SIST-TS CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2023

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TS CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2023
01-maj-2023
Profil zaščite za pametne števce - Minimalne varnostne zahteve
Protection Profile for Smart Meter - Minimum Security requirements
Schutzprofil für Smart Meter - Mindestsicherheitsanforderungen
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2022
ICS:
33.200 Daljinsko krmiljenje, daljinske Telecontrol. Telemetering
meritve (telemetrija)
35.030 Informacijska varnost IT Security
35.240.99 Uporabniške rešitve IT na IT applications in other fields
drugih področjih
SIST-TS CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2023 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

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SIST-TS CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2023


TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CEN/CLC/TS 17880

SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE

TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
December 2022
ICS 33.200; 35.030; 35.240.99

English version

Protection Profile for Smart Meter - Minimum Security
requirements
 Schutzprofil für Smart Meter -
Mindestsicherheitsanforderungen
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 4 December 2022 for provisional application.

The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN and CENELEC will be
requested to submit their comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European
Standard.

CEN and CENELEC members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the
CEN/TS available promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in
force (in parallel to the CEN/TS) until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.

CEN and CENELEC members are the national standards bodies and national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and United Kingdom.























CEN-CENELEC Management Centre:
Rue de la Science 23, B-1040 Brussels
© 2022 CEN/CENELEC All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means
Ref. No. CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2022 E
reserved worldwide for CEN national Members and for
CENELEC Members.

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Contents Page
European foreword . 3
Introduction . 4
1 Scope . 5
2 Normative references . 5
3 Terms and definitions . 5
4 Target of Evaluation . 9
5 Conformance Claims . 11
6 Security Problem Definition . 11
7 Security Objectives . 15
8 Extended Components Definitions . 16
9 Security Requirements . 21
10 Rationales . 53
Annex A (informative) Mapping to Minimum Security Requirements . 62
Bibliography . 72

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European foreword
This document (CEN/CLC/TS 17880:2022) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/CLC JTC 13
“cybersecurity and data protection”, the secretariat of which is held by DIN.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
It is based on the “Protection Profile for Smart Meter Minimum Security requirements” Version 1.0, 30
October 2019 (CENCLCETSI_SMCG/Sec/00156/DC) created by the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Coordination
Group on Smart Meters (CG-SM).
Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users’ national standards body.
A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CEN website.
According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the
following countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the
United Kingdom.
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Introduction
This Protection Profile describes a set of security requirements for smart meters, based on the ‘minimum
security requirements’ for components of Advanced Metering Infrastructures. The requirements in Smart
Meter Co-ordination Group Privacy and Security Approach –Part IV are based on the concept that there
are a common/generic set of underlying ‘minimum’ security requirements associated with smart
metering requirement specifications in a number of EU Member States. Members of the ad hoc CG-SM
Task Force on Privacy and Security as a result developed a set of generic minimum requirements that are
valid for most of the European Member States. From this set, the requirements applicable to smart meters
(as opposed to other parts of the AMI) have then been used as the basis for this Protection Profile by
translating them, with specification of additional detail where necessary, into Common Criteria Security
1
Functional Requirements (SFRs) and refinements to the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) . The
requirements defined in this Protection Profile can therefore serve as a basis for specific requirements of
individual EU Member States, based on a risk analysis that has assessed the specific assets and actors
applicable to their scheme.
The aim of this Protection Profile is to come to an European approach for the security certification of
Smart Meters. The Cyber Security Act of the European Commission, that came into act in June 2019, asks
for the development of European certification schemes for products, processes, and services in order to
prevent fragmentation of the market by various national certification schemes. The SM-CG Working
Group on Privacy and Security is of the opinion that Common Criteria provide a cost effective and efficient
method for an agreement between manufacturers, customers and security evaluators as to what
assurance level a product shall be provided based upon a protection profile and a security target for
Smart Meters.
The Task Force recognizes that some national schemes already exist and have proven their value, such
as the French CSPN (Certification Sécurité de Premier Niveau) approach and also the CPA (Commercial
Product Assurance) approach in Great Britain and is of the opinion that it must be possible for these
national approaches to be continued. In parallel the Task Force believes that an approach based on
Common Criteria EAL.3+ and the already existing mutual recognition of CC certificates among 17
European countries, is a valuable alternative for European countries that do not have an existing
certification scheme for Smart Meters yet.
The content of a Protection Profile is defined in ISO/IEC 15408-1.
Clauses 4 to 7 based on general concepts – they are therefore intended to be read by general readers.
Other sections specify more detailed requirements and require some familiarity with Common Criteria
concepts in ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts). These more detailed requirements are used by Common Criteria
experts within developer organisations when to write a Security Target (ST) that claims conformance to
this Protection Profile for their product and identifies the product-specific ways in which the
requirements are met and implemented in the product. During the evaluation of the product, the
evaluators will check the conformance of the developer’s ST to this Protection Profile, as well as the
conformance of the product to the requirements in the ST.
Any security functionality on the meter is an additional functionality and this does not have any influence
on the metrological characteristics of the meter.

