Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control important to safety - General requirement for systems

Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems important to safety may be implemented using conventional hard-wired equipment, computer-based (CB) equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment (see Note 1). IEC 61513:2011 provides requirements and recommendations for the overall I&C architecture which may contain either or both technologies. The main technical changes with regard to the previous edition are as follows:  - alignment with the latest revisions of IAEA documents;  - alignment with new editions of IEC 60880, IEC 61226, IEC 62138, IEC 62340 and IEC 60987;  - alignment with significant advances of software engineering techniques;  - integration of requirements for staff training.

Kernkraftwerke - Leittechnik für Systeme mit sicherheitstechnischer Bedeutung - Allgemeine Systemanforderungen

Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Instrumentation et contrôle commande importants pour la sûreté - Exigences générales pour les systèmes

Les systèmes d'I&C importants pour la sûreté peuvent être réalisés à l'aide de composants traditionnels câblés, de composants informatiques ou d'une combinaison des deux. La CEI 61513:2011 fait état des exigences et des recommandations relatives à l'architecture d'ensemble de l'I&C incluant l'une ou l'autre de ces technologies ou les deux. Les principaux changements techniques par rapport à l'édition précédente sont les suivants:  - mise en cohérence avec les nouvelles éditions des documents de l'AIEA;  - prise en compte des dernières éditions des normes CEI 60880, CEI 61226, CEI 62138, CEI 62340 et CEI 60987;  - prise en compte de progrès significatifs des techniques de génie logiciel;  - intégration des exigences relatives à la formation du personnel.

Jedrske elektrarne - Instrumenti in krmilje, pomembni za varnost - Splošne zahteve za sisteme

Merilna in nadzorna oprema za zagotavljanje varnosti se lahko načrtuje z uporabo konvencionalne fiksno pritrjene opreme, računalniške opreme (CB) ali kombinacije obeh vrst opreme (glej opombo 1). Ta mednarodni standard zagotavlja zahteve in priporočila (glej opombo 2) za celotno arhitekturo merilne in nadzorne opreme, ki lahko vključuje eno ali obe tehnologiji. Ta standard poudarja tudi potrebo po celovitih in natančnih zahtevah, izpeljanih iz varnostnih ciljev elektrarne, kot predpogoj za določitev celovitih zahtev za celotno arhitekturo merilne in nadzorne opreme in tako tudi posameznih delov merilne in nadzorne opreme za zagotavljanje varnosti. Ta standard vpeljuje koncept življenjskega cikla glede varnosti za celotno arhitekturo merilne in nadzorne opreme ter življenjski cikel glede varnosti za njene posamezne dele. Tako poudari razmerja med varnostnimi cilji jedrske elektrarne in zahtevami za celotno arhitekturo merilne in nadzorne opreme za zagotavljanje varnosti ter razmerja med celotno arhitekturo merilne in nadzorne opreme in zahtevami njenih posameznih delov za zagotavljanje varnosti. Življenjski cikli, predstavljeni in upoštevani v tem standardu, niso edini možni; drugi življenjski cikli so možni, če so izpolnjeni cilji, navedeni v tem standardu.
OPOMBA 1: Merilna in nadzorna oprema lahko uporablja tudi elektronske module, ki temeljijo na kompleksnih elektronskih komponentah, kot so integrirana vezja za določen namen (ASIC) in programirljivo polje vrat (FPGA). Glede na področje uporabe in delovanje teh komponent jih je mogoče obravnavati v skladu s smernicami za konvencionalno elektronsko opremo ali podobno kot računalniško opremo. Večina smernic za računalniško opremo se uporablja tudi za načrtovanje opreme s kompleksnimi elektronskimi komponentami, vključno npr. s koncepti ponovne uporabe predhodnih načrtov, in za ugotavljanje napak v načrtovanju programske ali kompleksne strojne opreme.
OPOMBA 2: Izraz »zahteva« je uporabljen kot skupen izraz za oboje – zahteve in priporočila. Do razlikovanja pride pri specifičnih določilih, kjer so zahteve izražene s strukturo »je treba«, priporočila pa z »naj bi«.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
09-May-2013
Technical Committee
Current Stage
6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
Start Date
09-May-2013
Due Date
14-Jul-2013
Completion Date
10-May-2013
Standard
SIST EN 61513:2013
English language
102 pages
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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-junij-2013
Jedrske elektrarne - Instrumenti in krmilje, pomembni za varnost - Splošne zahteve
za sisteme
Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control important to safety - General
requirement for systems
Kernkraftwerke - Leittechnik für Systeme mit sicherheitstechnischer Bedeutung -
Allgemeine Systemanforderungen
Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Instrumentation et contrôle commande importants
pour la sûreté - Exigences générales pour les systèmes
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN 61513:2013
ICS:
27.120.20 Jedrske elektrarne. Varnost Nuclear power plants. Safety
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

