ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)

ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)






TECHNICAL REPORT
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
LTE;
Security Assurance Methodology (SCAS)
for 3GPP network products
(3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15)

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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 1 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)



Reference
RTR/TSGS-0333916vf10
Keywords
LTE,SECURITY,UMTS
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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 2 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
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ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no
right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does
not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.
Legal Notice
This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities. These shall be
interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables.
The cross reference between 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http://webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp.
Modal verbs terminology
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interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
ETSI

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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 3 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Legal Notice . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 8
4 Overview . 9
4.0 Introduction . 9
4.1 Scope of a SECAM SCAS . 10
4.2 Scope of SECAM evaluation. 10
4.3 Scope of SECAM Accreditation . 11
4.4 Ultimate Output of SECAM Evaluation . 11
4.5 Network product evaluation process . 11
4.6 Roles in SECAM . 12
4.6.1 SECAM Roles Overview . 12
4.6.2 Examples of instantiation of roles in SECAM . 13
4.6.2.1 Introduction . 13
4.6.2.2 Example: Complete self-evaluation . 14
4.7 Operator security acceptance decision . 14
4.8 SECAM Assurance level . 14
4.9 Security baseline . 15
5 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) Creation . 16
5.1 Writing process overview . 16
5.2 SCAS documents structure and content . 17
5.2.1 General . 17
5.2.2 Security Problem Definition (SPD) . 17
5.2.2.1 Introduction . 17
5.2.2.2 Threats . 18
5.2.2.3 Security Objectives . 19
5.2.3 Security Requirements . 19
5.2.3.1 Introduction . 19
5.2.3.1.1 Level of detail of security requirements . 21
5.2.3.2 Incorporation of security requirements from existing 3GPP TSs in current releases . 21
5.2.3.3 Handling of security requirements . 22
5.2.3.4 Guidelines for writing test cases . 24
5.2.3.4.1 General . 24
5.2.3.4.2 Verifiability and repeatability . 24
5.2.3.4.3 System under test . 25
5.2.3.4.4 Template to be used for writing the test cases . 25
5.3 Improvement of SCAS and new security requirements. 25
6 Vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation . 25
6.1 Overview . 25
6.2 Audit and accreditation of Vendor network product development and network product lifecycle
management processes . 26
6.3 Audit and accreditation of test laboratories . 27
6.4 Monitoring . 27
6.5 Dispute resolution. 27
7 Evaluation and SCAS instantiation . 28
7.1 Security Assurance Specification instantiation documents creation . 28
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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 4 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
7.2 Evaluation and evaluation report . 28
7.2.1 Network product development process and network product lifecycle management . 28
7.2.2 SCAS instantiation evaluation . 29
7.2.2.1 Overview . 29
7.2.2.2 Content . 29
7.2.2.2.1 Scope of the evaluation . 29
7.2.2.2.2 Mapping of SCAS security requirements to the network product and assets in the network
product . 30
7.2.2.2.3 Operational guidance documents and configuration of the network product for evaluation . 31
7.2.2.2.4 Information needed to execute the required tests for SCT and BVT activities. 31
7.2.2.3 Process . 32
7.2.3 Security compliance testing . 33
7.2.3.1 Inputs . 33
7.2.3.2 Outputs . 33
7.2.3.3 Activities . 34
7.2.4 Basic Vulnerability Testing . 34
7.3 Self-declaration . 34
7.4 Partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle . 34
7.5 Comparison between two SECAM evaluations . 35
7.6 The evaluation of a new version . 35
Annex A: Summary of SECAM documents . 36
Annex B: Summary of actors involved in SECAM . 37
Annex C: Change history . 40
History . 41

ETSI

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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 5 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
Foreword
rd
This Technical Report has been produced by the 3 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x the first digit:
1 presented to TSG for information;
2 presented to TSG for approval;
3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections,
updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
ETSI