1
In general, the refinements to Security Assurance Requirements are made in order to make a clearer definition of
the evaluation activities required, and to improve the consistency of evaluations against the requirements in this
Protection Profile.

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1 Scope
This document specifies a security certification approach for smart electricity meters. It provides a
general solution for security certification to avoid fragmentation and to enable mutual recognition of
certificates in Europe. It defines the functional requirements and assurance criteria (see the Common
Criteria in ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts)) for security certification.
This Protection Profile does not define specific types of sensitive personal information or personally
identifiable information.
2 Normative references
There are no normative references in this document.
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
• IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/
• ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp
3.1
administrator
role that has a level of trust with respect to all policies implemented by the TSF in a generic term for a
privileged role that has access to sensitive operations affecting the configuration and operation of the
meter
3.2
advanced metering infrastructure
infrastructure which allows two way communications between the Head-End System and the meter(s)
Note to entry: An Advanced Metering Infrastructure can also be linked to other in house devices
3.3
assurance
grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs
3.4
consumer
end user of the metered quantity (electricity, gas, water or thermal energy)
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3.5
critical event
event that can take place in a smart meter and that is particularly significant for supply or security of the
meter
Note 1 to entry: The critical events for a meter conformant with this Protection Profile are defined as part of
FAU_ARP.2 in section 9.3.6.1)
3.6
digital signature
cryptographic techniques applied to data in order to allow verification of its integrity and authenticity
3.7
direct interface
interface to the meter that does not involve access from external networks
Note to entry 1: External networks can be WAN, Neighbourhood Network or Local Network
3.8
electromagnetic
EM
physical property related to the interrelation of electric currents or fields and magnetic fields
3.9
evaluator
person or group that carries out a security evaluation of the TOE
Note 1 to entry: An example of an evaluation standard is ISO/IEC 15408-3 with the associated evaluation
methodology given in ISO/IEC 18045.
3.10
firmware
executable code of a meter that is stored in hardware
Note to entry 1: For the purposes of this Protection Profile the relevant up-date process is defined in FPT_TSU.1,
see section 9.3.4.6
3.11
hand-held terminal unit
portable device for reading and programming equipment or meters at the consumer’s premises or at the
access point
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3.12
joint test action group
JTAG
commonly used to refer to the interface defined in IEEE 1149.1 Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-
Scan Architecture
3.13
local network
data communication network providing access to local (in-house/building) devices and / or other local
networks
3.14
message authentication code
MAC
cryptographic checksum on message data, used to provide assurance that the sender of a message is who
they claim to be and that the message is in the form originally sent (subject to the assumption that a
cryptographic key is known only to the sender and the receiver)
3.15
message
application-level communication sent to or left for a recipient
Note 1 to entry: The minimum requirements in Smart Meter Co-ordination Group Privacy and Security Approach –
Part IV, v1.1, 17 July 2016, that are the source for this Protection Profile require that security is implemented at the
application level, independent of protections that might be provided by the communication protocol.
3.16
meter data
meter readings that allow calculation of the quantity of electricity, gas, water, or thermal energy
consumed over a period
Note 1 to entry: Meter data thus may include daily and monthly meter readings, interval readings and actual meter
register values. Other readings and data may also be included (such as quality data, events and alarms)
3.17
metrology
non TSF part of the TOE that converts a physical property in a digital signal. These functions are governed
by the requirements of the Measuring Instruments Directive 2004/22/EC (MID)
3.18
neighbourhood network
data communication network providing access to several premises and / or other neighbourhood
networks
3.19
operational interfaces
interfaces required for normal operation of the meter (all other accessible interfaces are disabled)
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3.20
protection profile
PP
implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type
[Source ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009(en), 3.1.52]
3.21
role
entitlement of a party to execute a set of one or more commands associated with the role name
3.22
security assurance requirement
SAR
Description of how the TOE is to be evaluated, using the standardised language
3.23
security functional requirement
SFR
translation of the security objectives for the TOE into a set of standardised functional requirements
Note to entry 1: The SFR for the PP are drawn from ISO/IEC 15408-2 (or as extended components defined in
section 8)
3.24
sensor
device that translates a physical property in an electric signal
Note to entry 1: a sensor can be a non TSF part of the TOE, or mounted externally
EXAMPLE: a current transformer or a temperature sensor on a water return pipe
3.25
service technician
users who carry out any local installation, commissioning, maintenance or diagnostic activities on a meter
Note to entry 1: these activities may be carried out over direct or network interfaces and service technicians may
need access to privileged functions
3.26
smart meters co-ordination group
SM-CG
joint advisory body, combining expertise and resources from the European Standardization
Organizations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI), that provides a focal point concerning smart metering
standardisation issues
3.27
security target
ST
implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.63]
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3.28
arget of evaluation
TOE
set of software, firmware, hardware, or a combination of all three, possibly accompanied by guidance
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.70, modified]
3.29
TOE security functionality
TSF
combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE (3.3.4) that must be relied upon
for the correct enforcement of the SFRs (3.3.7)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.74]
3.30
TSF Data
data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
[Source ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009(en), 3.1.81]
3.31
user
external entity
human or IT entity interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
3.32
wide area network
WAN
extended data communication network connecting a large number of communication devices over a large
geographical area
4 Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smart supply meter that monitors, and possibly limits, the
2
consumption of electricity, gas, thermal energy, or water provided by utilities supply markets and
communicates with users via both local (“direct”) and network interfaces. The generic architecture of the
TOE is shown in Figure 1. (Interfaces are also labelled ‘C’, ‘G1’ ‘H1’ and ‘M’ to show correspondence with
CEN/CLC/ETSI TR 50571)

