prEN 419111-3

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-april-2013
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Protection profiles for signature creation and verification application - Signature creation
application - Part 3: Possible extensions
Schutzprofile für eine Anwendung zum Erzeugen und Prüfen von Signaturen - Signatur
Kreation Anwendung - Teil 3: Mögliche Extentionen
Profils de protection pour la création et la vérification de signatures électroniques -
Application de création de signature - Partie 3: Extensions possibles
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: prEN 419111-3
ICS:
35.240.15 Identifikacijske kartice in Identification cards and
sorodne naprave related devices
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

EUROPEAN STANDARD
DRAFT
NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM
February 2013
ICS 35.240.15 Will supersede CWA 14170:2004
English Version
Protection profiles for signature creation and verification
application - Signature creation application - Part 3: Possible
extensions
Profils de protection pour la création et la vérification de Schutzprofile für eine Anwendung zum Erzeugen und
signatures électroniques - Application de création de Prüfen von Signaturen - Signatur Kreation Anwendung -
signature - Partie 3: Extensions possibles Teil 3: Mögliche Extentionen
This draft European Standard is submitted to CEN members for enquiry. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 224.

If this draft becomes a European Standard, CEN members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which
stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration.

This draft European Standard was established by CEN in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language
made by translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management
Centre has the same status as the official versions.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.
Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to
provide supporting documentation.

Warning : This document is not a European Standard. It is distributed for review and comments. It is subject to change without notice and
shall not be referred to as a European Standard.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION

EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2013 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. prEN 419111-3:2013: E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

Contents Page
Foreword .4
1 Scope .5
2 Normative references .5
3 Terms and definitions .5
4 Symbols and abbreviations .5
5 Extended component definition .5
5.1 Definition of the Family FDP_SVR .5
6 Checker package .7
6.1 Conformance .7
6.1.1 CC Conformance Claim .7
6.1.2 EAL Claim .7
6.2 Security problem definition .7
6.2.1 Assets .7
6.2.2 Threats .7
6.2.3 Organisational security policies .7
6.2.4 Assumptions .7
6.3 Security objectives .8
6.3.1 Security objectives for the TOE .8
6.3.2 Security objectives for the operational environment.8
6.3.3 Rationale for Security objectives .8
6.4 Security requirements .8
6.4.1 Introduction .8
6.4.2 Security functional requirements.8
6.4.3 Security Functional Requirement rationale . 10
6.4.4 Rationale for SFR Dependencies . 13
7 Secure channel with SSCD package. 14
7.1 Conformance . 14
7.1.1 CC Conformance Claim . 14
7.1.2 EAL Claim . 14
7.2 Security problem definition . 14
7.2.1 Assets . 14
7.2.2 Threats . 15
7.2.3 Organisational security policies . 15
7.2.4 Assumptions . 15
7.3 Security objectives . 15
7.3.1 Security objectives for the TOE . 15
7.3.2 Security objectives for the operational environment. 15
7.3.3 Rationale for Security objectives . 15
7.4 Security requirements . 15
7.4.1 Introduction . 15
7.4.2 Security functional requirements. 15
7.4.3 Security Functional Requirement rationale . 16
7.4.4 Rationale for SFR Dependencies . 20
Bibliography . 22
Index . 24

Figures
Figure 1 — FDP_SVR component levelling . 6

Tables
Table 1 — Checker SFP – Objects and Operations. 8
Table 2 — Checker SFP – subjects, objects and attributes . 9
Table 3 — Checker operation rules . 9
Table 4 — SFR vs Objectives on the TOE . 10
Table 5 — SFR dependencies . 13
Table 6 — SFR vs Objectives on the TOE . 16
Table 7 — SFR dependencies . 20

Foreword
This document (prEN 419111-3:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 “Personal
identification, electronic signature and cards and their related systems and operations”, the secretariat of
which is held by AFNOR.
This document is currently submitted to the CEN Enquiry.
This document, together with prEN 419111-1:2013 and prEN 419111-1:2013, will supersede
CWA 14170:2004.
EN 419111 consists of the following parts under the general title "Protection profiles for signature creation and
verification application":
 Part 1: Introduction.
This part is an introduction to EN 419111;
 Part 2: Signature creation application – Core PP.
This part is a PP for the SCA, specifying only the core security functions;
 Part 3: Signature creation application – Possible extensions.
This part specifies possible additional security functions that can be added to the core SCA PP;
 Part 4: Signature verification application – Core PP.
This part is a PP for the SVA, specifying only the core security functions;
 Part 5: Signature verification application – Possible extensions.
This part specifies possible additional security functions that can be added to the core SVA PP.

