysteme
Explosifs a usage civil - Détonateurs et relais - Partie 27: Définitions, méthodes et
exigences relatives aux systemes d'amorçage électronique
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TS 13763-27:2003
ICS:
71.100.30 Eksplozivi. Pirotehnika Explosives. Pyrotechnics
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
CEN/TS 13763-27
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
July 2003
ICS 71.100.30
English version
Explosives for civil uses – Detonators and relays – Part 27:
Definitions, methods and requirements for electronic initiation
systems
Explosifs à usage civil – Détonateurs et relais – Partie 27: Explosivstoffe für zivile Zwecke – Zünder und
Définitions, méthodes et exigences relatives aux systèmes Verzögerungselemente – Teil 27: Definitionen, Verfahren
d’amorçage électronique und Anforderungen an elektronische Zündsysteme
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 19 December 2002 for provisional application.
The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their
comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.
CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS available. It
is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in parallel to the CEN/TS) until the final decision about the possible
conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
Management Centre: rue de Stassart, 36  B-1050 Brussels
© 2003 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TS 13763-27:2003 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

Contents
Page
Foreword.3
0 Introduction .5
1 Scope .9
2 Normative references .9
3 Terms and definitions.10
4 Procedure .12
5 Test report .36
6 Requirements .36
Annex A (informative) Examples of hazards and faults .37
Annex B (informative) Information on evaluation techniques .44
Annex C (informative) Proposals for the detonator fusehead replaced (dummy detonators) .46
Annex D (informative) Determination of resistance to dynamic pressure .48
Bibliography .49
Foreword
This document (CEN/TS 13763-27:2003) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 321 "Explosives for
civil uses", the secretariat of which is held by AENOR.
This document includes a Bibliography.
Annexes A, B, C and D are informative.
This Technical Specification is one of a series of standards with the generic title Explosives for civil uses –
Detonators and relays. The other parts of this series are listed below:
prEN 13763-1 Part 1: Requirements
EN 13763-2 Part 2: Determination of thermal stability
EN 13763-3 Part 3: Determination of sensitiveness to impact
prEN 13763-4 Part 4: Determination of resistance to abrasion of leading wires and shock tubes
prEN 13763-5 Part 5: Determination of resistance to cutting damage of leading wires and shock tubes
prEN 13763-6 Part 6: Determination of resistance to cracking in low temperatures of leading wires
prEN 13763-7 Part 7: Determination of the mechanical strength of leading wires, shock tubes, connections,
crimps and closures
prEN 13763-8 Part 8: Determination of resistance to vibration of plain detonators
prEN 13763-9 Part 9: Determination of resistance to bending of detonators
prEN 13763-10 Part 10: Method for the determination of resistance to torsion of sealing plugs
prEN 13763-11 Part 11: Determination of resistance to damage by dropping of detonators and relays
prEN 13763-12 Part 12: Determination of resistance to hydrostatic pressure
prEN 13763-13 Part 13: Determination of resistance of electric detonator to electrostatic discharge
prEN 13763-14 Part 14: Determination of resistance of electric detonator to the influence of radio frequency
radiation
prEN 13763-15 Part 15: Determination of equivalent initiating capability
prEN 13763-16 Part 16: Determination of delay accuracy
prEN 13763-17 Part 17: Determination of no-fire current of electric detonators
prEN 13763-18 Part 18: Determination of series firing current of electric detonators
prEN 13763-19 Part 19: Determination of firing pulse of electric detonators
prEN 13763-20 Part 20: Determination of total resistance of electric detonators
prEN 13763-21 Part 21: Determination of flash-over voltage of electric detonators
prEN 13763-22 Part 22: Determination of capacitance, insulation resistance and insulation breakdown of leading
wires
EN 13763-23Part 23: Determination of the shock-wave velocity of shock tube
EN 13763-24Part 24: Determination of the non-conductivity of shock tube
prEN 13763-25 Part 25: Determination of transfer capacity of relay and coupling accessories
prEN 13763-26 Part 26: Definitions, methods and requirements for devices and accessories for reliable and safe
function of detonators and relays.
