ASTM F1029-86(1997)e1
(Guide)Standard Guide for Selection of Physical Security Measures for a Facility (Withdrawn 2004)
Standard Guide for Selection of Physical Security Measures for a Facility (Withdrawn 2004)
SCOPE
1.1 This guide is intended to aid in the selection of effective physical security measures to deter or detect an attack on a protected facility. Consideration is made for the skill of the attacker and the type of facility that is being protected. A threat/physical security matrix given in Table 1 identifies typical protective measures and instrumentation applicable for protecting several types of facilities from several identified levels of threat.
WITHDRAWN RATIONALE
This guide is intended to aid in the selection of effective physical security measures to deter or detect an attack on a protected facility. Consideration is made for the skill of the attacker and the type of facility that is being protected.
Formerly under the jurisdiction of Committee F12 on Security Systems and Equipment, this guide was withdrawn in April 2004 in accordance with section 10.6.3.1 of the Regulations Governing ASTM Technical Committees, which requires that standards shall be updated by the end of the eighth year since the last approval date.
General Information
Relations
Standards Content (Sample)
NOTICE: This standard has either been superseded and replaced by a new version or withdrawn.
Please contact ASTM International (www.astm.org) for the latest information.
ϵ1
Designation: F 1029 – 86 (Reapproved 1997)
Standard Guide for
Selection of Physical Security Measures for a Facility
This standard is issued under the fixed designation F 1029; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (ϵ) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
ϵ NOTE—Keywords were added editorially in July 1998.
1. Scope and the ability to disable or defeat or otherwise compromise
medium and low level security measures. These intruders
1.1 This guide is intended to aid in the selection of effective
would be expected to be driven by profit motives.
physical security measures to deter or detect an attack on a
2.1.4.4 Threat Level 1—one or more unskilled individuals
protected facility. Consideration is made for the skill of the
who have little knowledge of security systems or protective
attacker and the type of facility that is being protected. A
measures, who attack with little or no advanced planning,
threat/physical security matrix given in Table 1 identifies
usually on installations with little or no security beyond locks,
typical protective measures and instrumentation applicable for
fences, and other physical protection. Their motivation is
protecting several types of facilities from several identified
almost always monetary or vandalistic.
levels of threat.
2.1.5 Internal Threat—Theriskofanattackbyanemployee
2. Terminology
or other individual with access to a facility and at least some
knowledge of the installation protection and alarm response
2.1 Descriptions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
procedures. Individuals attempting an internal attack will be
2.1.1 threat—an actual or perceived source of jeopardy.
expected to have some or all of the skills listed in 2.1.4 but the
2.1.2 vulnerability—the circumstances that would allow a
risk should be considered more significant by virtue of the
source of jeopardy to be identified or recognized.
increased accessibility and increased knowledge.
2.1.3 consequences—the negative results of an attack.
2.1.4 threat level—a perception of the capability, motiva-
3. Significance and Use
tion, and skill of an intruder. Four threat levels are identified in
3.1 Physical Security Guide—This guide is intended to
this guide:
serve as an aid in assessing the risk levels of a facility, setting
2.1.4.1 Threat Level 4—a group of highly skilled individu-
it into one of four categories, and correlating security equip-
als with strong motivation, substantial technological support,
ment and protective measures that could be installed to provide
knowledge, and funding. They are driven by motivations such
an effective security system.
as profit, public attention, sabotage, or acts of war.
2.1.4.2 Threat Level 3—a group of skilled individuals with
4. Threat/Physical Security Measures
similar but less motivation, capability, knowledge, and funding
4.1 Atabulation of applicable measures is given in Table 1.
than Threat Level 4. Driven by motives such as profit, public
This matrix is intended to serve as a starting point for security
attention, or disruption of services.
system design. Since each facility is unique, only general
2.1.4.3 Threat Level 2—one or more semi-skilled individu-
guidelines can be suggested in this guide. Not all of the
als with some knowledge of locks, barriers, intrusion detectors,
protective measures suggested in the matrix are applicable to a
specific installation. The designer should apply his knowledge
This guide is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee F-12 on Security
of physical considerations, equipment, vulnerability, conse-
Systems and Equipment and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee F12.40 on
quences, and cost effectiveness in making his selections.
Detection and Surveillance Systems and Services.
Current edition approved Sept. 26, 1986. Published December 1986.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959, United States.
NOTICE: This standard has either been superseded and replaced by a new version or withdrawn.
Please contact ASTM International (www.astm.org) for the latest information.
