IEC 62351-9:2023

IEC 62351-9 ®
Edition 2.0 2023-06
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and
communications security –
Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment

Gestion des systèmes de puissance et échanges d’informations associés –
Sécurité des communications et des données –
Partie 9: Gestion de clé de cybersécurité des équipements de système de
puissance
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IEC 62351-9 ®
Edition 2.0 2023-06
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and

communications security –
Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment

Gestion des systèmes de puissance et échanges d’informations associés –

Sécurité des communications et des données –

Partie 9: Gestion de clé de cybersécurité des équipements de système de

puissance
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
COMMISSION
ELECTROTECHNIQUE
INTERNATIONALE
ICS 33.200 ISBN 978-2-8322-6950-3

– 2 – IEC 62351-9:2023  IEC 2023
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 8
1 Scope . 10
2 Normative references . 11
3 Terms, definitions, and abbreviations . 12
3.1 Terms and definitions . 12
3.2 Abbreviations and acronyms . 17
4 Security concepts applicable to power systems . 19
4.1 General . 19
4.2 Security objectives . 19
4.2.1 Confidentiality . 19
4.2.2 Data integrity . 19
4.2.3 Authentication. 19
4.2.4 Non-repudiation . 20
4.3 Cryptographic algorithms and concepts . 20
5 Key establishment and management techniques . 21
5.1 General . 21
5.2 Key management lifecycle . 21
5.2.1 Key management in the life cycle of a device . 21
5.2.2 Lifecycle of a cryptographic key . 23
5.3 Cryptographic key usages . 24
5.4 Key management system security policy . 25
5.5 Key management design principles for power system operations . 25
5.6 Establishment of symmetric keys . 26
5.6.1 Overview . 26
5.6.2 The Diffie-Hellman key agreement method . 26
5.6.3 Key derivation function (KDF) method . 26
5.6.4 Group key management . 27
5.7 Trust supported by public-key infrastructures (PKI) and privilege
management infrastructures (PMI) . 30
5.7.1 General . 30
5.7.2 Registration authorities (RA) . 30
5.7.3 Certification authority (CA) . 30
5.7.4 Public-key certificates . 31
5.7.5 Attribute certificates . 32
5.7.6 Public-key certificate and attribute certificate extensions . 33
5.8 Certificate management of public-key certificates . 33
5.8.1 Certificate management process . 33
5.8.2 Initial certificate creation . 34
5.8.3 Onboarding of an entity . 34
5.8.4 Enrolment of an entity . 35
5.8.5 Certificate signing request (CSR) processing . 38
5.8.6 Enrolment Protocols . 41
5.8.7 Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP) . 42
5.9 Revocation of public-key certificates . 42
5.9.1 Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) . 42
5.9.2 Online certificate status protocol (OCSP) . 43
5.9.3 Server-based certificate validation protocol (SCVP) . 46