According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the following
countries are bound to announce this CEN Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
0 Introduction
0.1 Background and basic principles
Electronic initiation systems have been developed for use in civil blasting work. Detonators in these systems
normally have delay times which are far more accurate than conventional detonators with pyrotechnic delay, and
are claimed to facilitate better blasting results, e.g. in terms of better fragmentation, reduced ground vibrations, less
damage on remaining rock, etc.
From a safety and reliability point of view electronic initiation systems are more complex than conventional electric
and non-electric detonator systems, which results in new risk factors.
The aim of this Technical Specification is to reach negligible risks at least at the same applied safety and reliability
level as the corresponding standards for conventional electric detonators. This statement should be seen as a
general objective of the Technical Specification at a system level and not as a detailed guideline to judge the level
of acceptability for individual specific demands. However in some cases the standards for conventional electric
detonators referred to in this Technical Specification are applicable in various grades. In these cases the
requirement level for electric detonators have been adopted, possibly after some amendments if necessary.
This Technical Specification specifies a risk analysis procedure to be used to investigate the safety and reliability of
electronic initiation systems by identifying hazards and estimating the risks associated with the system.
The step in the risk analysis procedure, which refers to acceptability of risks, includes both references to testing
and evaluation methods, which apply where appropriate for the specific system. The Technical Specification also
stipulates levels of acceptability.
This structure of combining a general risk analysis procedure in combination with specific requirements related to
testing and evaluation as well as guidelines for evaluation specified in informative annexes has been chosen for the
following reasons:
• The use of electronic initiation systems are highly related to safety of human life and health as well as to
property. The safety and reliability of electronic initiation systems depends on a number of factors interacting,
which makes the systems complicated to evaluate in these respects. In this Technical Specification relevant risk
factors have been addressed to risks of unintended initiation, misfire and incorrect function.
• The need to consider safety and reliability for individual components of the system i.e. detonators,
firing/testing/programming units as well as overall system aspects including connection and set-up limits and
communication between the different components.
• The need for evaluation of safety-critical electronic hardware and software both in detonators and in
firing/testing/programming units.
• Manufacturers of electronic initiation systems have used significantly different design and system solutions in
order to fulfil acceptable safety and reliability criteria. The product development in the field is rapid. Therefore
the Technical Specification aims to be valid for different system solutions.
Considerable effort has been taken to refer to other parts of prEN 13763 for conventional detonators as far as
possible, specifying applicability of these tests as well as possible amendments in order to avoid redundancy and
inconsistency.
Possibilities for non-destructive testing using dummy detonators without explosive content, have been considered
as far as possible due to the high costs of electronic detonators.
0.2 Overview of an electronic initiation system
Electronic detonator systems can be fitted in two categories: non-programmable electronic detonators (or fixed
delay detonators) and programmable delay detonators. Programmable detonators can be programmed using one-
way data communication or two-way data communication. These categories are elaborated upon below:
Non-programmable detonators
This type of detonator does not require any data communications in order to ignite. The connection to the detonator
can be electrical or non-electrical. These detonators are normally numbered in such a way that the user recognizes
its intended delay time.
Programmable detonators
The delay time of these detonators is programmed prior to blasting, by either the testing unit or the firing unit. This
type of detonators usually require electrical connections to facilitate:
• One-way data communication: This implies that communication only take place to the detonator. No
information is received from the detonator. In these systems, it is vitally important that communications to the
detonator are robust.
• Two-way data communication: Communication takes place in both directions. Since feedback is received
from the detonator, it is possible to establish the state of the detonator. Useful information can include integrity
of the communications to the detonator, integrity of the initiation element, the firing capacitor voltage, results of
a self-test, etc.
0.3 Block diagram of a generic two wire programmable electronic detonator
Not all components illustrated below are necessarily required in an electronic detonator, at the same time, some
components may have been omitted. The purpose of the diagram is to familiarize the reader of this document with
some of the functions and components of an electronic detonator, such that the requirements and implications for
safe operations may be better understood.
