IEC 61500:2018
(Main)Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems important to safety - Data communication in systems performing category A functions
Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems important to safety - Data communication in systems performing category A functions
IEC 61500:2018 establishes requirements for data communication which is used in systems performing category A functions in nuclear power plants. It covers also interface requirements for data communication of equipment performing category A functions with other systems including those performing category B and C functions and functions not important to safety. This document gives requirements for functions and properties of on-line plant data communication by reference to IEC 60880 and IEC 60987, produced within the framework of IEC 61513. It requires categorisation of the communication functions in accordance with IEC 61226. This new edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
- the changes introduced to previously referenced standards have been confirmed to apply;
- relevant newly published standards have been referenced;
- lessons learned from several industrial applications have been incorporated.
Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Systèmes d'instrumentation et de contrôle-commande importants pour la sûreté - Communications de données dans les systèmes réalisant des fonctions de catégorie A
IEC 61500:2018 établit des exigences applicables à la communication de données assurée pour des systèmes réalisant des fonctions de catégorie A dans les centrales nucléaires de puissance. Cela comprend aussi les exigences relatives aux interfaces des équipements de communication de données assurant des fonctions de catégorie A, avec les autres systèmes y compris ceux qui assurent des fonctions de catégories B et C, ainsi que des fonctions non importantes pour la sûreté. Ce document fournit des exigences pour les fonctions et les propriétés afférentes à la communication de données en faisant référence aux IEC 60880 et IEC 60987, qui ont été développées sous couvert de l’IEC 61513. Cela implique que les fonctions de communication soient classées conformément à l’IEC 61226. Les principales modifications techniques par rapport à l'édition précédente sont les suivantes:
- les modifications introduites dans les normes précédemment référencées sont applicables;
- des normes pertinentes récemment publiées sont référencées;
- le retour d’expérience obtenu au niveau de plusieurs applications industrielles a été pris en compte.
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IEC 61500 ®
Edition 3.0 2018-04
REDLINE VERSION
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
colour
inside
Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Data communication in systems performing category A functions
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IEC 61500 ®
Edition 3.0 2018-04
REDLINE VERSION
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
colour
inside
Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Data communication in systems performing category A functions
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
ICS 27.120.20 ISBN 978-2-8322-5625-1
– 2 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 3
INTRODUCTION . 2
1 Scope . 8
2 Normative references . 8
3 Terms and definitions . 9
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 11
5 General requirements . 11
5.1 Principles of selection of data communication techniques and equipment . 11
5.2 Functional requirements . 11
5.3 Performance requirements . 12
Failure detection .
5.4 Communication within and between division . 13
5.5 Interfaces to systems of lower importance to safety . 13
6 Electrical isolation and physical separation . 13
6.1 Electrical isolation . 13
6.2 Physical separation . 13
7 Functional independence . 14
8 Reliability . 14
8.1 Self-supervision and failure mitigation . 14
8.1.1 Communication error detection . 14
8.1.2 Response to failure . 15
8.2 Testing . 15
8.3 Prevention of failures (including CCF) . 16
8.4 Cybersecurity . 17
9 Qualification . 17
10 Maintenance and modification . 17
Bibliography . 18
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
DATA COMMUNICATION IN SYSTEMS PERFORMING
CATEGORY A FUNCTIONS
FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
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– 4 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
International Standard IEC 61500 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation,
control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45:
Nuclear instrumentation.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition
constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous
edition:
a) the changes introduced to previously referenced standards have been confirmed to apply;
b) relevant newly published standards have been referenced;
c) lessons learned from several industrial applications have been incorporated.
The text of this standard is based on the following documents:
FDIS Report on voting
45A/1183/FDIS 45A/1194/RVD
Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on
voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
IMPORTANT – The “colour inside” logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding
of its contents. Users should therefore print this publication using a colour printer.
INTRODUCTION
a) Technical background, main issues and organization of the standard
The equipment for data communication of on-line plant data can simplify the hardwired cables
connecting distributed systems for instrumentation, control, protection and monitoring needed
for the safe operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Such communication systems can have
advantages over direct cables, for electrical isolation, for reduction of cable fire loads or other
reasons. In a distributed computer based system, communication equipment is an essential
part of the system. Data communication is usually essential for implementing I&C systems
important to safety in nuclear power plants.
It is intended that the document be used by operators of NPPs (utilities), manufacturers of
data communication equipment, systems evaluators and by licensors.
b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series
IEC 61500 is the third level IEC SC 45A document tackling the generic issue of data
communication for equipment performing category A functions.
IEC 61500 is to be read in association with IEC 61513, which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A
document providing guidance on general requirements for instrumentation and control
systems important to safety, IEC 60880, which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A document
providing guidance on software aspects for computer based systems performing category A
functions, and IEC 60987 which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A document providing guidance
on hardware aspects for computer based systems.
For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this
introduction.
c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of the standard
It is important to note that this standard establishes no additional functional requirements for
safety systems.
Aspects for which special recommendations have been provided in this standard are:
• Requirements for data communication within systems performing category A functions.
• Requirements for data communication between divisions of a system performing
category A functions.
• Requirements for data communication of systems performing category A functions with
systems of lower safety importance.
• Reliability requirements for data communication.
To ensure that the standard will continue to be relevant in future years, emphasis is placed on
principles, rather than on specific technologies.
d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships
with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)
The top-level documents of the IEC SC 45A standard series is are IEC 61513 and IEC 63046.
It IEC 61513 provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to
perform functions important to safety in NPP. IEC 63046 provides general requirements for
electrical power systems of NPP; it covers power supply systems including the supply
systems of the I&C systems. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 are to be considered in conjunction
and at the same level. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 structure the IEC SC 45A standard series
and shape a complete framework establishing general requirements for instrumentation,
control and electrical systems for nuclear power plants.
