ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
Testing;
Conformance test specifications for ITS Misbehaviour
Reporting service;
Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP);
Release 2
2 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)

Reference
DTS/ITS-00596-2
Keywords
ITS, security, testing, TSS&TP
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ETSI
3 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 6
2.2 Informative references . 6
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms . 7
3.2 Symbols . 7
3.3 Abbreviations . 7
4 Test Suite Structure (TSS) . 8
4.1 Structure for Security tests . 8
4.2 Test entities and states . 8
4.2.1 V-ITS-S states . 8
4.2.2 R-ITS-S states . 8
4.2.3 MA states . 8
4.3 Test configurations . 8
4.3.1 Overview . 8
4.3.2 ITS-S . 8
4.3.2.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 . 8
4.3.2.2 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_02 . 9
4.3.3 R-ITS-S . 9
4.3.3.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_03 . 9
4.3.4 MA . 9
4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_04 . 9
5 Test Purposes (TP) . 9
5.1 Introduction . 9
5.1.1 TP definition conventions . 9
5.1.2 TP Identifier naming conventions . 9
5.1.3 Rules for the behaviour description . 10
5.1.4 Sources of TP definitions . 10
5.1.5 Mnemonics for PICS reference . 10
5.1.6 Certificates content . 11
5.1.6.1 Root Certificate Authorities certificates . 11
5.1.6.2 Authorization Authorities certificate . 12
5.1.6.2.1 Authorization Authorities certificate with MRS SSPs . 12
5.1.6.2.2 Authorization Authorities certificate without MRS SSPs . 12
5.1.6.3 Authorization Tickets . 13
5.1.6.3.1 Authorization Tickets with MRS SSP s . 13
5.1.6.3.2 Authorization Tickets without MRS SSPs . 13
5.1.6.4 Misbehaviour Authority . 14
5.2 Misbehaviour Authority . 14
5.3 ITS-S . 15
5.3.1 Introduction. 15
5.3.2 CA messages . 16
5.3.2.1 General . 16
5.3.2.2 Class1 . 16
5.3.2.2.1 CAM security detector . 16
5.3.2.2.2 CAM speed misbehaviour detector . 22
5.3.2.2.3 CAM longitudinal acceleration misbehaviour detector . 23
5.3.2.2.4 CAM position misbehaviour detector . 24
5.3.2.3 Class2 . 24
5.3.2.3.1 CAM speed misbehaviour detector . 24
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4 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.3.2.3.2 CAM position misbehaviour detector . 25
5.3.2.3.3 CAM heading misbehaviour detector . 26
5.3.2.3.4 CAM acceleration misbehaviour detector . 26
5.3.2.3.5 CAM beacon interval detector . 27
5.3.2.3.6 CAM static misbehaviour detector . 27
5.3.2.4 Class3 . 31
5.3.2.5 Class4 . 31
5.3.2.6 Class5 . 31
5.3.2.7 Multiple CAM misbehaviour reports . 32
5.3.2.7.1 Class1 . 32
5.3.2.7.2 Class2 . 33
5.3.2.7.3 Class3 . 34
5.3.2.7.4 Class4 . 34
5.3.2.7.5 Class5 . 34
5.3.2.7.6 Multiple classes . 34
5.3.3 DEN messages . 35
5.4 Forwarding . 35
5.5 Short range transport . 36
History . 37