Key
1 Communication line
B Full wave rectifier to make the system polarity insensitive (optional)
C1 Power supply capacitor
C2 Firing capacitor. This capacitor supplies the energy required to fire the initiation element (IE). This capacitor may be
disconnected and/or shorted prior to blasting with the aid of SW1 and SW2. C1 and C2 may be separate capacitors, or they
may be combined. SW3 will be closed at the time of firing, after C2 had enough energy stored.
Figure 1 – Block diagram of a generic 2-wire programmable electronic detonator
The components illustrated above may be integrated into one or more monolithic circuits.
0.4 Electrical wiring systems
This section refers only to electrical connections. Even though other wiring system may exist, the two most
common topologies are:
• Bus topology
Each detonator is connected to a common and separate ”surface“ wire. Usually, a connector is used per detonator.
Key
1 Firing unit
2 Connectors
3 Detonators
4 Surface wire
Figure 2 – Electrical wiring systems - Bus topology
• Daisy chain topology
In this system, a detonator has enough wire to reach the neighbouring detonator, and the tail of the one detonator
is connected to the previous detonator. There is thus no separate bus wire. A detonator would usually have one or
two connectors.
Key
1 Firing unit
Figure 3 - Electrical wiring systems - Daisy chain topology
1 Scope
This Technical Specification specifies a risk analysis, evaluation and testing procedure to be used to investigate the
safety and reliability of electronic initiation systems by identifying hazards and estimating the risks associated with
the system. The Technical Specification also stipulates levels of acceptability for electronic initiation systems.
2 Normative references
This Technical Specification incorporates by dated or undated reference, provisions from other publications. These
normative references are cited at the appropriate places in the text, and the publications are listed hereafter. For
dated references, subsequent amendments to or revisions of any of these publications apply to this Technical
Specification only when incorporated in it by amendment or revision. For undated references the latest edition of
the publication referred to applies (including amendments).
prEN 13763-1; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 1: Requirements.
EN 13763-2; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 2: Determination of thermal stability.
EN 13763-3; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 3:Determination of sensitiveness to impact.
prEN 13763-4; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 4: Determination of resistance to abrasion
of leading wires and shock tubes.
prEN 13763-5; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 5: Determination of resistance to cutting
damage of leading wires and shock tubes.
prEN 13763-6; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 6: Determination of resistance to cracking
in low temperatures of leading wires.
prEN 13763-7; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 7: Determination of the mechanical strength
of leading wires, shock tubes, connections, crimps and closures.
prEN 13763-8; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 8: Determination of resistance to vibration
of plain detonators.
prEN 13763-9; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 9: Determination of resistance to bending of
detonators.
prEN 13763-10:2000; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 10: Method for the determination of
resistance to torsion of sealing plugs.
prEN 13763-11; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 11: Determination of resistance to
damage by dropping of detonators and relays.
prEN 13763-12; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 12: Determination of resistance to
hydrostatic pressure.
prEN 13763-13; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 13: Determination of resistance of electric
detonators against electrostatic discharge.
prEN 13763-14; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 14: Determination of resistance of electric
detonators to the influence of radio frequency radiation.
prEN 13763-15; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 15: Determination of equivalent initiating
capability.
prEN 13763-16; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 16: Determination of delay accuracy.
prEN 13763-17; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 17: Determination of no-fire current of
electric detonators.
prEN 13763-18; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 18: Determination of series firing current
of electric detonators.
prEN 13763-19; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 19: Determination of firing pulse on
electric detonators.
prEN 13763-20; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 20: Determination of total resistance of
electric detonators.
prEN 13763-21; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 21: Determination of flash-over voltage of
electric detonators.
prEN 13763-22; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 22: Determination of capacitance,
insulation resistance and insulation breakdown of leading wires.
EN 13763-23; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 23: Determination of the shock-wave
velocity of shock tubes.