– 6 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics
related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation of
systems, defence against common cause failure, control room design, electromagnetic
compatibility, cybersecurity, software and hardware aspects of computer-based systems for
programmable digital systems, coordination of safety and security requirements and
management of ageing. The standards referenced directly at this second level should be
considered together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 as a consistent document set.
At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 or by IEC 63046
are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually
these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be
used on their own.
A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series, corresponds to the Technical
Reports which are not normative.
The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the principles and
basic safety aspects provided in the IAEA code on the safety of NPPs and in the IAEA safety
series, in particular the Requirements NS-R-1, establishing safety requirements related to the
design of nuclear power plants, and the Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 dealing with instrumentation
and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. The terminology and
definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.
IEC 61513 has adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication
IEC 61508 with an overall safety life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework and
provides an interpretation of the general requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and
IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector. Compliance with IEC 61513 will facilitate
consistency with the requirements of IEC 61508 as they have been interpreted for the nuclear
industry. In this framework, IEC 60880 and IEC 62138 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for the
nuclear application sector.
IEC 61513 refers to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R-3 for topics related to quality assurance
(QA).
The IEC SC 45A standard series consistently implements and details the safety and security
principles and basic aspects provided in the relevant IAEA safety standards and in the
relevant documents of the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS). In particular this includes the
IAEA requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of nuclear
power plants, the IAEA safety guide SSG-30 dealing with the safety classification of
structures, systems and components in NPP, the IAEA safety guide SSG-39 dealing with the
design of instrumentation and control systems for NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-34
dealing with the design of electrical power systems for NPPs and the implementing guide
NSS17 for computer security at nuclear facilities. The safety and security terminology and
definitions used by the IEC SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 have adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety
publication IEC 61508 with an overall life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework.
Regarding nuclear safety, IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 provide the interpretation of the general
requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application
sector. In this framework IEC 60880, IEC 62138 and IEC 62566 correspond to IEC 61508-3
for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer to ISO as well as to IAEA
GS-R-3 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA).
At level 2, regarding nuclear security, IEC 62645 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A
security standards. It builds upon the valid high level principles and main concepts of the
generic security standards, in particular ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002; it adapts them
and completes them to fit the nuclear context and coordinates with the IEC 62443 series. Also
at level 2, IEC 60964 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A control rooms standards and
IEC 62342 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A ageing management standards.
NOTE 1 It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions
(e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or
national standards would be applied.
NOTE 2 IEC SC 45A domain was extended in 2013 to cover electrical systems. In 2014 and 2015 discussions
were held in IEC SC 45A to decide how and where general requirements for the design of electrical systems were
to be considered. IEC SC 45A experts recommended that an independent standard be developed at the same level
as IEC 61513 to establish general requirements for electrical systems. Project IEC 63046 is now launched to cover
this objective. When IEC 63046 will be published this NOTE 2 of the introduction of IEC SC 45A standards will be
suppressed.
– 8 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
DATA COMMUNICATION IN SYSTEMS PERFORMING
CATEGORY A FUNCTIONS
1 Scope
This document establishes requirements for data communication which is used in systems
performing category A functions in nuclear power plants.
It covers also interface requirements for data communication of equipment performing
category A functions with other systems including those performing category B and C
functions and functions not important to safety.
The scope of this document is restricted to the consideration of data communication within the
plant I&C safety systems. It does not cover communication by telephone, radio, voice, fax,
email, public address, etc.
The internal operation and the detailed technical specification of data communication
equipment are not in the scope of this document. This document is not applicable to the
internal connections and data communication of a processor unit, its memory and control logic.
It does not address the internal processing of instrumentation and control computer based
systems.
This document gives requirements for functions and properties of on-line plant data
communication by reference to IEC 60880 and IEC 60987, produced within the framework of
IEC 61513. It requires classification categorisation of the communication functions in
accordance with IEC 61226, which in turn requires environmental and seismic qualification
(i.e., the environment where the safety function is required to operate) according to
IEC/IEEE 60780-323 and IEC 60980.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their
content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition
cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.
IEC 60671:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Surveillance testing
IEC 60709, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Separation
IEC 60780:1998, Nuclear power plants – Electrical equipment of the safety system –
Qualification
IEC/IEEE 60780-323:2016, Nuclear facilities – Electrical equipment important to safety –
Qualification
IEC 60880:2006, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category A functions
IEC 60980, Recommended practices for seismic qualification of electrical equipment of the
safety system for nuclear generating stations
IEC 60987:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Hardware design requirements for computer-based systems
IEC 60987:2007/AMD1:2013
IEC 61000 (all parts), Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
IEC 61226, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Classification of instrumentation and control functions
IEC 61513, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control for systems important to
safety – General requirements for systems
IEC 62003, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Requirements for electromagnetic compatibility testing
IEC 62340:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Requirements for coping with common cause failure (CCF)
IEC 62566:2012, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Development of HDL-programmed integrated circuits for systems performing category A
functions
IEC 62645:2014, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Requirements
for security programmes for computer-based systems
IEC 62859, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Requirements for
coordinating safety and cybersecurity
IAEA safety guide No. NS-G-1.3:2002, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to
Safety in Nuclear Power Plants
IAEA safety guide No. SSG-39:2016, Design of instrumentation and control systems for
nuclear power plants
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC 60880, IAEA safety
glossary, IAEA safety guide No. NS-G-1.3 SSG-39 and the following apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following
addresses:
• IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
• ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp
3.1
communication channel
logical connection between two end-points within a communication system
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3:2007 2016, 3.1.8]
– 10 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
3.2
communication node
connection point on a communication network, at which data is conveyed via communication
channels to or from that point to other points on the network
3.3
communication system
arrangement of hardware, software and propagation media to allow the transfer of messages
(ISO/IEC 7498-1 application layer) from one application to another
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3: 2007 2016, 3.1.9]
3.4
cybersecurity
set of activities and measures the objective of which is to prevent, detect, and react to:
– malicious disclosures of information (confidentiality) that could be used to perform
malicious acts which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant performance
degradation;
– malicious modifications (integrity) of functions that may compromise the delivery or
integrity of the required service by I&C programmable digital systems (incl. loss of control)
which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant performance degradation;
– malicious withholding or prevention of access to or communication of information, data or
resources (incl. loss of view) that could compromise the delivery of the required service by
I&C systems (availability) which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant
performance degradation
Note 1 to entry: This definition is tailored with respect to the IEC 62645 scope and overall IEC SC 45A document
structure. It is recognized that the term “cybersecurity” has a broader meaning in other standards and guidance,
often including non-malevolent threats, human errors and protection against natural disasters. Those aspects –
except human errors degrading cybersecurity – are not included in the concept of cybersecurity used in the
IEC SC 45A standard series. See Annex A of IEC 62645:2014 for more detail about such exclusions.