2 2
Exhaustive list which matches the main media types in the OBIS identification system.

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Figure 1 — Generic Smart Meter TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a combination of the following meter-related functions from the reference architecture
in [1]:
• List item metrology functions including the conventional meter display (register or index) that are
under legal metrological control. When under metrological control, these functions are governed by
the requirements of the Measuring Instruments Directive 2004/22/EC (MID)
• additional functions not covered by the MID, typically including features such as remote reading of
the meter, advanced tariff and payment systems, and remote enablement and disablement of supply.
• meter communication functions, including network interfaces and direct interfaces.
All smart meters conformant with this PP will implement metrology functions, some additional functions,
and communication functions. However, not all meters will implement the same additional functions, nor
will they necessarily support all communication interfaces. This PP deals with the unknowns in this
regard by requiring identification of the TOE-specific details in an ST conformant to this PP, and by
defining refinements of certain SARs to support consistency checks for meter-specific details.
The meter’s basic security task is to ensure the integrity of its content, the authenticity and integrity of
instructions that it acts on, the confidentiality of data used to provide these other security information
and personally identifiable information. Much of this task is therefore concerned with the policies applies
by the meter to communications over its various interfaces.
The meter has a backup power source to keep the time during power interruptions.
For the purposes of this PP, all network interfaces are treated simply as exchanging messages of various
types with the TOE. Although different interfaces could be using distinct transport and application
protocols, this PP requires that all network interfaces are subject to message-level permission controls
(i.e. where the permission to act on the content of a message is based on the message itself and possibly
contextual factors such as an authenticated end-to-end logical channel used to deliver the messages).
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The direct interfaces may include a display and keypad for interaction with the user, and other
communication interfaces in accordance with CEN/CLC/ETSI TR 50571. These direct interfaces might be
used for communication with other in-home devices, for example to display and analyse consumption
data, to communicate with other meters, or to communicate with engineering and maintenance tools such
as a hand-held terminal unit.
A meter may have a number of interfaces that have been disabled by the time that it is put into operational
use (e.g. interfaces for initialisation, installation, or debugging). These interfaces can have a physical
presence on the meter (such as an optical port or debug interface) or can be purely logical interfaces
(such as engineering or maintenance functions using the display and keypad). This PP requires that the
effective disabling of these interfaces is evaluated in order to confirm that they do not provide methods
to bypass the security rules applicable over other interfaces during operational use.
The meter firmware is protected from tampering by a firmware integrity test, and by a secure update
method using digitally signed updates that can be authenticated and that have their integrity protected
between the originator and the meter. A meter conformant with this PP does not allow update of any TOE
firmware other than by using the secure update process.
5 Conformance Claims
This Protection Profile (PP) complies with ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts), for both the content and
presentation requirements.
All functional and assurance security requirements laid out in this PP comply with ISO/IEC 15408 Part 2
and ISO/IEC 15408 Part 3 respectively of the aforementioned Common Criteria version.
This PP does not claim conformance to any other PP. The assurance requirement of this Protection Profile
is EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.3. This Protection Profile requires strict conformance of any Security
Target or Protection Profile that claims conformance to this Protection Profile.
6 Security Problem Definition
6.1 Assets
The assets that need to be protected by the TOE are various forms of data, including meter data,
configuration data or other operating parameters. Almost all the anticipated benefits to an attacker take
the form of accessing one or more of these forms of data – e.g. an attacker might benefit from changing
available credit, changing consumption data stored or sent by the TOE, or obtaining a key that enables
access to such data. The types of data are not separately defined because in general all data are accessed
via one of the direct or network interfaces to the meter, and therefore the focus for the threats is simply
3
on unauthorised access to any of the available data .
Such definition is done as a part of the description of a specific scheme for operating a metering system
of which the smart meter forms a part, and/or in terms of the specific data held and processed by a
particular meter type. Cryptographic keys and public key certificates are an example of data which is not
specifically identified in this PP: no particular cryptographic scheme or mechanisms are assumed.
However, the Security Target for a particular product is required to identify the relevant parameters via
its rules for controlling access to configuration of operational parameters, and its rules for ensuring
message security and access control. For the purposes of this Protection Profile, the rules for preserving