EN 13763-24; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 24: Determination of the electrical non-
conductivity of shock tubes.
prEN 13763-25; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 25: Determination of transfer capacity of
relay and coupling accessories.
prEN 13763-26; Explosives for civil uses - Detonators and relays — Part 26: Definitions, methods and requirements
for devices and accessories for reliable and safe function of detonators and relays.
prEN 13857-1; Explosives for civil uses — Part 1: Terminology.
EN 60870-5-1; Telecontrol equipment and systems — Part 5: Transmission protocols — Section 1: Transmission
frame formats (IEC 60870-5-1:1990).
EN 61000-4-3; Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) — Part 4-3: Testing and measurement techniques. Radiated,
radio-frequency, electromagnetic field immunity test (IEC 61000-4-3:2002).
EN 61000-4-6; Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) — Part 4: Testing and measurement techniques — Section 6:
Immunity to conducted disturbances, induced by radio-frequency fields (IEC 61000-4-6:1996).
EN 61496-1:1997; Safety of machinery – Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 1: General requirements
and tests (IEC 61496-1:1997)
EN ISO/IEC 17025; General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories (ISO/IEC
17025:1999).
IEC 60068-2-14; Environmental testing — Part 2: Tests - Test N: Change of temperature (IEC 60068-2-14:1984 +
A1:1986).
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this Technical Specification the terms and definitions given in prEN 13857-1 and the following
apply.
3.1
electronic initiation system
system generally composed of a firing unit and/or a testing unit and/or a programming unit, and a certain number of
electronic detonators
3.2
electronic detonator
electronic detonator as defined in prEN13857-1
3.3
non programmable electronic detonator
electronic detonator with a programmed delay time. This programmation is made by the manufacturer.
3.4
pre-programmed electronic detonator
electronic detonator with a pre programmed delay number programmed by the manufacturer. The firing time of
these detonators is a multiple of this delay number and is determined on the field.
3.5
programmable electronic detonator
electronic detonator of which the functioning delay time is programmable, on the field, by mean of a programming
unit and/or a firing unit
3.6
firing unit
apparatus used in an electronic initiation system to initiate a blast. Such a device can control and/or program
and/or test the electronic detonators and charge the firing capacitor of the electronic detonators before the initiation
of the blast. This device can be driven by a computer.
3.7
testing unit
field tester intended, in an electronic initiation system, to test the electronic detonators and/or the initiating circuit.
This tester should not be able to initiate the electronic detonator.
3.8
programming unit
apparatus used, on the field, to program a delay time and/or an address to a programmable electronic detonator.
This apparatus can also test the electronic detonator. This apparatus should not be able to initiate the electronic
detonator.
3.9
electronic initiation system using no data communication
electronic initiation system in which the electronic detonator receives only firing energy from the firing unit (e.g. by
non-electric or electric means)
3.10
electronic initiation system using one way data communication
electronic initiation system in which the electronic detonator may receive commands from the programming/testing
unit and/or from firing unit but cannot send back any information to PROGRAMMING/TESTING and/or to firing unit
3.11
electronic initiation system using two way data communication
electronic initiation system in which the electronic detonator may receive commands from the programming/testing
unit and/or to firing unit and send back information to PROGRAMMING/TESTING and/or from firing unit
3.12
critical defect
defect that, according to judgement and experience, is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for
individuals using, maintaining or depending upon the considered product; or that is likely to prevent performance of
the function of a major end item e.g. an unintended initiation caused during transport, storage and handling
3.13
major defect
defect, other than critical, that is likely to result in failure, or to reduce materially the usability of the considered
product for its intended purpose, e.g. misfire of more than one detonator in a blasting round
3.14
minor defect
defect that is not likely to reduce materially the usability of the considered product for its intended purpose, or that
is a departure from established specifications having little bearing on the effective use or operation of this product,
e.g. misfire of one single detonator or incorrect function (delay time) of a detonator
NOTE The above defect criteria are specific to electronic initiation systems and apply to all components of the system.