Note 2 to entry: Computer security, security and cybersecurity are considered synonymous in this document.
[SOURCE: IEC 62645:2014, 3.6, modified: "disclosures" replaced by "malicious disclosures",
and notes 1 and 2 modified]
3.5
data communication
exchange of digital data between communication nodes via communication channels
3.6
data communication equipment
embodiment of the media, modulation and coding-dependent portion of a bus-connected
device, comprising the lower portions of the physical layer within the device
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3, 2007 IEC 61158-2, 2014, 3.1.9, modified:"fieldbus" replaced by
"bus"]
3.7
division
collection of items, including their interconnections, that form one redundancy of a redundant
system or safety group. Divisions may include multiple channels
[SOURCE: IAEA SSG-39, 2016]
3.8
message
ordered series of digital states in defined groups, used to convey information
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3: 2007 2016, 3.1.26, modified:"octets" replaced by "digital states in
defined groups"]
3.9
protocol
convention about the data formats, time sequences, and error correction in the data exchange
of communication systems
[SOURCE: IEC 61158-3-19: 2007 2014, 3.3.29]
3.8
processing unit
one or more processing cores whose instructions are specialized to handle networking or
communication-related functions, in this specific communication standard
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
CCF Common cause failure
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis
I&C Instrumentation and control
QA Quality assurance
5 General requirements
5.1 Principles of selection of data communication techniques and equipment
The communication equipment shall meet requirements for systems performing category A
functions.
NOTE To ensure acceptability for nuclear applications one of the following principles for
selection of data communication techniques and equipment can shall be applied:
• use of protocols implementing safety features;
• use of industrial standard protocols with added safety layers;
• use of protocols where higher protocol layers implementing unsafe or not needed
functionality are removed or replaced by ones with reduced and safe functionality.
The hardware and the software shall be qualified, see Clause 9.
5.2 Functional requirements
Generally each data communication channel is part of an overall system providing services of
information gathering and presentation, control or protection of the nuclear power plant.
Equipment providing cyclic data over a communication channel shall do it in a cyclic way that
is not dependent on the receipt of acknowledge messages from the receiver for continued
operation.
– 12 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
Communication channels including the memory mapping and allocation for sending/receiving
data shall not be allocated dynamically during the run time of the system but shall be statically
allocated and predefined by design.
All application software messages shall be transmitted periodically within a pre-defined
variation of cycle time.
Messages should have a fixed length predefined by design.
The communication system shall enable messages from instruments or other outstation
equipment using a communications channel to be sent and received within a specified time
frame, together with data integrity status information (if implemented) provide communication
channels for data exchange with instruments and other equipment allowing transfer within a
specified time frame.
Messages should have data integrity information.
The data communication network topology and media access control shall be designed and
implemented to avoid CCF of independent systems or subsystems (see 8.3).
Data may be distributed via data communication to redundant systems to enable continued
operation if one system is damaged fails.
The security threats arising from the use of data communication shall be taken into
consideration within the scope of the security plans according to IEC 61513 IEC 62645.
5.3 Performance requirements
Data communication channels shall provide sufficient performance to ensure that any
message sent from any communication node is received by the intended destination node in a
timely manner within a predefined maximum period.
Data communication shall meet the performance requirements in terms of response time and
data capacity which result from the functions functional requirements and the architectural
design of the I&C systems. The mechanisms and protocols used shall guarantee that any
delay which may occur during communication or during access to the communication
equipment is known and bounded by design.
Communication channels shall be verified to meet the specified real time response
requirements of the category A functions to be performed, under credible worst-case
conditions. The specified values of the required real time response and the worst-case
conditions shall be justified by analysis. Deterministic communication shall be used so that
the communication load does not vary, irrespective of plant conditions.
Where communication equipment is used for manual plant control and indication through a
control room, the time from operating the physical switch or soft control until the confirmation
of the action by indication of the changed state in the control room should be assessed under
all potential circumstances including worst-case conditions.
For monitoring functions and manually initiated functions that are needed in accident
conditions to bring the plant back into a safe state, the worst-case time response and limited
usage of resources shall be justified by analysis.
5.4 Failure detection
Hardware failures of Communication equipment shall be detected and reported. Detected
failures of the communication equipment that result in unacceptable degradation of the
nuclear safety functions of the I&C system shall be indicated to the plant operators in control
rooms.
The data communication including operation of error response features (if used) shall be
verified and validated prior to operational use of the equipment to perform category A
functions.
5.4 Communication within and between division
The data communication within a segregated division (train) shall be protected from adverse
influences from outside of the division. Thus messages in a division shall be passed directly
from the sending communication node to the receiving one without involvement of the any
communication equipment outside the division.