5.9.4 Recovering from certificate revocation of an end entity . 47
5.10 Trust via non-PKI issued (self-signed) certificates . 47
5.11 Authorization and validation lists . 48
5.11.1 General . 48
5.11.2 AVLs in non-constrained environments . 48
5.11.3 AVLs in constrained environments . 49
6 Key management (normative) . 49
6.1 General . 49
6.2 Handling of security events . 49
6.3 Required cryptographic material. 50
6.4 Random Number Generation . 50
6.5 Object identifiers . 50
6.5.1 Concept of object identifiers . 50
6.5.2 Use of object identifiers by this document . 50
7 Asymmetric key management (normative). 51
7.1 General . 51
7.2 Certificate components . 51
7.2.1 Public-Key certificate components . 51
7.2.2 Attribute certificate components . 52
7.3 Certificate generation and installation . 53
7.3.1 Private and public key generation and installation. 53
7.3.2 Cryptographic key protection . 54
7.3.3 Use of existing security key management infrastructure . 54
7.3.4 Certificate policy . 54
7.3.5 Entity registration for identity establishment . 55
7.3.6 Entity configuration . 55
7.3.7 Entity enrolment . 56
7.3.8 Trust anchor information update . 58
7.4 Certificate components and certificate verification. 58
7.4.1 General . 58
7.4.2 Certificate format and encoding . 58
7.4.3 Certificate signature verification . 59
7.4.4 Public-key certificate components . 59
7.4.5 Attribute certificate components . 66
7.4.6 Certificate revocation status . 69
7.5 Certificate revocation . 70
7.6 Certificate expiration and renewal . 71
7.7 Clock Synchronization and Accuracy. 72
7.8 Authorization and validation lists . 72
7.8.1 General . 72
7.8.2 Syntax for authorization and validation list (AVL) for public-key
certificates . 72
7.8.3 AVL scope restriction . 73
7.8.4 AVL protocol restriction extension. 74
7.8.5 AVL pinning of certificate and associated identifier . 74
7.8.6 Public-key certificate extensions related to use of AVLs . 75
7.8.7 Issuing of an AVL . 75
7.8.8 Endpoint Handling of AVLs . 75
8 Group based key management (normative) . 75

– 4 – IEC 62351-9:2023  IEC 2023
8.1 GDOI requirements . 75
8.2 Internet Key Exchange Version 1 (IKEv1) . 76
8.3 Phase 1 IKEv1 main mode exchange type 2. 77
8.3.1 General . 77
8.3.2 Certificate request payload . 78
8.3.3 Security association exchange (1) . 78
8.3.4 Key exchange (2) . 79
8.3.5 ID authentication exchange (3) . 80
8.4 Phase 1/2 ISAKMP informational exchange type 5 . 81
8.4.1 General . 81
8.4.2 Phase 1 informational exchange . 82
8.4.3 Phase 2 Informational Exchange . 83
8.5 Phase 2 GDOI GROUPKEY-PULL exchange type 32 . 83
8.5.1 General . 83
8.5.2 Hash computations . 84
8.5.3 Multi-sender and counter mode encryption algorithm . 85
8.5.4 SA KEK, SEQ, KEK/LKH key download payload support . 85
8.5.5 GROUPKEY-PULL group SA request exchange . 85
8.5.6 SA TEK payload . 90
8.5.7 IEC 61850 SA TEK payload . 91
8.5.8 SA TEK payload for IEC 61850-9-3 . 92
8.5.9 SPI discussion . 94
8.5.10 SA data attributes . 95
8.5.11 GROUPKEY-PULL group key download exchange . 95
8.5.12 TEK Key Download Handling . 98
8.6 Phase 2 GROUPKEY-PUSH exchange type 33 . 98
8.6.1 General . 98
8.6.2 GROUPKEY-PUSH Message . 99
8.6.3 GROUPKEY-PUSH acknowledgement message . 99
8.7 Operational considerations . 100
8.7.1 General . 100
8.7.2 Group Security Policy . 100
8.7.3 Group dynamicity . 100
8.7.4 Handling of Key Delivery Assurance (informative) . 102
9 Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) . 102
9.1 General . 102
9.2 Notation . 103
9.3 Conformance to general key management requirements . 103
9.4 Conformance to requirements for asymmetric key management . 103
9.5 Requirements for group-based key management . 104
9.6 Supported GDOI Payload OIDs . 104
Annex A (informative) Relations to other parts of IEC 62351 and other IEC documents . 105
Annex B (informative) Cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms. 107
B.1 Trust and trust anchor . 107
B.2 Cryptographic algorithms . 107
B.2.1 Introduction . 107
B.2.2 Security strength . 108
B.3 Public-key algorithms . 108
B.3.1 General . 108