3
Different types of meters may adopt specific policies that differentiate different types of data, in which case this
must be visible in Security Targets by the completion of rules in FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_IFF.1/Msgs.
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confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of such information are to be included in the specific
4
authorization, access control and data destruction rules defined in a Security Target .
The other potential goal of an attacker is to be able to remotely disable supply of the energy that the meter
controls. This might be achieved by unauthorised access to data as above (e.g. by modifying the balance
of a prepayment meter to a level at which the meter disables the supply, or by sending a command that
changes an ‘enable/disable supply’ operating state). Remotely disabling a meter might alternatively be
achieved by causing an irrecoverable fault in the meter, and therefore the correct operation of the meter
is also treated as an asset in this Protection Profile.
6.2 Entities and Threat Agents
The external entities that interact with the TOE are as follows:
Direct Users users who interact physically with the meter, using a display and keyboard included as
part of the TOE, or via a separate component connected to the meter by a direct interface.
Network Users entities who interact with the meter over the logical, communications-based functional
interfaces presented by the meter. These functional interfaces may be accessed via WAN, Neighbourhood
Network or Local Network.
The SFRs in this Protection Profile do not define specific roles or privileged operations on the meter but
5
require the specification of all such roles and privileged operations to be included in the Security Target .
As an example, one such role might be that of a service technician who carries out any installation,
commissioning, maintenance, or diagnostic activities on the meter: for the purposes of this Protection
Profile such users are treated as direct or network users depending on the interfaces that they use to
interact with the TOE. However, it is also possible that service technicians may need access to privileged
functions, and any such functions are to be included in the Security Target as part of the definition of the
operational interfaces of the TOE.
Threat agents are considered to be individuals (or groups) interacting with the TOE using the same
interfaces and methods available to Direct Users and Network Users as above.
6.3 Threats
6.3.1 General
The following threats are defined for the TOE. The attacker (i.e. the ‘threat agent’) described in each of
the threats is a subject who is not authorized for the relevant action: the attacker may present themselves
as either a completely unknown user, or as one of the legitimate external entities in section (but in this
case the attacker will not have access to the authentication or authorization data for the user or remote
entity).
6.3.2 T.NetworkDisclosure - Unauthorised data disclosure via network access
An attacker gains access via a network interface to data that requires protection of confidentiality (this is
defined according to the policies implemented in the TOE, but typically includes private and secret keys,
reference authentication/authorization data such as unencrypted password or PIN values, and personal
data such as consumption and financial data held on the meter). Access might be gained either from
intercepting messages in transit to or from the TOE, or by executing a command (without authorization)
to remotely access data stored in the TOE.

4
Access control rules are described in FDP_ACF.1, authorisation rules in FDP_IFF.1/Msgs, and data subject to
specific secure destruction in FDP_RIP.1.
5
E.g. roles are specified as required in FMT_SMR.1, and rules defining authorisation and access controls are
specified in FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_IFF.1/Msgs. The ST author may also choose to refine the definition of External
Entities in this section in order to allow greater clarity and better granularity in the SFRs.
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6.3.3 T.DirectDisclosure - Unauthorised data disclosure via direct access
An attacker gains access to data that requires protection of confidentiality (defined according to the
policies implemented in the TOE, as described for T.NetworkDisclosure). Access might be gained either
from intercepting messages in transit to or from the TOE, or by executing a command (without
authorization) via a direct interface to access data stored in the TOE (noting that, in additional to any
network interfaces a direct attacker will also be able to use any other interfaces present on the meter,
such as the display and keypad). In addition, the attacker might attempt unauthorised physical access to
the meter by accessing internal interfaces and components (e.g. to access memory directly, without using
the intended interfaces).
6.3.4 T.Net
...