Data communication in a division shall be separated from the other divisions. However,
communication between divisions may be acceptable if it is required by for voting logic.
5.5 Interfaces to systems of lower importance to safety
Communication equipment of systems performing category A functions shall be adequately
segregated from communication equipment of systems performing only lower category
functions.
When plant systems performing functions of different categories are required to communicate
over communication channels, then the plant data flow should be from category A functions to
lower category functions only.
Data flow from lower categories to category A functions should be prevented unless the
design of the communication channel is such that category A functions cannot be adversely
affected by such a connection.
If communication equipment of systems performing category A functions is interfaced to
systems of lower importance to safety then cybersecurity measures shall be applied in
accordance with IEC 62645 and IEC 62859.
6 Electrical isolation and physical separation
6.1 Electrical isolation
The electrical isolation of systems performing category A functions connected by
communication channels to other systems shall be considered in accordance with IEC 60709.
NOTE 1 The degree of electrical isolation will depend on the station power supply voltages present, national
practice, and plant-specific requirements.
NOTE 2 A method of achieving a high degree of electrical isolation is by means of optical fibre connections or
opto-electronic isolators.
Appropriate isolation shall be demonstrated between data communication equipment and
connected equipment. This shall be sufficient to prevent faults of the connected equipment
and cables from affecting the operation of the data communication equipment adversely.
Connected equipment includes sensors, contacts, power supplies and other communication
equipment.
6.2 Physical separation
The communication equipment should be designed such that faults are not propagated from
one part of the equipment to another, or to another system. IEC 60709 gives requirements for
– 14 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
this and specifically for communication from equipment performing functions of one category
to equipment performing functions of another category.
The requirements of IEC 60709 shall be applied to the cables of communication channels
important to safety.
The preferred method of physical separation and protection of the cables of communication
channels, whether carrying electrical or optical signals, should be by the use of dedicated
cable enclosures or trunking, providing adequate protection against hazards.
A system can require redundant paths for communication, which can be required to provide
redundancy in the event of a hazard such as a fire which may affect a localized area.
Redundant equipment which is providing protection against such a physical hazard shall be
separated physically.
NOTE Requirements for coping with common cause failures are addressed in IEC 62340 8.3.
7 Functional independence
For receiving and transmitting data from and to separate processing units, software modules
shall be provided which have specified interfaces with the communications network and with
the system software and the application software of the related processing unit, to avoid fault
propagation.
The design should use separate software modules for numerical and logical operations
performed on signals and message contents, from those used for data transmission and
message checking. This will reduce complexity and simplify verification and validation.
The requirements below are intended to inhibit fault propagation:
a) Independent processing modules shall be designed so that they continue operation even if
a communication partner fails.
NOTE 1 This implies use of measures such as the avoidance of handshake.
b) Processing modules shall provide separate communication interfaces for independent
communication links.
The design should use separate software modules for processing of application data and for
communication handling.
NOTE 2 This will reduce complexity and simplify verification and validation.
8 Reliability
8.1 Self-supervision and failure mitigation
8.1.1 Communication error detection
Communication equipment should incorporate self-monitoring features. Detected failures shall
be signalled to the control room. Communication equipment shall check the integrity of
communicated data to confirm correct transmission, or to record/report transmission failures.
The communication equipment shall provide error detection facilities according to the relevant
requirements of 4.2 d) of IEC 60987, and 4.8 of IEC 60880 6.2 of IEC 60880:2006 or 8.3.9 of
IEC 62566:2012. These facilities shall provide appropriate assurance that data
communication errors failures will be detected so that erroneous faulty data will not affect the
performance of category A functions. In particular, these should address:
a) faulty insertion of single bits or a group of bits in the transmitted message (relating to
either a valid or unknown / unexpected source),
b) corruption of bits of the transmitted message,
c) transmission of out-of-date data (arising from unintended repetition of an old message),
d) message loss,
e) incorrectly addressed message,
f) unacceptable message delay,
g) incorrect message sequence.
8.1.2 Response to failure
I&C systems performing category A functions shall take suitable actions, when communication
faults are detected.
Detected failures of the communication equipment that result in unacceptable degradation of
the nuclear safety functions of the I&C system shall be indicated to the plant operators in the
control rooms.
When failures of communication equipment are detected, appropriate automatic measures
should be taken: e.g.
a) isolation of failed communication channels,
b) indication of the failed equipment to warn operators of failure (see also 5.4).
The action to be taken upon the detection of failures shall be specified, e.g., logging, warning
to the maintenance team, alarm for immediate corrective or mitigation action.
As part of the design substantiation verification process, data communication equipment and
processes shall be systematically analyzed using appropriate methods e.g. FMEA with
respect to the consequences of failures upon category A functions.
Failures or malfunctions of a single communication node shall not affect the availability and
reliability of the I&C system.
The potential affect impact of the failure of any communication node on the performance of
category A functions or channels shall be considered during the design process, and this
analysis shall be documented. Any required actions to be taken by the system upon the
detection of failure shall be defined, e.g. record the failure, produce an alarm, or drive plant to
a safe state.
Communication channels should be tolerant of ‘soft’ errors to transient faults, such as a
missed message or a soft error in a single message, provided the frequency of such errors
faults is not high enough to compromise the performance of category A functions; such ‘soft’
errors transient faults should not lead to the shutdown of a channel, but they should be logged
by the system.
8.2 Testing
The relevant testing requirements of IEC 60987, Clause 10, shall apply to class 1
communication channels. Also, the relevant subclauses 7.10 (testability), 7.11 (operational
bypasses) and 7.12 (control of access to protection systems equipment) of IAEA safety guide
No. NS-G-1.3 shall apply to communication channels of systems performing category A
functions.