B.3.2  The RSA public-key algorithm . 109
B.3.3  The DSA public-key algorithm . 110
B.3.4  The ECDSA public-key algorithm . 110
B.3.5  The EdDSA public-key algorithms . 112
B.3.6  Digital signature algorithms . 114
B.4  Symmetric key algorithms . 116
B.4.1  Stream ciphers vs. block ciphers . 116
B.4.2  Advance encryption standard . 116
B.4.3  Advanced encryption standard – cipher block chaining (AES-CBC) . 117
B.4.4  Advanced encryption standard – counter mode (AES-CTR) . 117
B.5  Hash algorithms . 118
B.6  Integrity check value (ICV) algorithms . 119
B.6.1  General . 119
B.6.2  Keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) algorithm . 119
B.6.3  Advance Encryption Standard (AES) – Galois message authentication
code (GMAC) algorithm . 120
B.7  Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithms . 120
B.7.1  General . 120
B.7.2  Advanced encryption standard (AES) – Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) . 121
B.7.3  Advanced encryption standard (AES) – Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) . 121
B.8  Diffie-Hellman key agreement . 122
B.8.1  General . 122
B.8.2  Introduction to cyclic groups . 122
B.8.3  Diffie-Hellman method over finite field . 123
B.8.4  The discrete logarithm problem . 123
B.8.5  Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement . 123
B.8.6  Key establishment algorithms . 124
B.9  Key derivation . 125
B.10  Migration of cryptographic algorithms . 126
B.11  Post-quantum computing cryptography . 126
B.12  Random Number Generation (RNG) . 127
B.12.1  Random number generation types . 127
B.12.2  Deterministic random bit generators . 127
B.12.3  Non-deterministic random number generation . 128
B.12.4  Entropy sources . 128
Annex C (informative) Certificate enrolment and renewal flowcharts . 129
C.1  Certificate Enrolment . 129
C.2  Certificate Renewal . 130
Annex D (informative) Security Event mapping to IEC 62351-14 . 131
D.1  General . 131
D.2  Security event log records for credential transport and enrolment . 131
D.3  Security event log records for public-key certificate verification . 132
D.4  Security event log records for attribute certificate verification . 134
D.5  Security event log records for certificate revocation status . 136
D.6  Security event log records for group-based key management with GDOI . 137
Bibliography . 138

Figure 1 – Overview key management in the life cycle of an entity . 22

– 6 – IEC 62351-9:2023  IEC 2023
Figure 2 – Cryptographic key life cycle . 23
Figure 3 – Overview of group key management on the example of GDOI . 27
Figure 4 – GDOI IKE Phase 1 – Authentication and securing communication channel . 28
Figure 5 – GDOI Pull Phase 2 . 29
Figure 6 – Overview of PKI infrastructure and realization examples . 30
Figure 7 – Central certificate generation . 32
Figure 8 – Relationship between public-key certificates and attribute certificates . 33
Figure 9 – Example of the SCEP entity enrolment and CSR process . 36
Figure 10 – Example of the EST entity enrolment and CSR process . 37
Figure 11 – CSR processing . 38
Figure 12 – Certification request format . 39
Figure 13 – Certificate request message format . 40
Figure 14 – Certificate revocation list . 43
Figure 15 – Overview of the online certificate status protocol (OCSP) . 44
Figure 16 – Diagram using a combination of CRL and OCSP processes . 45
Figure 17 – Call Flows for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). 46
Figure 18 – Overview Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol using OCSP
Backend . 47
Figure 19 – IKEv1 (RFC 2409) main mode exchange with RSA digital signatures . 78
Figure 20 – IKEv1 main mode exchange and security association messages . 78
Figure 21 – IKEv1 main mode exchange: key exchange messages . 79
Figure 22 – IKEv1 Main Mode Exchange: ID authentication messages . 80
Figure 23 – IKEv1 HASH_I calculation . 81
Figure 24 – Phase 1 Informational Exchange (cf. RFC 2408, section 4.8) . 82
Figure 25 – Phase 2 Informational Exchange (cf. RFC 2409, section 5.7) . 83
Figure 26 – IKEv1 HASH(1) calculation . 83
Figure 27 – GDOI GROUPKEY-PULL as defined in RFC 6407 . 84
Figure 28 – GROUPKEY-PULL hash computations . 84
Figure 29 – GROUPKEY-PULL initial SA request exchange . 85
Figure 30 – RFC 6407 Identification Payload . 86
Figure 31 – ID_OID Identification Data . 87
Figure 32 – 61850_UDP_ADDR_GOOSE/SV ASN.1 BNF . 88
Figure 33 – IPADDRESS ASN.1 BNF . 88
Figure 34 – Example IecUdpAddrPayload ASN.1 Data with DER Encoding . 89
Figure 35 – 61850_UDP_TUNNEL Payload ASN.1 BNF . 89
Figure 36 – 61850_ETHERNET_GOOSE/SV Payload ASN.1 BNF . 89
Figure 37 – RFC 6407 SA TEK Payload . 90
Figure 38 – IEC-61850 SA TEK Payload . 91
Figure 39 – Correlation of SPI Value . 94
Figure 40 – GROUPKEY-PULL Key Download Exchange . 95
Figure 41 – GROUPKEY-PULL group key download hash computations . 95
Figure 42 – Key renewal triggered by the entities . 97
Figure 43 – GROUPKEY-PUSH message (from RFC 6407) . 98