EUROPEAN STANDARD
EN 61513
NORME EUROPÉENNE
February 2013
EUROPÄISCHE NORM
ICS 27.120.20
English version
Nuclear power plants -
Instrumentation and control important to safety -
General requirements for systems
(IEC 61513:2011)
Centrales nucléaires de puissance -  Kernkraftwerke -
Instrumentation et contrôle-commande Leittechnik für Systeme mit
importants pour la sûreté - sicherheitstechnischer Bedeutung -
Exigences générales pour les systèmes Allgemeine Systemanforderungen
(CEI 61513:2011) (IEC 61513:2011)

This European Standard was approved by CENELEC on 2013-01-14. CENELEC members are bound to comply
with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard
the status of a national standard without any alteration.

Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on
application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CENELEC member.

This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other
language made by translation under the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified
to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.

CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

CENELEC
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung

Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B - 1000 Brussels

© 2013 CENELEC - All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC members.
Ref. No. EN 61513:2013 E
Foreword
This document (EN 61513:2013) consists of the text of IEC 61513:2011 prepared by SC 45A
"Instrumentation and control of nuclear facilities" of IEC/TC 45 "Nuclear instrumentation".

The following dates are fixed:

(dop) 2014-01-14
• latest date by which this document has to be
implemented
at national level by publication of an identical
national standard or by endorsement
(dow) 2016-01-14
• latest date by which the national standards conflicting
with this document have to be withdrawn

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CENELEC [and/or CEN] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such
patent rights.
As stated in the nuclear safety directive 2009/71/EURATOM, Chapter 1, Article 2, item 2, Member
States are not prevented from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by
the Directive, in compliance with Community law. In a similar manner, this European Standard does
not prevent Member States from taking more stringent nuclear safety measures in the subject-matter
covered by this standard.
Endorsement notice
The text of the International Standard IEC 61513:2011 was approved by CENELEC as a European
Standard without any modification.

In the official version, for Bibliography, the following notes have to be added for the standards
indicated:
IEC 61508-1:2010 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 61508-1:2010 (not modified).
IEC 61508-3:2010 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 61508-3:2010 (not modified).
IEC 61069-1:1991 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 61069-1:1993 (not modified).
IEC 62381 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 62381.
IEC 61000-6-2 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 61000-6-2.
IEC 61000-6-4 NOTE  Harmonized as EN 61000-6-4.
ISO 9000:2005 NOTE  Harmonized as EN ISO 9000:2005 (not modified).
ISO 8402:1994 NOTE  Harmonized as EN ISO 8402:1995 (not modified).

- 3 - EN 61513:2013
Annex ZA
(normative)
Normative references to international publications
with their corresponding European publications

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE  When an international publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevant EN/HD
applies.
Publication Year Title EN/HD Year

IEC 60671 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 60671 -
and control systems important to safety -
Surveillance testing
IEC 60709 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 60709 -
and control systems important to safety -
Separation
IEC 60780 - Nuclear power plants - Electrical equipment EN 60780 -
of the safety system - Qualification

IEC 60880 2006 Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 60880 2009
and control systems important to safety -
Software aspects for computer-based
systems performing category A functions