The relevant surveillance testing requirements of IEC 60987:2007, Clause 11, and IEC 60671
shall apply to class 1 communication channels. Also, the relevant subclauses 7.35 to 7.38
(protection system – operational bypasses) and 6.153 to 6.158 (control of access to systems
– 16 – IEC 61500:2018 RLV IEC 2018
important to safety) of IAEA safety standard SSG-39:2016 shall apply to communication
channels of systems performing category A functions.
The performance of data communication functions shall be verified before equipment is
placed in full operational service. The data communication including operation of fault
handling features shall be verified and validated prior to operational use of the equipment to
perform category A functions. The following aspects of system functionality shall be covered:
a) transmission error handling,
b) correct operation when under the maximum data transfer rates,
IEC 60880, IEC 60987 and IEC 62566 require that the data communication system shall have
self-test capabilities (see 8.1.1). Additional periodic tests as a supplement to self-tests should
be possible during the lifetime of the equipment as required to reduce the probability of
unrevealed hardware failures compromising the performance of category A functions, e.g.
c) alteration of the state or value of input signals, and monitoring of the alteration at the
receiving equipment;
d) interruption of transmission, and confirmation that the receiving equipment will detect this
and take correct actions.
NOTE Nuclear safety considerations may make such testing undesirable at power operation of
the plant.
The communication equipment shall be qualified for operational use by functional testing in
accordance with 4.79 to 4.96 of IAEA safety guide No. NS-G-1.3 subclauses 6.78, 6.79 and
6.92 of IAEA safety standard SSG-39:2016. Testing of the eq
...
IEC 61500 ®
Edition 3.0 2018-04
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Data communication in systems performing category A functions
Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Systèmes d’instrumentation et de contrôle-
commande importants pour la sûreté – Communications de données dans les
systèmes réalisant des fonctions de catégorie A
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IEC 61500 ®
Edition 3.0 2018-04
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Data communication in systems performing category A functions
Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Systèmes d’instrumentation et de contrôle-
commande importants pour la sûreté – Communications de données dans les
systèmes réalisant des fonctions de catégorie A
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
COMMISSION
ELECTROTECHNIQUE
INTERNATIONALE
ICS 27.120.20 ISBN 978-2-8322-5583-4
– 2 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 3
INTRODUCTION . 5
1 Scope . 7
2 Normative references . 7
3 Terms and definitions . 8
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 10
5 General requirements . 10
5.1 Principles of selection of data communication techniques and equipment . 10
5.2 Functional requirements . 10
5.3 Performance requirements . 11
5.4 Communication within and between division . 11
5.5 Interfaces to systems of lower importance to safety . 11
6 Electrical isolation and physical separation . 12
6.1 Electrical isolation . 12
6.2 Physical separation . 12
7 Functional independence . 12
8 Reliability . 13
8.1 Self-supervision and failure mitigation . 13
8.1.1 Communication error detection . 13
8.1.2 Response to failure . 13
8.2 Testing . 14
8.3 Prevention of failures (including CCF) . 14
8.4 Cybersecurity . 15
9 Qualification . 15
10 Maintenance and modification . 15
Bibliography . 16
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
DATA COMMUNICATION IN SYSTEMS PERFORMING
CATEGORY A FUNCTIONS
FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
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patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
International Standard IEC 61500 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation,
control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45:
Nuclear instrumentation.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition
constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous
edition:
a) the changes introduced to previously referenced standards have been confirmed to apply;
b) relevant newly published standards have been referenced;
c) lessons learned from several industrial applications have been incorporated.
– 4 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
The text of this standard is based on the following documents:
FDIS Report on voting
45A/1183/FDIS 45A/1194/RVD
Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on
voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
INTRODUCTION
a) Technical background, main issues and organization of the standard
The equipment for data communication of on-line plant data can simplify the hardwired cables
connecting distributed systems for instrumentation, control, protection and monitoring needed
for the safe operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Such communication systems can have
advantages over direct cables, for electrical isolation, for reduction of cable fire loads or other
reasons. In a distributed computer based system, communication equipment is an essential
part of the system. Data communication is usually essential for implementing I&C systems
important to safety in nuclear power plants.
It is intended that the document be used by operators of NPPs (utilities), manufacturers of
data communication equipment, systems evaluators and by licensors.
b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series
IEC 61500 is the third level IEC SC 45A document tackling the generic issue of data
communication for equipment performing category A functions.
IEC 61500 is to be read in association with IEC 61513, which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A
document providing guidance on general requirements for instrumentation and control
systems important to safety, IEC 60880, which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A document
providing guidance on software aspects for computer based systems performing category A
functions, and IEC 60987 which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A document providing guidance
on hardware aspects for computer based systems.
For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this
introduction.
c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of the standard
It is important to note that this standard establishes no additional functional requirements for
safety systems.
Aspects for which special recommendations have been provided in this standard are:
• Requirements for data communication within systems performing category A functions.
• Requirements for data communication between divisions of a system performing
category A functions.
• Requirements for data communication of systems performing category A functions with
systems of lower safety importance.
• Reliability requirements for data communication.
To ensure that the standard will continue to be relevant in future years, emphasis is placed on
principles, rather than on specific technologies.
d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships
with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)
The top-level documents of the IEC SC 45A standard series are IEC 61513 and IEC 63046.
IEC 61513 provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to
perform functions important to safety in NPP. IEC 63046 provides general requirements for
electrical power systems of NPP; it covers power supply systems including the supply
systems of the I&C systems. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 are to be considered in conjunction
and at the same level. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 structure the IEC SC 45A standard series
and shape a complete framework establishing general requirements for instrumentation,
control and electrical systems for nuclear power plants.