ϵ1
F 1029 – 86 (1997)
TABLE 1 Threat/Physical Security Matrix
Threat Level
Protected Site
12 3 4
1. Residential
Physical: Good door and window Higher grade door Higher grade door Rewards inadequate
locks and window locks and window locks to warrant attempt
Standard doors Solid doors Structurally sound
door assemblies
Window grills
Lighting Lighting Lighting
Detection: Mechanical or mag- Magnetic door Magnetic door
netic door switches switches switches
Photoelectric beam Photoelectric beam
Pressure mats Volumetric motion
detection
Alarm Transmission: Local audible alarms Auto telephone dialer Interrogate/response
Digital dialer DC or AC alarm
Series current loop transmission
alarm circuit
Miscellaneous: Pet dog Warning signs Trained animals
Recorded sounds Local audible alarms Police patrols
Timed lighting Police patrols Safes
Warning signs Pet dog
2. Commercial
Physical: Good door and win- Higher grade door Higher grade door Rewards inadequate
dow locks and window locks and window locks to warrant attempt
Solid doors Solid doors Structurally sound
Lighting Lighting door assemblies,
Perimeter fence Perimeter fence walls and ceilings
Safes/vaults
Lighting
Perimeter fence or
barriers
Detection: Magnetic door switch Balanced magnetic Exterior:
Window foil door switches Fence disturbance
Glass breakage detec- Glass breakage detec- sensor
tors tors Microwave
Fence strain wire sen- Volumetric motion Infra-red
sor detectors Buried line
Fence disturbance Fence strain wire sen- Interior:
sensor sor Balanced magnetic
Fence disturbance door switches
sensor Glass breakage detec-
Invisible barrier tors
microwave Volumetric motion
infra-red detectors
Capacitance proxim-
ity sensors
Alarm Transmission: Local audible alarm DC or AC digitial Interrogate/response
Series current loop dialers DC or AC digitial
alarm circuit dialers
Digital dialer
Miscellaneous: Warning signs Television surveil- Trained animals
Television surveil- lance Attack dogs
lance Local audible alarm Full time guards
Watch dog One-way glass Television surveil-
Trained animals lance and alarm
assessment
One-way glass
3. Industrial
Physical: Risk of apprehension Perimeter fences Perimeter fences Usually for industrial
usually great; attack High security locks High security locks espionage; use Threat
not normally attempted Structurally sound door Structurally sound door Level 3 techniques
assemblies assemblies
Window grills Window grills
Safes/vaults Safes/vaults
Lighting Security lighting
Detection: Strain fence sensors Exterior:
NOTICE: This standard has either been superseded and replaced by a new version or withdrawn.
Please contact ASTM International (www.astm.org) for the latest information.
ϵ1
F 1029 – 86 (1997)
Threat Level
Protected Site
12 3 4
Balanced magnetic switches Fence disturbance sensor
Glass breakage detectors Invisible perimeter barrier
Photoelectric barriers (infra-red or microwave)
Buried sensor
Electric field sensor
Interior:
Balanced magnetic door
switches
Volumetric motion detector
Vibration detectors
Alarm Transmission: Local audible alarm Interrogate/response
Digital dialer with pseudorandom
Series current loop coding
alarm circuit
Miscellaneous: Guards Attack dogs
Police patrols Trained animals
Warning signals Armed guards
Trained animals Television surveillance
and alarm assessment
4. Very High Risk Facilities
Physical: Would not consider it Would usually not consider Multiple fences Multiple perimeter barrier
because of the risk of it because of the risk High security locks High security locks
being caught of being caught Structurally sound door Structurally sound door
assemblies assemblies
Window grills Window grills
Safes/vaults Safes/vaults
Structurally sound walls Structurally sound walls
and ceilings and ceilings
Security lighting Security lighting
Detection: Exterior: Exterior:
Fence disturbance Fence disturbance sensor
sensors (microwave or (microwave or infra-red
infra-red beam) beams)
Electric field sensor Electric-field sensor
Buried line sensor Buried line sensor
Interior: Interior:
Balanced magnetic door Balanced magnetic door
switches switches
Volumetric motion detectors Volumetric motion detector
Vibration dertectors Vibration detectors
Television with automatic Television with motion
motion detection detection
Alarm Transmission: Interrogate/response Interrogate/response
type with type with
pseudorandom coding pseudorandom coding
Miscellaneous: Armed guards Armed guards
Attack dogs Attack dogs
Trained animals Trained animals
Television surveillance and Television surveillance and
alarm assessment alarm assessment
Trained response force
4.2 Asset Levels (Risk)—The level of assets may be placed 4.2.2 Commercial—Offices,retailstores,andsmallbusiness
in one of four categories in this matrix. Although there is no with moderate value assets. Residential areas with high value
sharp demarcation between categories, t
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