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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 6 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
1 Scope
The present document defines the complete Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) evaluation process (evaluation,
relation to SECAM Accreditation Body, roles, etc.) as well as the components of SECAM that are intended to provide
the expected security assurance. It will thus describe the general scheme providing an overview of the entire scheme
and explaining how to create and apply the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs). It will detail the different
evaluation tasks (vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assessment,
Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing and Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis) and the different
actors involved. Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis is outside the scope of the present release of SECAM. The present
document will help all involved parties to have a clear understanding of the overall process and the covered threats.
The concrete security requirements will be part of the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs) for each network
product class and not part of this overall process document. Some of the tasks described in the SECAM scheme are
meant to be performed by 3GPP, while other tasks are meant to be performed by the SECAM Accreditation Body. This
accreditation body has been agreed to be the GSMA. 3GPP maintains the overall responsibility for the SECAM scheme
and creates the SCASs. The SECAM Accreditation Body is tasked to develop requirements on vendor network product
development, the network product lifecycle management process, and SECAM-accreditation for vendors and test
laboratories, and describe these requirements in separate documents that will complement the present document. The
SECAM Accreditation Body defines its own scheme that covers all these tasks.
2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present
document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or
non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including
a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same
Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture".
[3] void
[4] 3GPP TR 33.821: "Rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolution (LTE) RAN /
3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)".
[5] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture".
[6] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP
network product classes".
[7] GSMA FS.13: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme – Overview",
http://ww w .g sma.co m/NESA S_O ver vie w.
[8] GSMA FS.14: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme – Security Test Laboratory
Accreditation Requirements and Process",
http://www.gsma.com/NESAS_Test_Lab_Accreditation.
[9] GSMA FS.15: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme – Vendor Development and
Product Lifecycle Requirements and Accreditation Process",
http://www.gsma.com/NESAS_Product_Lifecycle_Accreditation.
[10] GSMA FS.16: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme – Dispute Resolution Process",
http://www.gsma.com/NESAS_Dispute_Resolution.
ETSI

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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 7 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)