3.15
fault
state of an entity characterized by the inaptitude to achieve an intended function
3.16
failure
suspension of the aptitude of an entity to achieve a necessary function. After a failure, the entity is in fault.
3.17
independent circuits
two circuits are independent if they are physically separated and if a failure of one circuit cannot put the second
one in fault
4 Procedure
4.1 General (step 1 of Figure 4)
The risk analysis, evaluation and testing procedure, as described in 4.2 to clause 5 and illustrated in the flow
diagram given in Figure 4.
Step 1
Start
Step 2
Identify qualitative and
quantitative
characteristics (4.2)
Step 3
Identify p ossible
hazards (4.3)
Step 4
Estimate risk for
each hazard (4.4)
Step 5
Is risk
yes
acceptable?
(4.5)
no
Step 6
Is risk
Report risk analysis.
reduced? no
Action required
(4.6)
Step 7
yes
Other hazards
yes
generated? (4.7)
no
Step 8
Are all identified
no
hazards evaluated? (4.8)
yes
Step 9
Are all hazards
no
identified? (4.9)
yes
Report risk
analysis (5)
Figure 4 - Flow diagram of risk analysis, evaluation and testing procedure
4.2 Identification of qualitative and quantitative characteristics related to electronic initiation
system (step 2 of Figure 4)
The information in this step shall be provided by the manufacturer of the electronic initiation system to the body
responsible for carrying out the risk analysis procedure described in this Technical Specification.
For the particular electronic initiation system or accessory being considered, list all those characteristics that can
affect its safety and reliability.
NOTE The following list exemplifies questions to be answered, if relevant for the system, in drawing up such a list:
a) What is the intended use and how is the electronic initiation system to be used?
The following factor shall be considered:
• During which phases of normal operation is the operator potentially exposed to risks?
b) How is the system designed?
• Complete design drawings provided by the manufacturer.
c) Which devices and accessories are included in the system?
Description, principles and intended application (on the blast site, only in safe area, etc.) of e.g.:
• Programming units
• Testing units
• Firing units
d) Which functions are provided by the system?
• General functions
• Safety functions
• Reliability functions
• Time out functions (detonator, firing/testing/programming units)
• Possibilities to abort the blasting sequence
• Programming functions
• Calibration function (e.g. for delay accuracy)
• Self-check functions (e.g. start up check, run-time check of device and detonator, information transfer and
storing; detonator timer operation, fusehead, voltage level, capacitor level, error handling)
• Limits for safe functioning
• Output strength of detonator
e) Which design measures have been taken to obtain necessary safety and reliability?
• Safety - fault tolerance measures, safety against two independent faults
• Reliability - fault tolerance measures, safety against one fault
• Can relevant failures be detected before a possible hazard occurs?
f) To which environmental stresses will the system be subjected during transport, storage and use?
• Climatic environment (temperature, humidity, hydrostatic pressure)
• Mechanical environment (static and dynamic)
• Electrical environment (e.g. electrostatic discharge, electromagnetic radiation).
• Shelf life limits
g) Which communication principles between detonators and system devices or accessories are used?
• No data communication or one way/two way data communication. Which information is transmitted/received?
• Coding principles for communication
• Delay of the detonator depending on the connection order?
• Is the function depending on intact communication and wiring during the whole blasting sequence or is the
detonator self-contained after receiving the initiation command?
• Number of wires on the bus (information carrier for the different wires)
h) Which output energy is provided from the output of firing/programming/testing units?
• Voltage
• Current
• Energy (pulse lengths)
• Limits for safe functioning of detonator (e.g. battery level, bus wire length)
i) Which energy source is used to initiate the detonator?
• Electrical energy (fusehead characteristics, e.g. no fire current/voltage, all fire current/voltage)
j) Is energy stored inside the detonator?
• Time limits for safe functioning
• Self discharge principles (at interrupted firing sequence, at disconnection from the wiring bus, comparison with
longest available delay time)
k) Do the different devices contain software?