– 6 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics
related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation,
defence against common cause failure, control room design, electromagnetic compatibility,
cybersecurity, software and hardware aspects for programmable digital systems, coordination
of safety and security requirements and management of ageing. The standards referenced
directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 as
a consistent document set.
At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 or by IEC 63046
are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually
these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be
used on their own.
A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series, corresponds to the Technical
Reports which are not normative.
The IEC SC 45A standard series consistently implements and details the safety and security
principles and basic aspects provided in the relevant IAEA safety standards and in the
relevant documents of the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS). In particular this includes the
IAEA requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of nuclear
power plants, the IAEA safety guide SSG-30 dealing with the safety classification of
structures, systems and components in NPP, the IAEA safety guide SSG-39 dealing with the
design of instrumentation and control systems for NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-34
dealing with the design of electrical power systems for NPPs and the implementing guide
NSS17 for computer security at nuclear facilities. The safety and security terminology and
definitions used by the IEC SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 have adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety
publication IEC 61508 with an overall life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework.
Regarding nuclear safety, IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 provide the interpretation of the general
requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application
sector. In this framework IEC 60880, IEC 62138 and IEC 62566 correspond to IEC 61508-3
for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer to ISO as well as to IAEA
GS-R-3 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA).
At level 2, regarding nuclear security, IEC 62645 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A
security standards. It builds upon the valid high level principles and main concepts of the
generic security standards, in particular ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002; it adapts them
and completes them to fit the nuclear context and coordinates with the IEC 62443 series. Also
at level 2, IEC 60964 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A control rooms standards and
IEC 62342 is the entry document for the IEC SC 45A ageing management standards.
NOTE 1 It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions
(e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or
national standards would be applied.
NOTE 2 IEC SC 45A domain was extended in 2013 to cover electrical systems. In 2014 and 2015 discussions
were held in IEC SC 45A to decide how and where general requirements for the design of electrical systems were
to be considered. IEC SC 45A experts recommended that an independent standard be developed at the same level
as IEC 61513 to establish general requirements for electrical systems. Project IEC 63046 is now launched to cover
this objective. When IEC 63046 will be published this NOTE 2 of the introduction of IEC SC 45A standards will be
suppressed.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
DATA COMMUNICATION IN SYSTEMS PERFORMING
CATEGORY A FUNCTIONS
1 Scope
This document establishes requirements for data communication which is used in systems
performing category A functions in nuclear power plants.
It covers also interface requirements for data communication of equipment performing
category A functions with other systems including those performing category B and C
functions and functions not important to safety.
The scope of this document is restricted to the consideration of data communication within the
plant I&C safety systems. It does not cover communication by telephone, radio, voice, fax,
email, public address, etc.
The internal operation and the detailed technical specification of data communication
equipment are not in the scope of this document. This document is not applicable to the
internal connections and data communication of a processor unit, its memory and control logic.
It does not address the internal processing of instrumentation and control computer based
systems.
This document gives requirements for functions and properties of on-line plant data
communication by reference to IEC 60880 and IEC 60987, produced within the framework of
IEC 61513. It requires categorisation of the communication functions in accordance with
IEC 61226, which in turn requires environmental and seismic qualification (i.e., the
environment where the safety function is required to operate) according to
IEC/IEEE 60780-323 and IEC 60980.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their
content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition
cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.
IEC 60671:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Surveillance testing
IEC 60709, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Separation
IEC/IEEE 60780-323:2016, Nuclear facilities – Electrical equipment important to safety –
Qualification
IEC 60880:2006, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category A functions
IEC 60980, Recommended practices for seismic qualification of electrical equipment of the
safety system for nuclear generating stations
– 8 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
IEC 60987:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Hardware design requirements for computer-based systems
IEC 60987:2007/AMD1:2013
IEC 61000 (all parts), Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
IEC 61513, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety – General
requirements for systems
IEC 62003, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Requirements for electromagnetic compatibility testing
IEC 62340:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Requirements for coping with common cause failure (CCF)
IEC 62566:2012, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Development of HDL-programmed integrated circuits for systems performing category A
functions
IEC 62645:2014, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Requirements
for security programmes for computer-based systems
IEC 62859, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Requirements for
coordinating safety and cybersecurity
IAEA safety guide No. SSG-39:2016, Design of instrumentation and control systems for
nuclear power plants
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC 60880, IAEA safety
glossary, IAEA safety guide No. SSG-39 and the following apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following
addresses:
• IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
• ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp
3.1
communication channel
logical connection between two end-points within a communication system
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3:2016, 3.1.8]
3.2
communication node
connection point on a communication network, at which data is conveyed via communication
channels to or from that point to other points on the network
3.3
communication system
arrangement of hardware, software and propagation media to allow the transfer of messages
(ISO/IEC 7498-1 application layer) from one application to another
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3:2016, 3.1.9]
3.4
cybersecurity
set of activities and measures the objective of which is to prevent, detect, and react to:
– malicious disclosures of information (confidentiality) that could be used to perform
malicious acts which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant performance
degradation;
– malicious modifications (integrity) of functions that may compromise the delivery or
integrity of the required service by I&C programmable digital systems (incl. loss of control)
which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant performance degradation;
– malicious withholding or prevention of access to or communication of information, data or
resources (incl. loss of view) that could compromise the delivery of the required service by
I&C systems (availability) which could lead to an accident, an unsafe situation or plant
performance degradation
Note 1 to entry: This definition is tailored with respect to the IEC 62645 scope and overall IEC SC 45A document
structure. It is recognized that the term “cybersecurity” has a broader meaning in other standards and guidance,
often including non-malevolent threats, human errors and protection against natural disasters. Those aspects –
except human errors degrading cybersecurity – are not included in the concept of cybersecurity used in the
IEC SC 45A standard series. See Annex A of IEC 62645:2014 for more detail about such exclusions.