Figure 44 – GROUPKEY-PUSH ACK message (from RFC 8263) . 98
Figure 45 – GROUPKEY-PUSH ACK hash computations . 99
Figure 46 – GROUPKEY-PUSH ack_key computations . 99
Figure A.1 – IEC 62351-9 relationship to other parts of IEC 62351 . 105
Figure C.1 – Certificate Enrolment (general) . 129
Figure C.2 – Certificate Renewal State Machine . 130

Table 1 – Public-key certificate components . 51
Table 2 – Attribute certificate components . 53
Table 3 – KDC IKEv1 Requirements . 76
Table 4 – IEC 61850 Object IDs: Mandatory (m) and Optional (o) . 87
Table 5 – PICS for general key management . 103
Table 6 – PICS for asymmetric key management . 103
Table 7 – PICS for group-based key management (valid for KDC and Client) . 104
Table 8 – PICS for supported OIDs for the identification payload . 104
Table D.1 – Security event logs for credential transport and certificate enrolment
mapped to IEC 62351-14 . 131
Table D.2 – Security event logs defined for public-key certificate verification mapped to
IEC 62351-14. 132
Table D.3 – Security event logs defined for attribute certificate verification mapped to
IEC 62351-14. 134
Table D.4 – Security event logs defined for certificate revocation status mapped to
IEC 62351-14. 136
Table D.5 – Security event logs for GDOI mapped to IEC 62351-14 . 137

– 8 – IEC 62351-9:2023  IEC 2023
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION
EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment

FOREWORD
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8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
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9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of patent
rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
IEC 62351-9 has been prepared by WG15: Data and Communication Security, of IEC technical
committee TC57: Power systems management and associated information exchange. It is an
International Standard.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition
constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous
edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE
61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;

f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been
added.
The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:
Draft Report on voting
57/2579/FDIS 57/2594/RVD
Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in
the above table.
The language used for the development of this International Standard is English.
This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in
accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available
at www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs. The main document types developed by IEC are
described in greater detail at www.iec.ch/publications.
NOTE The following print types are used:
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): in courier new and bold courier new type.
The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the
stability date indicated on the IEC website under webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the
specific document. At this date, the document will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
IMPORTANT – The "colour inside" logo on the cover page of this document indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding
of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.

– 10 – IEC 62351-9:2023  IEC 2023
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION
EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment

1 Scope
This part of IEC 62351 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the
management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key
certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds
a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is
also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as
applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and
technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key
management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security
policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may
have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore
specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography
infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of
cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of
communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise
communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and
IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system
communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect
GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-
based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this
protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues
which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to
these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined
by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum
computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent.
Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.

2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated refe
...