SIST EN 419241-1:2018

2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.Zaupanja vredni sistemi, ki podpirajo strežniško podpisovanje - 1. del: Splošne varnostne zahteve sistemaVertrauenswürdige Systeme, die Serversignaturen unterstützen - Teil 1: Allgemeine SystemsicherheitsanforderungenSystèmes fiables de Serveur de Signature électronique - Partie 1: Exigences de sécurité générales du systèmeTrustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing - Part 1: General System Security Requirements35.030Informacijska varnostIT SecurityICS:Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z:EN 419241-1:2018SIST EN 419241-1:2018en,fr,de01-oktober-2018SIST EN 419241-1:2018SLOVENSKI
STANDARDSIST-TS CEN/TS 419241:20141DGRPHãþD

EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPÉENNE EUROPÄISCHE NORM
EN 419241-1
July
t r s z English Version
Trustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing æ Part
sã General System Security Requirements Systèmes fiables de serveur de signature électronique æPartie
sã Exigences de sécurité générales du système
Vertrauenswürdige Systemeá die Serversignaturen unterstützen æ Teil
sã Allgemeine Systemsicherheitsanforderungen This European Standard was approved by CEN on
u r April
t r s zä
egulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alterationä Upætoædate lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CENæCENELEC Management Centre or to any CEN memberä
translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CENæCENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versionsä
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t r s z CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Membersä Refä Noä EN
v s { t v sæ sã t r s z ESIST EN 419241-1:2018

Requirements for electronic identification means, characteristics and design . 34 A.1 Enrolment . 34 A.1.1 Application and registration . 34 A.1.2 Identity proofing and verification (natural person) . 34 A.1.3 Identity proofing and verification (legal person) . 37 A.1.4 Binding between the electronic identification means of natural and legal persons . 39 A.2 Electronic identification means and authentication . 40 A.2.1 Electronic identification means characteristics and design . 40 A.2.2 Authentication mechanism . 41 Bibliography . 42
IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp 3.1 authentication provision of assurance in the identity of an entity [SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-2:2009] 3.2 authentication Factor piece of information and/or process used to authenticate or verify the identity of an entity [SOURCE: ISO/IEC 19790:2012] 3.3 data to be signed representation data formatted which is used to compute the digital signature value (e.g. hash value) [SOURCE: ETSI/TR 119 001:2016] 3.4 digital signature data unit appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of a data that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient [SOURCE: ETSI/TR 119 001:2016] 3.5 eIDAS Regulation Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC SIST EN 419241-1:2018

CC Common Criteria, ISO/IEC 15408, Evaluation criteria for IT security CEN Comité Européen de Normalization (European Committee for Standardization) DTBS/R Data To Be Signed Representation EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission ISSS Information Society Standardization System QSCD Qualified Electronic Signature (or Electronic Seal) creation device as defined in the eIDAS Regulation RA Registration Authority SAD Signature Activation Data SAM Signature Activation Module SAP Signature Activation Protocol SCA Signature Creation Application SCAL Sole Control Assurance Level SCDev Signature Creation Device SIC Signer’s Interaction Component SSA Server Signing Application TSP Trust Service Provider TW4S Trustworthy System Supporting Server Signing SIST EN 419241-1:2018