IEC 60964 2009 Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - EN 60964 2010
Design
IEC 60965 - Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - EN 60965 -
Supplementary control points for reactor
shutdown without access to the main control
room
IEC 60980 - Recommended practices for seismic - -
qualification of electrical equipment of the
safety system for nuclear generating stations

IEC 60987 2007 Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 60987 2009
(mod) and control important to safety -
Hardware design requirements
for computer-based systems
IEC 61000-4-1 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-1 -
Part 4-1: Testing and measurement
techniques - Overview
of IEC 61000-4 series
IEC 61000-4-2 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-2 -
Part 4-2: Testing and measurement
techniques - Electrostatic discharge
immunity test
IEC 61000-4-3 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-3 -
Part 4-3: Testing and measurement
techniques - Radiated, radio-frequency,
electromagnetic field immunity test

IEC 61000-4-4 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-4 -
Part 4-4: Testing and measurement
techniques - Electrical fast transient/burst
immunity test
Publication Year Title EN/HD Year
IEC 61000-4-5 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-5 -
Part 4-5: Testing and measurement
techniques - Surge immunity test

IEC 61000-4-6 - Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - EN 61000-4-6 -
Part 4-6: Testing and measurement
techniques - Immunity to conducted
disturbances, induced by radio-frequency
fields
IEC 61226 2009 Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 61226 2010
and control important to safety -
Classification of instrumentation
and control functions
IEC 61500 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 61500 -
and control important to safety - Data
communication in systems performing
category A functions
IEC 61508-2 2010 Functional safety of EN 61508-2 2010
electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic safety-related systems -
Part 2: Requirements for
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems
IEC 61508-4 2010 Functional safety of EN 61508-4 2010
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems -
Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations

IEC 62138 2004 Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 62138 2009
and control important for safety - Software
aspects for computer-based systems
performing category B or C functions

IEC 62340 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 62340 -
and control systems important to safety -
Requirements for coping with common
cause failure (CCF)
ISO 9001 2008 Quality management systems - EN ISO 9001 2008
Requirements
IAEA INSAG-10 1996 Defence in depth in nuclear safety - -

IAEA NS-R-1 2000 Safety of nuclear power plants: Design - -

IAEA GS-R-3 2006 The management system for facilities - -
and activities - Safety requirements

IAEA GS-G-3.1 2006 Application for the management system - -
for facilities and activities - Safety Guide

IAEA NS-G-1.3 2002 Instrumentation and control systems - -
important to safety in nuclear power plants

IAEA 75-INSAG-3 1999 Basic safety principles for nuclear power - -
Rev.1 - INSAG 12 plants
IEC 61513 ®
Edition 2.0 2011-08
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
General requirements for systems

Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Instrumentation et contrôle-commande
importants pour la sûreté – Exigences générales pour les systèmes

INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
COMMISSION
ELECTROTECHNIQUE
PRICE CODE
INTERNATIONALE
CODE PRIX XD
ICS 27.120.20 ISBN 978-2-88912-663-7

– 2 – 61513  IEC:2011
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 5
INTRODUCTION . 7
1 Scope . 9
1.1 General . 9
1.2 Application: new and pre-existing plants . 9
1.3 Framework . 9
2 Normative references . 12
3 Terms and definitions . 13
4 Symbols and abbreviations . 26
5 Overall I&C safety life cycle . 26
5.1 General . 26
5.2 Deriving the I&C requirements from the plant safety design base . 29
5.2.1 General . 29
5.2.2 Review of the functional, performance and independence
requirements . 29
5.2.3 Review of the categorisation requirements . 30
5.2.4 Review of plant constraints . 31
5.3 Output documentation . 32
5.4 Design of the overall I&C architecture and assignment of the I&C functions . 32
5.4.1 General . 32
5.4.2 Design of the I&C architecture . 33
5.4.3 Assignment of functions to systems . 36
5.4.4 Required analysis . 37
5.5 Overall planning . 38
5.5.1 General . 38
5.5.2 Overall quality assurance programs . 38
5.5.3 Overall security plan . 38
5.5.4 Overall I&C integration and commissioning . 39
5.5.5 Overall operation plan . 41
5.5.6 Overall maintenance plan . 42
5.5.7 Planning of training. 42
5.6 Output documentation . 43
5.6.1 General . 43
5.6.2 Architectural design documentation . 43
5.6.3 Functional assignment documentation . 43
6 System safety life cycle . 44
6.1 General . 44
6.2 Requirements . 46
6.2.1 General . 46
6.2.2 System requirements specification . 47
6.2.3 System specification . 52
6.2.4 System detailed design and implementation . 55
6.2.5 System integration . 57
6.2.6 System validation . 58
6.2.7 System installation . 59
6.2.8 System design modification . 59

