CEN/TS 17489-5:2025
(Main)Personal identification - Secure and interoperable European breeder documents - Part 5: Trust establishment and management processes
Personal identification - Secure and interoperable European breeder documents - Part 5: Trust establishment and management processes
1.1 Objective
This document is intended for the use of breeder document issuing authorities both policymakers and technical, for having uniform formats that conform to printed as well as digital requirements of CEN member and associated states (including EU member states).
The objectives are:
a) provision of a common set of formats of breeder documents – printed and digital to be implemented by CEN member and associated states (including EU member states), with the extended objective of their acceptance internationally;
b) the focus is on having common recognizable formats as well as prevention of identity fraud, particularly related to the use of breeder documents to obtain national and international ID documents, such as passports, and residence permits.
1.2 Human dimension of identity management
Each country’s identity management system also provides a framework for observing and protecting many of the human rights embodied in international declarations and conventions. Depending on the provisions in place, the system can ensure that citizens can exercise a wide range of rights, such as rights to property, privacy, freedom of movement and free choice of place of residence, as well as access to social services such as education, healthcare and social security. In states with more advanced technological infrastructure, population registration provides the basis for the establishment of a number of citizen-oriented computerized services, also known as e-services and e-government. Identity management is also central to prevention of discrimination in exercising guaranteed rights.
The identity management infrastructure provides the backbone for a functioning and viable state by securing civil, population and tax registers, as well other systems such as healthcare benefits, voter lists and the issuance of travel and identity documents based on verifiable identities. Such flaws may become visible during elections, where shortcomings in voter lists can affect confidence in the election process. In essence, a secure identity management system can be seen as the foundation, a root level, that is able to then feed into and help numerous other branches of key state services function effectively and accurately (OSCE, 2017, p.13) [27].
1.3 Security dimension of identity management
One of the key elements of a secure environment for cross-border travel is that the travel documents used by visitors meet international standards in terms of security of the document itself and security in that the document reflects the genuine identity of its holder. Similarly, the systems for issuing travel documents need to be linked to identity management systems to streamline decision-making processes, preferably through modernized systems that reflect developments in document security technology. As entries in registers or officially issued identification documents provide access to specific services, criminal networks are constantly looking for possible gaps in identity management systems to obtain genuine documents under fabricated or stolen identities. Documents obtained as result of gaps in identity management have enabled criminals to target business entities and cause significant financial losses through the use of genuine documents issued to non-existent identities (OSCE, 2017, p.14) [27].
Both legal and illegal immigration breeder docs are regularly used to determine an identity if no MRTD or eMRTD is presented. An identity which will be printed on an eRP, Foreigners ppt, Refugees travel doc etc. unless other supportive evidence of identity is provided.
Organized crime has not overlooked this and fraudulently obtained or falsified travel documents are regularly presented to hide the true identity.
Since a significant portion of the world’s population cannot reliably prove their identity, they rely on verbally presented identities and/or supportive breeder documents when registering in another country.
Asylum applicants who...
Persönliche Identifikation - Sichere und interoperable Europäische Ausgangsdokumente - Teil 5: Vertrauensbildung und Verwaltungsprozesse
Osebna identifikacija - Varni in interoperabilni evropski izvorni dokumenti - 5. del: Postopki vzpostavitve in vodenja zaupanja
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-oktober-2025
Osebna identifikacija - Varni in interoperabilni evropski izvorni dokumenti - 5. del:
Postopki vzpostavitve in vodenja zaupanja
Personal identification - Secure and interoperable European breeder documents - Part 5:
Trust establishment and management processes
Persönliche Identifikation - Sichere und interoperable Europäische Ausgangsdokumente
- Teil 5: Vertrauensbildung und Verwaltungsprozesse
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TS 17489-5:2025
ICS:
35.240.15 Identifikacijske kartice. Čipne Identification cards. Chip
kartice. Biometrija cards. Biometrics
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
CEN/TS 17489-5
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
August 2025
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
ICS 35.240.15
English Version
Personal identification - Secure and interoperable
European breeder documents - Part 5: Trust establishment
and management processes
Persönliche Identifikation - Sichere und interoperable
Europäische Ausgangsdokumente - Teil 5:
Vertrauensbildung und Verwaltungsprozesse
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 4 August 2025 for provisional application.
The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to
submit their comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.
CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS
available promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in
parallel to the CEN/TS) until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and
United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Rue de la Science 23, B-1040 Brussels
© 2025 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TS 17489-5:2025 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
Contents Page
European foreword . 3
Introduction . 4
1 Scope . 6
1.1 Objective . 6
1.2 Human dimension of identity management . 6
1.3 Security dimension of identity management . 6
1.4 Legal identity . 7
2 Normative references . 8
3 Terms and definitions . 8
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 10
5 Methodology . 10
5.1 Introduction . 10
5.2 Procedure . 11
5.3 Classification. 11
5.3.1 Categories of criteria adoption . 11
5.3.2 Categories of implementation status . 11
5.4 Reporting . 11
5.4.1 Objective . 11
5.4.2 Declaration of Implementation (DOI) . 12
5.4.3 Ranking . 12
Annex A (informative) Checklist “Declaration of Implementation . 14
A.1 General recommendations on issuance and operational procedures . 14
A.1.1 Logistical aspects . 14
A.1.2 Human resources . 18
A.1.3 Technical controls and system migration . 24
A.1.4 Distribution of secure public keys and systems access . 31
A.1.5 Civil registration (Newly born) . 33
A.1.6 Civil registration (other) . 49
A.1.7 Content update of data-entries . 52
A.1.8 Reissuance of birth certificates . 58
A.1.9 Issuance process . 60
A.1.10 Coding; Transcribing of eastern / western names and character sets . 62
A.1.11 Validity of document . 63
A.1.12 Vetting of data . 64
A.1.13 Note . 66
Bibliography . 67
European foreword
This document (CEN/TS 17489-5:2025) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224
“Personal identification and related personal devices with secure element, systems, operations and
privacy in a multi sectorial environment”, the secretariat of which is held by AFNOR.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users’ national standards body.
A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CEN website.
According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the
following countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the
United Kingdom.
Introduction
A legally recognized identity enables citizens to exercise their rights and access state and other services.
This includes the right to travel and access to travel documents such as passports, as well as access to
education, healthcare, social services, and bank accounts. In order to establish legally recognized
identities of citizens, states implement identity management (IdM) systems.
Breeder documents are legal documents which certify a vital event of a person and are essential
components of these IdM systems. According to the United Nations terminology [10] vital events include
live birth, death, foetal death, marriage (which includes partnership), divorce, adoption, legitimation,
recognition of parenthood, annulment of marriage, or legal separation. These vital events of a person are
recorded in the civil register (if used) of the state, during a process which is called registration, and a
corresponding breeder document is issued to the citizen.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) points out the importance of a breeder
document (denoted as primary documents) framework [8]:
“While there are several layers of identity management that produce different types of identity
documents, frameworks for issuing primary identity documents are the critical components of the entire
identity management system. They provide a framework for the legal establishment of one’s identity and
identity documents on the basis of which other types of identity documents may be issued.”
While there are standardized frameworks for identity documents such as travel documents including
passports, a standardized framework for secure and interoperable breeder documents is missing.
For machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) including passports, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has published the Doc 9303 standard [4] which has been prepared in collaboration
with the standardization group ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17/WG 3. The international adoption and
implementation of this document establishes a certain security level for travel documents and enables
interoperability, e.g. by means of the standardized layout and character set used for travel documents.
The lack of breeder document standardization leads to interoperability as well as security issues. The
layout of breeder documents differs between states and often even between the municipalities of a state.
Breeder documents typically do not support machine readable technologies, and therefore their data is
be manually entered for subsequent processing which is error prone and time consuming. The non-
standardized layout can hinder a verifier to identify the required breeder document data and a
translation of the breeder document is potentially required. This translation potentially uses a
transliteration of names, i.e. a conversion of the names from one alphabet to another, and this can lead to
different spellings of the name of the same person, e.g. if diacritical marks are used in the original breeder
document, but not used in the translated document.
For instance, the International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS) [6] has addressed these interoperability
issues in several conventions and recommendations that specify a data set and a character set to be used
as well as identifiers for the different data fields of a breeder document.
Breeder documents are typically used as an identity evidence in identity proofing scenarios for issuing
travel documents. Due to the established security level of travel documents and the typically lower
security level of breeder documents fraudsters aim at obtaining authentic travel documents on the basis
of false identities based e.g. on non-genuine or forged breeder documents instead of forging or
counterfeiting travel documents. Therefore, fraudsters use:
— counterfeit breeder documents, i.e. unauthorized reproductions of genuine documents;
— forged breeder documents, i.e. genuine breeder document that have been altered;
— genuine breeder documents of another person; i.e. they impersonate the legitimate holder of the
breeder documents. As breeder documents such as birth certificates usually do not include
information that links the breeder document to its legitimate holder, strong organisational methods
are required to establish this link, in particular in the case of first-time registration;
— forged data and identity evidence documents to obtain breeder documents with false data
representations.
Breeder documents are considered the weakest link in the issuance process of travel documents, see the
ICAO guidelines [5] for best practices on how breeder documents are used in this process. For this reason
the European Union (EU) has funde
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