1 Scope
This document contains a set of packages. These packages describe security functions that may be added to
the core SCA PP prEN 419111-2:2013 [2]. The following packages are available:
 Checker package
 Certificate management package
 Secure channel with SSCD package
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references,
the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
prEN 419111-1:2013, Protection profiles for signature creation and verification application – Part 1:
Introduction
[NR1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general
model – July 2009 – Version 3.1 Rev. 3 CCMB-2009-07-001
[NR2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional
components – July 2009 – Version 3.1 Rev. 3 CCMB-2009-07-002
[NR3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
components – July 2009 – Version 3.1 Rev. 3 CCMB-2009-07-003
[NR4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation methodology – July
2009 – Version 3.1 Rev. 3 CCMB-2009-07-004
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in prEN 419111-1:2013 apply.
4 Symbols and abbreviations
For the purposes of this document, the symbols and abbreviations given in prEN 419111-1:2013 apply.
5 Extended component definition
5.1 Definition of the Family FDP_SVR
In order to define the IT-security requirements of the TOE completely, an additional functional family
(FDP_SVR) of class FDP (user data protection) is defined. This family describes the functional requirements
for a secure viewer component of a signature application component.
Due to the complexity of a legal binding viewer component as required by the signature law this component
could not be modelled from the components that are provided by the Common Criteria framework. Therefore
the introduction of a separate functional family is necessary that covers the requirements to describe the TOE
consistently as needed for a confirmation that is based on the results of the Common Criteria evaluation.
FDP_SVR Secure Viewer
Family behaviour
This family defines the functional requirements to a secure viewer component for electronic signature
applications. Electronic signature applications require a viewer component, which ensures, that the displayed
data is unambiguous. The user shall be informed about content, that may not be displayed but the electronic
signature will refer to.
Component levelling
Figure 1 — FDP_SVR component levelling

FDP_SVR.1 Secure Viewer requires the TSF to display the documents content in an unambiguous way,
which is free of hidden content. In addition, the ability to inform the user about hidden
content is required.
FDP_SVR.2 Secure Viewer requires the TSF to display the results of the signature verification according
to the signature policy.
Management: FDP_SVR.1, FDP_SVR.2
For this component no management activities are foreseen.
Audit: FDP_SVR.1, FDP_SVR.2
No actions are identified, that should be logged, if FAU_GEN is part of the PP/ST.
FDP_SVR.1 Secure viewer of data content
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP_SVR.1.1 The TSF shall ensure, that the displayed content of a document is unambiguous according
to [assignment: norms for document format].
FDP_SVR.1.2 The TSF shall check that the displayed content of a document is free of active or hidden
content. The TSF shall ensure that the user is informed about hidden or active content and
its implications.
FDP_SVR.1.3 The TSF shall ensure, that the user is informed about content that cannot be displayed.
FDP_SVR.2 Secure viewer of signature verification results
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SVR.2.1 The TSF shall ensure, that the displayed results of signature verification is unambiguous
according to [assignment: signature policy].
FDP_SVR.2.2 The TSF shall inform the user about [assignment: list of verification results].
The assurance requirements that have been defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 Part 3 [NR3] are applicable
to the functional family FDP_SVR. This functional family has been defined to meet the requirements of a
secure viewer component in a signature application component.
Because this component is a software component with a well defined behaviour on its external interfaces, the
assurance requirements that have been defined in Part 3 of Common Criteria [NR3] are applicable to this
functional family.
Through its nature as a software component the assurance classes ACM, ADO, ADV, AGD, ALC, ATE and
AVA are applicable in the evaluation process. It is not required to define a new assurance class or assurance
family for a consistent and complete description to cover this SFR. This SFR does not define any behaviour
that might require an extension of Part 3 of the Common Criteria Evaluation Framework [NR3].
6 Checker package
6.1 Conformance
6.1.1 CC Conformance Claim
This package is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant and written according to the Common Criteria
version 3.1R3 ([NR1], [NR2], [NR3] and [NR4]).
6.1.2 EAL Claim
The evaluation assurance level for this package is EAL3 augmented with the assurance components
AVA_VAN.3.
6.2 Security problem definition
6.2.1 Assets
No additional asset.
6.2.2 Threats
No additional threat.
6.2.3 Organisational security policies
No modification in OSP.
6.2.4 Assumptions
No modification in assumptions.
6.3 Security objectives
6.3.1 Security objectives for the TOE
OT.Checker
The TSF shall provide a module able to determine if the semantics of the document to be signed is
conformant to the rules defined for the determined format.
6.3.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
OE.Checker removed from core
6.3.3 Rationale for Security objectives
The modification consists in replacing OE.Checker by OT.Checker in the header row, and in the justification.
6.4 Security requirements
6.4.1 Introduction
6.4.1.1 Subjects Objects and security attributes
6.4.1.2 Operations
6.4.2 Security functional requirements
FDP_SVR.1 is added to the Core SCA PP.
FDP_IFC/Checker and FDP_IFF/Checker from the Core SCA PP are replaced by the following
FDP_ACC/Checker and FDP_ACF/Checker.
FDP_ACC.1.1/Checker The TSF shall enforce the [Checker SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects,
and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

Table 1 — Checker SFP – Objects and Operations
Subject Object Operation
S.Signer O.SDO Check
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP_ACF.1.1/Checker The TSF shall enforce the [Checker SFP] to objects based on the following:
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each,
the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

Table 2 — Checker SFP – subjects, objects and attributes
Subject/Object Attributes
S.Signer AT.Authenticated
O.SDO AT.Status, AT.CheckerStatus, AT.CheckerOptional, AT.Type

FDP_ACF.1.2/Checker The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules governing access
among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled
objects].
The following operations are allowed only when the rules are met:
Table 3 — Checker operation rules
Object Operation Conditions
O.SDO Check Type of document is supported by the Checker

FDP_ACF.1.3/Checker The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorise access of subjects to objects].

FDP_ACF.1.4/Checker The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access
of subjects to objects].
FDP_SVR.1 Secure viewer of data content
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP_SVR.1.1 The TSF shall ensure, that the displayed content of a document is unambiguous according
to [assignment: norms for document format].
FDP_SVR.1.2 The TSF shall check that the displayed content of a document is free of active or hidden
content. The TSF shall ensure that the user is informed about hidden or ac
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