• Programming language and compiler/linker used
• Memory storage principles, both variable and unvariable
• Description of safety related program modules
• Description of self-monitoring measures made
• Manufacturer specified circuits (e.g. PAL, PLA, PLD, CPLD, FPGA or ASIC’s)
l) Which safety measures have been considered in case of misuse?
• Use of device/accessory for electronic initiation system with conventional electric detonator
• Use of device/accessory for conventional electric detonators with electronic detonator
NOTE Furthermore information on marking principles may be required due to national regulations, e.g. marking in respect of
identifying detonators:
• Marking at production (sequence number, delay time, etc)
• Manual marking after programming
4.3 Hazard identification (step 3 of Figure 4)
Compile a comprehensive list of potential hazards associated with the electronic initiation system in both normal
and fault conditions. Clause A.1 can be used as a list of examples of potential hazards.
4.4 Risk estimation (step 4 of Figure 4)
For each of the possible hazards identified under 4.3, estimate the risks in both normal and fault conditions using
available information/data and address them to:
• Critical defect
• Major defect
• Minor defect
Several methods are available for the systematic analysis of hazards. Examples are given in annex B.
4.5 Acceptability of risk (step 5 of Figure 4)
Evaluate and test that a risk for a given hazard is appropriately addressed by compliance with a relevant standard
or method as described in 4.5.1 to 4.5.6 below. If the risk for a given hazard estimated in accordance with 4.4
exceeds the levels of acceptability defined through the application of relevant standards or by other means,
proceed to 4.6, otherwise proceed to 4.8.
4.5.1 Evaluation of functionality
Carry out evaluation of functional safety and reliability according to specific demands below by evaluation in detail
design of electronic hardware and software where applicable. Examples of functionality evaluation techniques are
listed in annex B.
4.5.1.1 Evaluation of system functionality
4.5.1.1.1 Evaluate that all functions (hardware and software) and interactions between the devices in the
system comply with the manufacturer’s specification.
4.5.1.1.2 Depending on design principle (e.g. no/one way/two way data communication system), evaluate that
sufficient testing possibilities are included in the system according to examples in A.3.
4.5.1.1.3 Evaluate that the blast order is unique and is transmitted simultaneously to all the detonators.
4.5.1.1.4 Evaluate that the time between firing order to the first blast (lowest actual delay time) shall be limited
to maximum 10 s. If longer times are available, possibilities of interrupting the blasting sequence after
the firing order has been sent shall be included.
4.5.1.1.5 In the case of an adjustable delay system using sensor, evaluate that the modification of the firing
parameters during shotfiring take place during a defined time interval in order to ensure detonation
during a desired time interval.
NOTE This means normally that the firing sequence shall not be changed as a result of this modification.
However for some applications a change in sequence might be desirable or the firing sequence might not be
determined before the firing command has been received by the detonator.
4.5.1.1.6 Evaluate the possibility to display the stored data relevant for blasting in firing and programming unit.
4.5.1.2 Evaluation of detonator functionality
4.5.1.2.1 Evaluate that the detonators do not include a permanent electric energy storage source, which in itself
is capable of firing the detonator.
NOTE This requirement is fulfilled if the impulse or current of the electrical energy storage source does not
exceed 10 % of the corresponding no-fire level of the electronic detonator fusehead, when the source is
connected directly to the fusehead.
4.5.1.2.2 Evaluate that the detonator cannot reach unsafe states in other ways than intended. This could be
done by studying a state machine graph or in the case of a microprocessor controlled detonator by
studying the software program flow.
4.5.1.2.3 Evaluate that five minutes after interruption of the firing sequence or if the detonator is disconnected
from the wire system, the shotfiring capacitors shall not offer sufficient energy to allow a blast.
4.5.1.2.4 Evaluate that the leakage current in the fuseheads is less than 10 % of the no-fire current, as long as
the firing order has not been transmitted.
4.5.1.2.5 Evaluate that each detonator is capable to operate in a self-contained way after the firing order has
been received by the detonators.
NOTE The first detonation can destroy the communication line between the firing unit and the detonators. The
delay timer should continue to run, and the energy supply in the detonator should be sufficient for operation until
the delay time has expired. The discharge time should therefore be properly set in relation to the longest delay
time.