If the external party uses an electronic identification means issued under a notified scheme that is included in the list published by the Commission pursuant to Article 9 of the eIDAS [4] Regulation, there is no need to demonstrate the conformance to the required level, conformance to the regulatory requirements can be assumed. 5.7.4.3 SCAL2 The TSP SHALL ensure that the authentication process delegated to the external party meets the requirements specified in SRA_SAP.1.1. The TSP SHALL ensure that: — the external party fulfils all the relevant requirements of this standard and the requirements for registration according to the applicable regulatory requirements, or NOTE 1 In the context of the European Union, the applicable regulatory requirements are defined in REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 [4]. — the authentication process delegated to the external party uses an electronic identification means issued under a notified scheme in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements. NOTE 2 In the context of the European Union, the list of electronic identification means, issued under notified schemes, is published by the European Commission pursuant to Article 9 of REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 [4].
Figure 1 — Scope of requirements NOTE The scope of requirements may be extended to an external party when using delegation of authentication (see 5.7.4). 5.13.3 Signature activation mechanisms 5.13.3.1 General This clause presents some suggested models for signature activation in order to create a digital signature. Any other architecture compliant with Clause 6 MAY be implemented. TW4S is typically used by a set of signers, each signer owning one or several signing keys and TW4S can include one or several SCDev to perform signature operations. The signing key can be securely stored outside the SCDev and loaded dynamically, provided that controls apply to ensure the same security on the signing key. Key loading/unloading mechanisms to be employed for protecting signing keys are outside the scope of this standard. 5.13.3.2 Signature activation for SCAL1 Signing key confidentiality and integrity are ensured by the SCDev. The SCDev can be activated by the SSA. The activation can remain for a given period and/or for a given number of signatures. The signing key activation requires that the signer has been authenticated by the SSA (see Figure 2). When the signer authentication succeeds, the corresponding signing key MAY be used for signature operation on behalf of signer within a certain time frame and/or a certain amount of signature operations. This allows the SSA to be used for bulk/batch signature purposes. SIST EN 419241-1:2018

Figure 2 —Signature activation system with SCAL1 NOTE This architecture may be extended to an external party when using delegation of authentication (see 5.7.4). This architecture can be used to create digital signature value (e.g. hash encrypted using the signer’s private key) with low assurance of control. 5.13.3.3 Signature activation for SCAL2 Signing key confidentiality and integrity are ensured by the remote SCDev. The remote SCDev is under control of the SSA. The remote SCDev participates in SAP and ensures that the signature operation is under the legitimate signer control. The SSA interfaces via a secure channel the SAM of the remote SCDev which verifies the SAD in order to activate the corresponding signing key (see Figure 3). The signer authentication can remain for a given period and/or for a given number of signatures. But SAD computation SHALL be done for each signature operation. The SAD MAY be linked to a set of DTBS/R, this allows the SSA to be used for bulk/batch signature purposes. Signer authentication can be done using a SSIC that is used to create a link between the signer and the signature as part of the SAD. The SAD uses is under the responsibility of the SAM: — If the SAD is generated by the SIC, it SHALL be transferred securely from the SIC to the SAM for verification. — If the SAD is not generated by the SIC, it SHALL be generated on/during a successful signer’s authentication using the SIC and be transferred securely to the SAM for verification. SIST EN 419241-1:2018

Figure 3 — Signature activation system with SCAL2 NOTE 1 This architecture may be extended to an external party when using delegation of authentication (see 5.7.4). NOTE 2 The scope of requirements may be extended to an external party when using delegation of authentication (see 5.7.4). This architecture can be used to create digital signature value (e.g. hash encrypted using the signer’s private key) with higher assurance of control. 5.13.4 TW4S components The core parts of a TW4S for which this standard specifies requirements are the set of functional components: — Signing key setup – to generate signing keys within the SCDev and assign them for use by authorized signers. — Signing key management – to delete, backup and restore signing keys within the SCDev. — Signer authentication – to authorize the use of signing key by the signer. — Digital signature creation – to interface the authorized signer in order to create the digital signature within the SCDev. In order to enhance level of assurance, additional components are mandatory to reach SCAL2: — The SIC – to create a link between the signer and the signature operation within the SAP. SIC MAY generate SAD in the signer’s environment.
The SAM provides a set of components: — SAD generation – to generate SAD in the tamper protected environment when the SAD is not generated by the SIC. — Signing key activation – to manage SAD verification and to activate the signing keys. — Signing key generation – to manage authentication factors bound to signing keys. 6 Security requirements 6.1 General This clause describes all requirements applicable to a server signing system in order to be regarded as a TW4S. Requirements in
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