Note 2 to entry: Computer security, security and cybersecurity are considered synonymous in this document.
[SOURCE: IEC 62645:2014, 3.6, modified: "disclosures" replaced by "malicious disclosures",
and notes 1 and 2 modified]
3.5
data communication
exchange of digital data between communication nodes via communication channels
3.6
data communication equipment
embodiment of the media, modulation and coding-dependent portion of a bus-connected
device, comprising the lower portions of the physical layer within the device
[SOURCE: IEC 61158-2, 2014, 3.1.9, modified:"fieldbus" replaced by "bus"]
3.7
division
collection of items, including their interconnections, that form one redundancy of a redundant
system or safety group. Divisions may include multiple channels
[SOURCE: IAEA SSG-39, 2016]
3.8
message
ordered series of digital states in defined groups, used to convey information
[SOURCE: IEC 61784-3:2016, 3.1.26, modified:"octets" replaced by "digital states in defined
groups"]
3.9
protocol
convention about the data formats, time sequences, and error correction in the data exchange
of communication systems
[SOURCE: IEC 61158-3-19:2014, 3.3.29]
– 10 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
CCF Common cause failure
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis
I&C Instrumentation and control
QA Quality assurance
5 General requirements
5.1 Principles of selection of data communication techniques and equipment
The communication equipment shall meet requirements for systems performing category A
functions.
To ensure acceptability for nuclear applications one of the following principles for selection of
data communication techniques and equipment shall be applied:
• use of protocols implementing safety features;
• use of industrial standard protocols with added safety layers;
• use of protocols where higher protocol layers implementing unsafe or not needed
functionality are removed or replaced by ones with reduced and safe functionality.
The hardware and the software shall be qualified, see Clause 9.
5.2 Functional requirements
Generally each data communication channel is part of an overall system providing services of
information gathering and presentation, control or protection of the nuclear power plant.
Equipment providing data over a communication channel shall do it in a cyclic way that is not
dependent on the receipt of acknowledge messages from the receiver for continued operation.
Communication channels including the memory mapping and allocation for sending/receiving
data shall not be allocated dynamically during the run time of the system but shall be statically
allocated and predefined by design.
All application software messages shall be transmitted periodically within a pre-defined cycle
time.
Messages should have a fixed length predefined by design.
The communication system shall provide communication channels for data exchange with
instruments and other equipment allowing transfer within a specified time frame.
Messages should have data integrity information.
The data communication network topology and media access control shall be designed and
implemented to avoid CCF of independent systems or subsystems (see 8.3).
Data may be distributed via data communication to redundant systems to enable continued
operation if one system fails.
The security threats arising from the use of data communication shall be taken into
consideration within the scope of the security plans according to IEC 62645.
5.3 Performance requirements
Data communication channels shall provide sufficient performance to ensure that any
message sent from any communication node is received by the intended destination node
within a predefined maximum period.
Data communication shall meet the performance requirements in terms of response time and
data capacity which result from the functional requirements and the architectural design of the
I&C systems. The mechanisms and protocols used shall guarantee that any delay which may
occur during communication or during access to the communication equipment is known and
bounded by design.
Communication channels shall be verified to meet the specified real time response
requirements of the category A functions to be performed, under credible worst-case
conditions. The specified values of the required real time response and the worst-case
conditions shall be justified by analysis. Deterministic communication shall be used so that
the communication load does not vary, irrespective of plant conditions.
Where communication equipment is used for manual plant control and indication through a
control room, the time from operating the physical switch or soft control until the confirmation
of the action by indication of the changed state in the control room should be assessed under
all potential circumstances including worst-case conditions.
For monitoring functions and manually initiated functions that are needed in accident
conditions to bring the plant back into a safe state, the worst-case time response and limited
usage of resources shall be justified by analysis.
5.4 Communication within and between division
The data communication within a segregated division (train) shall be protected from adverse
influences from outside of the division. Thus messages in a division shall be passed directly
from the sending communication node to the receiving one without involvement of any
communication equipment outside the division.
Data communication in a division shall be separated from the other divisions. However,
communication between divisions may be acceptable for voting logic.
5.5 Interfaces to systems of lower importance to safety
Communication equipment of systems performing category A functions shall be adequately
segregated from communication equipment of systems performing only lower category
functions.
When plant systems performing functions of different categories are required to communicate
over communication channels, then the plant data flow should be from category A functions to
lower category functions only.
Data flow from lower categories to category A functions should be prevented unless the
design of the communication channel is such that category A functions cannot be adversely
affected by such a connection.
If communication equipment of systems performing category A functions is interfaced to
systems of lower importance to safety then cybersecurity measures shall be applied in
accordance with IEC 62645 and IEC 62859.
– 12 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
6 Electrical isolation and physical separation
6.1 Electrical isolation
The electrical isolation of systems performing category A functions connected by
communication channels to other systems shall be considered in accordance with IEC 60709.
NOTE 1 The degree of electrical isolation will depend on the station power supply voltages present, national
practice, and plant-specific requirements.
NOTE 2 A method of achieving a high degree of electrical isolation is by means of optical fibre connections or
opto-electronic isolators.
Appropriate isolation shall be demonstrated between data communication equipment and
connected equipment. This shall be sufficient to prevent faults of the connected equipment
and cables from affecting the operation of the data communication equipment. Connected
equipment includes sensors, contacts, power supplies and other communication equipment.
6.2 Physical separation
The communication equipment should be designed such that faults are not propagated from
one part of the equipment to another, or to another system. IEC 60709 gives requirements for
this and specifically for communication from equipment performing functions of one category
to equipment performing functions of another category.
The requirements of IEC 60709 shall be applied to the cables of communication channels
important to safety.