61513  IEC:2011 – 3 –
6.3 System planning . 59
6.3.1 General . 59
6.3.2 System quality assurance plan . 60
6.3.3 System security plan . 62
6.3.4 System integration plan . 62
6.3.5 System validation plan . 63
6.3.6 System installation plan . 63
6.3.7 System operation plan . 64
6.3.8 System maintenance plan . 64
6.4 Output documentation . 65
6.4.1 General . 65
6.4.2 System requirements specification documentation . 65
6.4.3 System specification documentation . 66
6.4.4 System detailed design documentation . 67
6.4.5 System integration documentation . 68
6.4.6 System validation documentation. 69
6.4.7 System modification documentation . 69
6.5 System qualification . 70
6.5.1 General . 70
6.5.2 Generic and application-specific qualification . 70
6.5.3 Qualification plan . 71
6.5.4 Additional qualification of interconnected systems . 72
6.5.5 Maintaining qualification . 73
6.5.6 Documentation . 73
7 Overall integration and commissioning . 74
7.1 General . 74
7.2 Requirements on the objectives to be achieved . 75
7.3 Output documentation . 75
8 Overall operation and maintenance . 75
8.1 General . 75
8.2 Requirements on the objectives to be achieved . 75
8.3 Output documentation . 76
Annex A (informative) Basic safety issues in the NPP . 77
Annex B (informative) Categorisation of functions and classification of systems . 80
Annex C (informative) Qualitative defence approach against CCF. 85
Annex D (informative) Relations of IEC 61508 with IEC 61513 and standards of the
nuclear application sector . 89
Annex E (informative) Changes to be performed in later revisions of SC 45A standards
to adapt to this version of IEC 61513 . 96
Bibliography . 98

Figure 1 – Overall framework of this standard . 11
Figure 2 – Typical relations of hardware and software in a computer-based system . 25
Figure 3 – Relations between system failure, random failure and systematic fault . 25
Figure 4 – Connections between the overall I&C safety life cycle and the safety life
cycles of the individual I&C systems . 29
Figure 5 – System safety life cycle . 46

– 4 – 61513  IEC:2011
Figure 6 – Product- and plant-application-specific topics to be addressed in the system
qualification plan . 74
Figure B.1 – Relations between I&C functions and I&C systems . 81
Figure C.1 – Examples of assignment of functions of a safety group to I&C systems . 85

Table 1 – Overview of the overall I&C safety life cycle . 27
Table 2 – Correlation between classes of I&C systems and categories of I&C functions . 33
Table 3 – Overview of the system safety life cycle . 44
Table B.1 – Typical classification of I&C systems . 84
Table C.1 – Examples of CCF sensitive in safety groups . 86

61513  IEC:2011 – 5 –
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEMS

FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications,
Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC
Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested
in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-
governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely
with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by
agreement between the two organizations.
2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international
consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all
interested IEC National Committees.
3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National
Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC
Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any
misinterpretation by any end user.
4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications
transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence
between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in
the latter.
5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity
assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any
services carried out by independent certification bodies.
6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and
members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or
other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and
expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC
Publications.
8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of
patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
International Standard IEC 61513 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation
and control of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear instrumentation.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition, published in 2001, and constitutes
a technical revision.
The main technical changes with regard to the previous edition are as follows:
• to align the standard with the new revisions of IAEA NS-R-1 and NS-G-1.3, to review the
existing requirements and to update the terminology and definitions;
• to take account of, as far as possible, requirements associated with standards published
since the first edition, especially IEC 60880, IEC 61226, IEC 62138, IEC 62340 and
IEC 60987;
• to take into account the fact that software engineering techniques have advanced
significantly in the intervening years;