4.5.1.2.6 Evaluate depending on design that the detonator has sufficient protection against the influence of
stray currents, electrostatic sensitivity and flash-over voltage in respect of unintended initiation and
misfire.
NOTE Depending on design, the test methods specified in 4.5.5.17 to 4.5.5.22, can be applicable to evaluate this
demand.
4.5.1.3 Evaluation of firing/testing/programming unit functionality
4.5.1.3.1 Evaluate that, in the case of a detected hardware or software error in the firing/testing/programming
unit, it shall indicate an error and enter a safe state.
4.5.1.3.2 Evaluate that the testing and programming unit is not capable of issuing a firing order on the
communication line to the detonators. The software of the testing and programming unit shall not
contain any such function.
4.5.1.3.3 Evaluate that the time between the end of the charge and the firing order is limited to a maximum of
10 min. After this time the blasting sequence shall be interrupted.
4.5.1.3.4 Evaluate that the firing unit software cannot issue firing command or reach other dangerous states in
other ways than intended and normally used.
4.5.1.3.5 Evaluate that it is possible to verify the relevant parameters for the blast in the firing/programming unit
before the blast.
4.5.2 Evaluation of fault tolerance
Carry out evaluation of fault tolerance according to specific demands below by evaluation in detail design of
electronic hardware and software where applicable. Examples of faults and combination of faults for some different
design principles are evident from annex A, clause A.2 - A.3. Examples of applicable evaluation techniques are
listed in annex B.
Fault modes for different components are evident from EN 61496-1:1997, annex B. Exclusions from this list are
evident from the following table (two alternative solutions allowed):
Component Criteria Limits for changing of values
Alternative 1: Work at nominal Alternative 2: Work at 2/3 of the
characteristics (e.g. power,maximum characteristics (e.g.
voltage, temperature) power, voltage, temperature)
Safety +100%, +50%,
- 50% -25%
Resistors and
inductances
Reliability– Tolerance specified by– Tolerance specified by manufacturer
manufacturer of component of component
Capacitor Safety + Tolerance specified by+ Tolerance specified by
manufacturer of component manufacturer of component.
- 50 % -25%
Reliability– Tolerance specified by– Tolerance specified by manufacturer
manufacturer of component of component
The rest of the components in the table of EN 61496-1:1997, annex B are applicable only for safety.
NOTE The principle for 2/3 of the maximum characteristics is evident from EN 50020.
4.5.2.1 General fault tolerance evaluation
4.5.2.1.1 Evaluate for programming/testing units that unintended initiation (critical defects) do not occur even in
the presence of two independent faults in any parts of the system.
4.5.2.1.2 Evaluate for firing units that unintended initiation (critical defects) do not occur even in the presence of
one fault.
4.5.2.1.3 Evaluate that misfire of more than one detonator (major defects) do not occur even in the presence of
one fault.
4.5.2.1.4 Evaluate that misfire of one single detonator or incorrect function (minor defects) do not occur at
intended functioning.
4.5.2.2 Specific fault tolerance evaluation
4.5.2.2.1 Evaluate that the non-firing of a series of detonators is impossible even in the presence of one fault.
4.5.2.2.2 Evaluate that the electronic components, which are necessary for safety and reliability, shall work at
the less than the nominal characteristics.
4.5.2.3 Fault tolerance evaluation - Incompatibility for use with conventional electric detonator systems
4.5.2.3.1 Evaluate that testing/programming unit for electronic initiation system is not capable of firing a
conventional electric detonator even in the presence of one fault in the testing/programming unit.
NOTE This requirement is fulfilled if the impulse or current level does not exceed the corresponding no-fire level
for the most sensitive electric detonator class (class I) even in the presence of one fault in the
testing/programming unit. If the no fire impulse is not exceeded the no fire current can be exceeded.
4.5.2.3.2 Evaluate that an electronic detonator even in the presence of one fault is not capable of being fired by
a testing unit for conventional electric detonators.