The preferred method of physical separation and protection of the cables of communication
channels, whether carrying electrical or optical signals, should be by the use of dedicated
cable enclosures or trunking, providing adequate protection against hazards.
A system can require redundant paths for communication, which can be required to provide
redundancy in the event of a hazard such as a fire which may affect a localized area.
Redundant equipment which is providing protection against such a physical hazard shall be
separated physically.
NOTE Requirements for coping with common cause failures are addressed in 8.3.
7 Functional independence
The requirements below are intended to inhibit fault propagation:
a) Independent processing modules shall be designed so that they continue operation even if
a communication partner fails.
NOTE 1 This implies use of measures such as the avoidance of handshake.
b) Processing modules shall provide separate communication interfaces for independent
communication links.
The design should use separate software modules for processing of application data and for
communication handling.
NOTE 2 This will reduce complexity and simplify verification and validation.
8 Reliability
8.1 Self-supervision and failure mitigation
8.1.1 Communication error detection
Communication equipment should incorporate self-monitoring features. Detected failures shall
be signalled to the control room. Communication equipment shall check the integrity of
communicated data to confirm correct transmission, or to record/report transmission failures.
The communication equipment shall provide error detection facilities according to the relevant
requirements of 6.2 of IEC 60880:2006 or 8.3.9 of IEC 62566:2012. These facilities shall
provide appropriate assurance that data communication failures will be detected so that faulty
data will not affect the performance of category A functions. In particular, these should
address:
a) faulty insertion of single bits or a group of bits in the transmitted message (relating to
either a valid or unknown / unexpected source),
b) corruption of bits of the transmitted message,
c) transmission of out-of-date data (arising from unintended repetition of an old message),
d) message loss,
e) incorrectly addressed message,
f) unacceptable message delay,
g) incorrect message sequence.
8.1.2 Response to failure
I&C systems performing category A functions shall take suitable actions, when communication
faults are detected.
Detected failures of the communication equipment that result in unacceptable degradation of
the nuclear safety functions of the I&C system shall be indicated to the plant operators in the
control rooms.
When failures of communication equipment are detected, appropriate automatic measures
should be taken: e.g.
a) isolation of failed communication channels,
b) indication of the failed equipment to warn operators of failure.
The action to be taken upon the detection of failures shall be specified, e.g., logging, warning
to the maintenance team, alarm for immediate corrective or mitigation action.
As part of the design verification process, data communication equipment and processes shall
be systematically analyzed using appropriate methods e.g. FMEA with respect to the
consequences of failures upon category A functions.
Failures or malfunctions of a single communication node shall not affect the availability of the
I&C system.
The potential impact of the failure of any communication node on the performance of
category A functions or channels shall be considered during the design process, and this
analysis shall be documented. Any required actions to be taken by the system upon the
detection of failure shall be defined, e.g. record the failure, produce an alarm, or drive plant to
a safe state.
– 14 – IEC 61500:2018 IEC 2018
Communication channels should be tolerant to transient faults, such as a missed message or
a soft error in a single message, provided the frequency of such faults is not high enough to
compromise the performance of category A functions; such transient faults should not lead to
the shutdown of a channel, but they should be logged by the system.
8.2 Testing
The relevant surveillance testing requirements of IEC 60987:2007, Clause 11, and IEC 60671
shall apply to class 1 communication channels. Also, the relevant subclauses 7.35 to 7.38
(protection system – operational bypasses) and 6.153 to 6.158 (control of access to systems
important to safety) of IAEA safety standard SSG-39:2016 shall apply to communication
channels of systems performing category A functions.
The data communication including operation of fault handling features shall be verified and
validated prior to operational use of the equipment to perform category A functions. The
following aspects of system functionality shall be covered:
a) transmission error handling,
b) correct operation when under the maximum data transfer rates,
IEC 60880, IEC 60987 and IEC 62566 require that the data communication system shall have
self-test capabilities (see 8.1.1). Additional periodic tests as a supplement to self-tests should
be possible during the lifetime of the equipment as required to reduce the probability of
unrevealed hardware failures compromising the performance of category A functions, e.g.
c) alteration of the state or value of input signals, and monitoring of the alteration at the
receiving equipment;
d) interruption of transmission, and confirmation that the receiving equipment will detect this
and take correct actions.
Nuclear safety considerations may make such testing undesirable at power operation of the
plant.
The communication equipment shall be qualified for operational use by functional testing in
accordance with subclauses 6.78, 6.79 and 6.92 of IAEA safety standard SSG-39:2016.
Testing of the equipment modules shall be performed during factory tests or on-site
commissioning tests, or evidence of previous type testing in accordance with 7.4.1 of
IEC/IEEE 60780-323:2016 shall be provided.
8.3 Prevention of failures (including CCF)
Data communication equipment could be affected by conditions which cause several
redundant parts of the system to fail at the same time. In order to eliminate or minimize the
possibility of simultaneous failures of several modules by hazards which a system is required
to survive, consideration shall be given to the following potential hazards:
a) seismic disturbance or other relevant external hazards;
b) fire, smoke or flooding in equipment or cable areas;
c) loss of environmental control, heating and ventilation;
d) excessive radiation or other factors external to the equipment, and
e) factors internal to the equipment itself.
The cable trays which contain the cables for data communication between separated
redundancies/trains shall be designed and separated in accordance with the requirements of
IEC 60709, so that possible hazards are limited and the required fault tolerance for the overall
I&C system is met.
Data communication shall be designed to prevent failure propagation, e.g. by transfer of
corrupted data (see IEC 62340:2007, 7.4).
The potential failures taken into account and the claimed features to prevent or mitigate these
failures shall be analyzed and documented.
NOTE Requirements for coping with common cause failures are given in IE
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