– 6 – 61513  IEC:2011
• to integrate requirements for staff training.
The text of this standard is based on the following documents:
FDIS Report on voting
45A/838/FDIS 45A/848/RVD
Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on
voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
61513  IEC:2011 – 7 –
INTRODUCTION
a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the standard
This International Standard sets out requirements applicable to instrumentation and control
systems and equipment (I&C systems) that are used to perform functions important to safety
in nuclear power plants (NPPs).
This standard highlights the relations between
• the safety objectives of the NPP and the requirements for the overall architecture of the
I&C systems important to safety;
• the overall architecture of the I&C systems and the requirements of the individual systems
important to safety.
It is intended that the standard be used by designers, operators of NPPs (utilities), systems
evaluators and by licensors.
b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series
IEC 61513 is the first level IEC SC 45A document tackling the issue of general requirements
for systems. It is the entry point of the IEC SC 45A standard series.
For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this
introduction.
c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this standard
It is important to note that this standard establishes no additional functional requirements for
safety systems.
To ensure that the standard will continue to be relevant in future years, the emphasis has
been placed on issues of principle, rather than specific technologies.
d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships
with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)
The top-level document of the IEC SC 45A standard series is IEC 61513. It provides general
requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions important to
safety in NPPs. IEC 61513 structures the IEC SC 45A standard series.
IEC 61513 refers directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to
categorisation of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation of systems,
defence against common cause failure, software aspects of computer-based systems,
hardware aspects of computer-based systems, and control room design. The standards
referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 as a
consistent document set.
At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 are standards
related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these
documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be used
on their own.
A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series, corresponds to technical reports
which are not normative.
– 8 – 61513  IEC:2011
IEC 61513 has adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication
IEC 61508, with an overall safety life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework.
Regarding nuclear safety, it provides the interpretation of the general requirements of
IEC 61508-1 [1] , IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector. In this
framework, IEC 60880 and IEC 62138 correspond to IEC 61508-3 [2] for the nuclear
application sector.
IEC 61513 refers to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R-3 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 for topics related to
quality assurance (QA).
The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the principles and
basic safety aspects provided in the IAEA code on the safety of NPPs and in the IAEA safety
series, in particular the requirements document NS-R-1, establishing safety requirements
related to the design of nuclear power plants, and the safety guide NS-G-1.3 dealing with
instrumentation and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. The
terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the
IAEA.
NOTE It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions (e.g.
to address worker safety, asset protection, protection from chemical hazards and process energy hazards),
international or national standards would be applied, that are based on the requirements of such a standard as the
IEC 61508 series.
___________
References in square brackets refer to the bibliography.