NOTE This requirement is fulfilled if the no fire current and no fire impulse of the electronic detonator fusehead is
higher than the maximum output current or impulse allowed of the testing unit for conventional electric detonators
in normal condition (i.e. no fault condition). The maximum output current and impulse for testing units for
conventional electric detonators is evident from prEN 13763-26.
4.5.3 Evaluation of design
Carry out evaluation according to specific demands below by evaluation in detail design of electronic hardware and
software where applicable. Examples of evaluation techniques are listed in annex B.
4.5.3.1 User interface
4.5.3.1.1 Evaluate that messages to the user firing/programming/testing units are presented in a way so that the
user clearly can understand the information.
4.5.3.1.2 Evaluate that if a planning tool (e.g. a computer program) is used, it shall be intuitive and the timing
information to the detonators shall be ordered in an unambiguous way to prevent errors as
connections in reverse order.
4.5.3.1.3 Evaluate that the operation of charge is obtained by a permanent positive command.
NOTE Further user interface demands indicated in 4.5.5.26 (reference to specified clauses of prEN 13763-26) shall also be
considered.
4.5.3.2 Software design and coding
This clause is valid only for software controlling the programming/testing/firing sequence.
4.5.3.2.1 Evaluate that the software is designed in a modular structure (see B.12). All modules shall also
contain the name of the programmer, the original date and revision.
4.5.3.2.2 Identify the safety critical variables and which procedures that use safety-critical variables and if they
are local or global. Evaluate that safety-critical variables are not used by non safety-critical procedures
(see B.13).
4.5.3.2.3 Evaluate that the possibility for executing wrong program parts are reduced to a minimum (see B.14)
4.5.3.2.4 Evaluate that the software version is possible to read out, either on a display or on a label. All software
shall be marked, both embedded software and PC programs.
NOTE Further information about design, development and coding of software is evident from IEC 61508-3:1998, especially
clauses 7.4.5 Requirements for detailed design and development and Tables A.4, B.1, B.7 and B.9 as well as clause 7.4.6
Requirements for code implementation and Tables A.5, B.2, B.3 and B.6.
4.5.3.3 Transmission of information
4.5.3.3.1 For electronic initiation systems using digital code transmission (i.e. sending digital “words”), evaluate
that the transmission of information- and the integrity of the communication system are in conformity
with EN 60870-5-1 :
• level I1 if faulty information can affect the reliability of the shot,
• level I2 if faulty information can have a direct influence on the safety of persons and if the
detonators can be armed or initiated by the voltage used for communication. Otherwise, use level
I1.
For electronic initiation systems, which do not use digital code transmission, e.g. systems based on
coding information within specific time windows, the evaluation has to take the specific system into
account. This may be a change of time window length (add or reduce a typical length), a change from
high signal level to low signal level or in the other direction. The faults shall not change the information
to an unintended arming or firing signal.
If the system contains other systems than CRC (cyclic redundancy check) this shall be considered
when evaluating the safety of the system. In general for both transmission principles (with or without
digital coding) means to provide error detection and handling shall be included in the system.
4.5.3.4 Techniques to control random hardware failures in complex electronics
The detection, handling and indication of random hardware faults may be evaluated, for e.g, by:
• Fault simulation/Fault insertion testing (B.4).
• Walk-throughs/design reviews (B.7).
Evaluate that firing units and testing/programming units as well as detonators having two way data communication
include suitable self-checking possibilities during start-up. Safety of single bit errors shall be considered only. The
following protective measures shall be taken:
4.5.3.4.1 Checking of faults in variable memory storing safety-related data.
4.5.3.4.2 Checking of errors in non-variable memory storing program code or data.
4.5.3.4.3 Power supply monitoring to be able to halt the execution in a controlled way at supply power failure.
4.5.3.4.4 Checking of program flow e.g. by a watchdog function.
4.5.4 User manual
Evaluate that the following information according to 4.5.4.1 to 4.5.4.5 is evident from the us
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