3 Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply.
A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
3GPP Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM): SECAM is a process used to measure the security features of
3GPP network products studied and described in the present document.
Accreditation: Formal recognition by an accreditation body that a test laboratory is impartial and competent to carry
out specific tests or types of assessments.
NOTE1: In the context of SECAM, it would be recognition that a test laboratory is competent to assess the 3GPP
network product against the requirements from the 3GPP SCAS and to produce an evaluation report.
SECAM Accreditation Body: the entity responsible for the accreditation process. This entity is the GSMA.
Assurance: confidence that a network product meets its specific security objectives.
NOTE 2: Assurance is usually verified by performing an evaluation.
Assurance level: evaluation effort in terms of scope, depth and rigor. For higher assurance level, more information with
more details is typically required, and this information will be analysed more rigorously.
NOTE 3: The "3GPP Assurance Levels" have nothing to do with "Evaluated Assurance Levels" used in Common
Criteria.
Basic Vulnerability Testing (BVT): The process of running security tools against a network product.
BVT is defined by the use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) security
testing tools on the external interfaces of the network product.
NOTE 4: Details on these tools can be found in clause 7.2.4.
Certification: confirmation by an independent Certification Authority (CA) that the evaluation has been properly
carried out.
NOTE 5: Certification of network products is out of scope for SECAM. However, SECAM does not preclude
certification activities for network products which would e.g. complement the Self-declaration step.
Enhanced Vulnerability Testing (EVA): Evaluation process step described in Clause 7.2.5. This activity takes the
output of the earlier Security Compliance Testing (SCT) and Basic Vulnerability Testing (BVT) into account.
NOTE 6: Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis is outside the scope of the present release of SECAM.
Evaluation report: the output document delivered by the test laboratory for its evaluation task, in which the test
procedures, the test results and other related information may be included. For three specific evaluation tasks defined in
SECAM (SCT, BVT, EVA), the according output document is SCT report, BVT report, EVA report respectively.
Test laboratory: enityt that evaluates the network product and produces an evaluation report. The vendor, the operator,
GSMA, NVIOT, 3GPP, GCF or some other party, could take the test laboratory role.
Hardening: contributes to the security baseline of a network product, achieved for example by configurations, settings,
and protocol restrictions, to decrease the attack surface for a network product. The difference in hardening is one aspect
that influences the security baseline of a network product.
Network Product: A network product is the instantiation of one or more network product class(es).
Network Product Class: A network product class, in the context of SECAM, is the class of products that all
implements a common set of 3GPP defined functionalities.
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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 8 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme (NESAS): the name given to the scheme that will provide an
administrative framework for implementation of SECAM for security evaluation of 3GPP compliant network
equipment.
NOTE 7: NESAS is a GSMA term but is not used in this document.
SECAM evaluation: A SECAM evaluation comprises of the Vendor Network Product Development process
evaluation, the product lifecycle management process evaluation and the Network Product evaluation.
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS): The SCAS for a given network product class provides a description of the
security requirements (which are including test cases) pertaining to that network product class.
Security baseline: The security baseline of an evaluated network product is a set of security requirements and
environmental assumptions defining its capacity to resist a given attack potential.
Security Compliance Testing (SCT): Evaluation process step used to describe activities for checking the compliance
of a network product with applicable Security Assurance Specifications (SCAS).
Self-declaration: Self-declaration is a declaration of the claims made on the network product by the vendor.
It means that a vendor provides a self-declaration of its network product based on the evaluation report required by
SECAM to the operator without any review of a certification authority of these reports before.
Self-evaluation: Self-evaluation is an assessment of the network product by the vendor. It means that the vendor has an
accredited evaluation lab in its organization that performs the evaluation of the network product. The evaluation lab
assesses the network product against defined criteria and produces an evaluation report according to a formalized and
standardized procedure.
Third-party evaluation: Third-party-evaluation is an assessment of the network product by an independent third-party.
It means that a third-party has an accredited evaluation lab that performs the evaluation of the network product.
The evaluation lab assesses the network product against defined criteria and produces an evaluation report according to
a formalized and standardized procedure. Third-party evaluation is similar to self-evaluation. The only difference is that
the party performing the evaluation is different from the vendor.
Vulnerability: An exploitable issue in a network product rendering it unable to withstand attacks. Vulnerabilities create
the risk of successful attacks.
Vulnerability Assessment (VA): The process of assessing the output of SCT or BVT activities to classify the found
issues by severity in order to identify those which are relevant vulnerabilities.
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply.
An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any,
in TR 21.905 [1].
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BVT Basic Vulnerability Testing
CC Common Criteria
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
CPA Commercial Product Assurance
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System
EVA Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis
FASMO Frequent and Serious Misoperation
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIRST Forum for Incident Response and Security Team
FOSS Free and Open Source Software
GSF Generic Security Functionality
GSMA GSM Association
HW HardWare
IMEI-SV IMEI-SoftwareVersion
IT Information Technology
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3GPP TR 33.916 version 15.1.0 Release 15 9 ETSI TR 133 916 V15.1.0 (2020-01)
MME NP MME Network Product
MME NPC MME Network Product Class
MME Mobility Management Entity
MNO Mobile Network Operator
NB NodeB
NDPP Network Device Protection Profile
NESAG Network Equipment Security Assurance Group
NPC Network Product Class
NPCD Network Product Class Description
OAM Operations, Administration and Maintenance
OS Operating System
OSPP Operating System Protection Profile
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SCAS SeCurity Assurance Specification
SCT Security Compliance Testing
SECAM Security Assurance Methodology
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SO Security Objective
SPD Security Problem Definition
SR Security Requirement
SSH Secure Shell
TCG Trusted Computing Group
USB Universal Serial Bus
4 Overview
4.0 Introduction
Security of Network Products should be measurable, comparable, and follow a common standardised baseline. This
allows mobile network operators to determine the achieved level of security of network products. 3GPP addresses this
by introducing SECAM. SE
...