61513  IEC:2011 – 9 –
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEMS

1 Scope
1.1 General
I&C systems important to safety may be implemented using conventional hard-wired equip-
ment, computer-based (CB) equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment
(see Note 1). This International Standard provides requirements and recommendations (see
Note 2) for the overall I&C architecture which may contain either or both technologies.
This standard highlights also the need for complete and precise requirements, derived from
the plant safety goals, as a pre-requisite for generating the comprehensive requirements for
the overall I&C architecture, and hence for the individual I&C systems important to safety.
This standard introduces the concept of a safety life cycle for the overall I&C architecture, and
a safety life cycle for the individual systems. By this, it highlights the relations between the
safety objectives of the NPP and the requirements for the overall architecture of the I&C
systems important to safety, and the relations between the overall I&C architecture and the
requirements of the individual systems important to safety.
The life cycles illustrated in, and followed by, this standard are not the only ones possible;
other life cycles may be followed, provided that the objectives stated in this standard are
satisfied.
NOTE 1 I&C systems may also use electronic modules based on complex electronic components such as ASICs
or FPGA. Depending on the scope and functionality of these components, they may be treated according to the
guidance for conventional electronic equipment, or similar to CB equipment. A significant part of the guidance for
CB equipment is also applicable to the design of equipment with complex electronic components, including e.g. the
concepts of re-using pre-existing designs, and the evaluation of design errors in software or complex hardware
designs.
NOTE 2 In the following, “requirement” is used as a comprehensive term for both requirements and
recommendations. The distinction appears at the level of the specific provisions where requirements are expressed
by “shall” and recommendations by “should”.
1.2 Application: new and pre-existing plants
This standard applies to the I&C of new nuclear power plants as well as to I&C up-grading or
back-fitting of existing plants.
For existing plants, only a subset of requirements is applicable and this subset should be
identified at the beginning of any project.
1.3 Framework
The standard comprises four normative clauses (an overview is provided in Figure 1):
• Clause 5 addresses the overall architecture of the I&C systems important to safety:
– defining requirements for the I&C functions, and associated systems and equipment
derived from the safety analysis of the NPP, the categorisation of I&C functions, and
the plant lay-out and operational context;
– structuring the overall I&C architecture, dividing it into a number of systems and
assigning the I&C functions to systems. Design criteria are identified, including those
to give defence in depth and to minimize the potential for common cause failure (CCF);

– 10 – 61513  IEC:2011
– planning the overall architecture of the I&C systems.
• Clause 6 addresses the requirements for the individual I&C systems important to safety,
particularly the requirements for computer-based systems. This includes differentiation of
requirements according to the safety category of the I&C functions which are
implemented;
• Clauses 7 and 8 address the overall integration, commissioning, operation and
maintenance of the I&C systems.
NOTE Figure 1 outlines the structure of the standard. It does not necessarily present the timely order of activities
which may be in reality partially executed in parallel, or include iterations.
Additionally, the standard provides informative annexes:
• Annex A highlights the relations between IAEA and basic safety concepts that are used
throughout this standard;
• Annex B provides information on the categorisation/classification principles;
• Annex C gives examples of I&C sensitivity to CCF;
• Annex D provides guidance to support comparison of this standard with parts 1, 2 and 4 of
IEC 61508. This annex surveys the main requirements of IEC 61508 to verify that the
issues relevant to safety are adequately addressed, considers the use of common terms
and explains the reason for adopting different or complementary techniques or terms;
• Annex E indicates modifications to be made in future revisions of daughter standards of
IEC 61513 to make them consistent and to minimize overlapping contents.

61513  IEC:2011 – 11 –
5 Overall safety lifecycle: Requirements specification for the overall I&C

5.2  Deriving the I&C requirements from the 5.3 Requirements on output documentation
plant safety design base
5.2.2 Functional, performance and    Overall requirements specification for the I&C
independence requirements systems important to safety

5.2.3 Categorisation requirements

5.2.4 Plant constraints
5 Overall safety lifecycle: Design and planning of the overall I&C architecture and assignment of the I&C functions
to the individual I&C systems
5.4  Requirements on the 5.5   Requirements on the 5.6  Requirements on the
objectives overall planning documentation
5.5.2 O QA programs 5.6.2 Architectural design
5.4.2 Design of the I&C
architecture
5.5.3 O security plan 5.6.3 Functional assignment
5.4.3 Assignment of the
5.5.4 O integration and
functions to the
commissioning plan
individual systems
5.5.5 O operation plan
5.4.4 Required analysis
5.5.6 O maintenance plan
6 System safety lifecycle: Realisation and planning of the individual I&C systems

6.3   Requirements on 6.4  Requirements on
6.2  Requirements on the
objectives of the thesystem planning output documentation
system life-cycle
phases
6.2.2 Requirements  6.3.2 S quality plan 6.4.2 Requirements

specification specification
6.3.3 S security plan
6.2.3 Equipment selection & 6.4.3 Specification
6.3.4 S integration plan
system specification
6.4.4 Detailed design
6.3.5 S validation plan
6.2.4 Detailed design &
6.4.5 Integration
6.3.6 S installation plan
implementation
6.4.6 Validation
6.3.7 S operation plan
6.2.5 Integration
6.4.7 Modification
6.3.8 S maintenance plan
6.2.6 Validation
6.2.7 Installation
6.2.8 Modifications
6.5 Qualification
6.5.2, 6.5.4  6.5.3, 6.5.5 6.5.6
Requirements on system S Qualification plan Requirements on
qualification qualification documents

7 Overall integration and commissioning

7.2 Requirements on the objectives 7.3 Requirements on output documentation

8 Overall operation and maintenance

8.2 Requirements on the objectives 8.3 Requirements on output documentation

IEC  1895/11
Key QA: Quality Assurance; O: Overall; S: System
Figure 1 – Overall framework of this standard

– 12 – 61513  IEC:2011
2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document.
For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition
of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
IEC 60671, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Surveillance testing
IEC 60709, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Separation
IEC 60780, Nuclear power plants – Electrical equipment of the safety system – Qualification
IEC 60880:2006, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category A functions
IEC 60964:2009, Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Design
IEC 60965, Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Supplementary control points for reactor
shutdown without access to the main control room
IEC 60980, Recommended practices for seismic qualification of electrical equipment of the
safety system for nuclear generating stations
IEC 60987:2007, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Hardware design requirements for computer-based systems
IEC 61000-4-1, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-1: Testing and measurement
techniques – Overview of IEC 61000-4 series
IEC 61000-4-2, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-2: Testing and measurement
techniques – Electrostatic discharge immunity test
IEC 61000-4-3, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-3: Testing and measurement
techniques – Radiated, radio-frequency, electromagnetic field immunity test
IEC 61000-4-4, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-4: Testing and measurement
techniques – Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test
IEC 61000-4-5, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-5: Testing and measurement
techniques – Surge immunity test
IEC 61000-4-6, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-6: Testing and measurement
techniques – Immunity to conducted disturbances, induced by radio-frequency fields
IEC 61226:2009, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to
safety – Classification of instrumentation and control functions
IEC 61500, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety – Data
communication in systems performing category A functions
IEC 61508-2:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems – Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems
61513  IEC:2011 – 13 –
IEC 61508-4:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems – Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations
IEC 62138:2004, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important for safety –
Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category B or C functions
IEC 62340, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –
Requirements for coping with common cause failure (CCF)
ISO 9001:2008, Quality management systems – Requirements
IAEA INSAG-10:1996, Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety
IAEA NS-R-1:2000, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design
IAEA GS-R-3:2006, The Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety –
Requirements
IAEA GS-G-3.1:2006, Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities –
Safety Guide
IAEA NS-G-1.3:2002, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear
Power Plants
IAEA 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1 – INSAG 12:1999, Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
3.1
application function
function of an I&C system that performs a task related to the process being controlled rather
than to the functioning of the system itself
NOTE 1 See also “I&C function”, “I&C system”, “application software”.
NOTE 2 An application function is normally a subfunction of an I&C function.
3.2
application software
part of the software of an I&C system that implements the application functions
NOTE 1 See also “application function”, “application software library”, “system software”.
NOTE 2 Application software contrasts with system software.
NOTE 3 See also Figure 2.
NOTE 4 In the context of complex electronic components, the term “application logic” may be inferred instead of
“application software” where appropriate throughout this standard.
3.3
application software library
collection of software modules implementing typical application functions
NOTE 1 When using pre-existing equipment, such a library is considered to be part of the system software and
qualified as such.
– 14 – 61513  IEC:2011
NOTE 2 See also Figure 2.
3.4
category of an I&C function
one of three possible safety assignments (A, B, C) of I&C functions resulting from
considerations of the safety relevance of the function to be performed. An unclassified
assignment may be made if the function has no importance to safety
NOTE 1 See also “class of an I&C system”, “I&C function”.
NOTE 2 IEC 61226 defines categories of I&C functions. To each category there corresponds a set of
req
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