ETSI
5 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
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pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, are publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be
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ETSI in respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the
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Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS).
The present document is part 2 of a multi-part deliverable. Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [3].
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
ETSI
6 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
1 Scope
The present document provides the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP) for ITS Misbehaviour Reporting
service as specified in ETSI TS 103 759 [1] in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6].
The ISO standard for the methodology of conformance testing (ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.3] and ISO/IEC 9646-2 [i.4]) as well
as the ETSI rules for conformance testing (ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.7]) are used as a basis for the test methodology.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI TS 103 759 (V2.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Misbehaviour
Reporting service; Release 2".
[2] ETSI TS 103 097 (V2.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and
certificate formats; Release 2".
[3] ETSI TS 103 868-1 (V2.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test
specifications for ITS Misbehaviour Reporting service; Part 1: Protocol Implementation
Conformance Statement (PICS); Release 2".
[4] ETSI TS 102 941 (V2.2.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Trust and Privacy
Management; Release 2".
[5] ETSI EN 302 637-2 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications;
Basic Set of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service".
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] ETSI EG 202 798 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Framework for
conformance and interoperability testing".
[i.2] ETSI TS 102 965: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Application Object Identifier (ITS-AID);
Registration".
[i.3] ISO/IEC 9646-1 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 1: General concepts".
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7 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
[i.4] ISO/IEC 9646-2 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 2: Abstract Test Suite
specification".
[i.5] ISO/IEC 9646-6 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 6: Protocol profile test
specification".
[i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 7: Implementation
Conformance Statements".
[i.7] ETSI ETS 300 406 (1995): "Methods for testing and Specification (MTS); Protocol and profile
conformance testing specifications; Standardization methodology".
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 102 941 [4], ETSI TS 103 097 [2], ETSI
TS 103 861-1 [3], ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2], ISO/IEC 9646-6 [i.5] and ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6] apply.
3.2 Symbols
Void.
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 103 759 [1], ETSI TS 103 097 [2], ETSI
TS 103 861-1 [3], ETSI TS 102 941 [4] and the following apply:
BO exceptional BehaviOur
BV Valid Behaviour
CA Co-operative Awareness
CERT CERTificate
GN-MGMT GeoNetworking ManaGeMenT message
GPC GNSS Positioning Correction
IUT Implementation Under Test
IVIM Infrastructure to Vehicle Information Message
MAPEM MAP (topology) Extended Message
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OBU On-Board Unit
PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
PIXIT Partial Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing
PSID Provider Service IDentifier
RSU Road-Side Unit
SPATEM Signal Phase And Timing Extended Message
SREM Signal Request Extended Message
SSEM Signal request Status Extended Message
TP Test Purposes
TS Test System
TSS Test Suite Structure
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8 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
4 Test Suite Structure (TSS)
4.1 Structure for Security tests
Table 1 shows the Security Test Suite Structure (TSS) defined for conformance testing.
Table 1: TSS for MR service
Root Group Sub-Group Category
mrs Security Valid and invalid
Message General Valid
CAM Valid
DENM Valid
MULTIPLE CAM Valid
DENM Valid
Forwarding Valid
Short Range Valid
4.2 Test entities and states
4.2.1 V-ITS-S states
• State 'idle':
- ITS-S in 'idle' state is sending CA message or beacons.
4.2.2 R-ITS-S states
• State 'idle':
- RSU in 'idle' state is sending CA message or beacons.
4.2.3 MA states
• State 'idle':
- MA in 'idle' state is ready to process MRs.
4.3 Test configurations
4.3.1 Overview
This clause introduces the different IUT's configurations required to execute the TPs described in clause 5.
4.3.2 ITS-S
4.3.2.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01
IUT: ITS-S of type V-ITS-S in the state 'idle':
• Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the MA emulated by the TS:
- Long range Transport.
TS: MA is emulated by TS.
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9 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
4.3.2.2 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_02
IUT: ITS-S of type V-ITS-S in the state 'idle':
• Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the MA emulated by the TS:
- Short range Transport.
4.3.3 R-ITS-S
4.3.3.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_03
IUT: RSU in the state 'idle':
• Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the MA emulated by the TS:
- Short range Transport.
- Long range Transport.
TS: MA and ITS-S are emulated by TS.
4.3.4 MA
4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_04
IUT: MA in the state 'idle':
• Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the ITS-S emulated by the TS:
- Long range Transport.
TS: ITS-S is emulated by TS.
5 Test Purposes (TP)
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 TP definition conventions
The TP definition is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1].
5.1.2 TP Identifier naming conventions
The identifier of the TP is built according to Table 2.
Table 2: TP naming convention
Identifier TP____ _ Sub-Group Category
= root MRS
= target ITSS IUT is an OBU
RSU IUT is an RSU
MA General behaviour
= group SEC Security behaviour
Message misbehaviour
MESSAGES
detection
FORWARDING Message forwarding
SRT Short Range Transport
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10 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
Identifier TP____ _ Sub-Group Category
= sub-group CLASS1 MBR class1
CLASS2 MBR class2
CLASS3 MBR class3
CLASS4 MBR class4
CLASS5 MBR class5
Multiple detectors of same or
MULTIPLE
different classes
= category BV Valid Behaviour tests
BO Invalid Behaviour Tests
= test purpose sequential number 01 to 99

5.1.3 Rules for the behaviour description
The description of the TP is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1].
ETSI TS 103 759 [1] does not use the finite state machine concept. As consequence, the test purposes use a generic
"Initial State" that corresponds to a state where the IUT is ready for starting the test execution. Furthermore, the IUT
shall be left in this "Initial State", when the test is completed.
Being in the "Initial State" refers to the starting point of the initial device configuration. There are no pending actions,
no instantiated buffers or variables, which could disturb the execution of a test.
5.1.4 Sources of TP definitions
All TPs have been specified according to ETSI TS 103 759 [1] which shall be followed as specified in the present
document
5.1.5 Mnemonics for PICS reference
To avoid an update of all TPs when the PICS document is changed, Table 3 introduces mnemonics name and the
correspondence with the real PICS item number. The 'PICS item' as defined in tables provided in clause A.6 of ETSI
TS 103 868-1 [3] shall be used to determine the test applicability.
Table 3: Mnemonics for PICS reference
Mnemonic PICS item
PICS_IUT_ITS_S ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.2 Item 1
PICS_IUT_RSU ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.2 Item 2
PICS_IUT_MA ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.3 Item 1
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_BEACON ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 1
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_STATIC ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 5
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_POSITION ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 3
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SPEED ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 2
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_LONG_ACC ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 4
PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SECURITY ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 6
PICS_SHORT_RANGE ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3], Table A.4 Item 1

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11 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.1.6 Certificates content
5.1.6.1 Root Certificate Authorities certificates
Table 4: Content of the Root CA certificates with MRS ITS-AID permissions
RCA certificate Content To be installed
on the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_RCA • self-signed
Yes
• name "ETSI Test RCA A certificate"
• application permissions:
- CRL with SSP 0x01
- CTL with SSP 0x0138
• certificate issuing permissions:
- CAM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003)
- DENM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFFF / 0xFF000000)
- SPATEM with all possible SSP (0x01E0 / 0xFF1F)
- MAPEM with all possible SSP (0x01C0 / 0xFF3F)
- IVIM with all possible SSP (0x01000000FFF8 / 0xFF0000000007)
- SREM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFE0 / 0xFF00001F)
- SSEM with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- GPC with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- GN-MGMT without SSP
- CRT-REQ with SSP (0x01FE / 0xFF01)
- MRS with SSP (0x01C0 / 0xFF00)
- MDM with SSP (0x01010201240125 / 0xFF000000000000)
• validation time for 3 years
• no region restriction
• assurance level 6
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve
NOTE 1: For MRS SSPs, all PSIDs are authorized.
NOTE 2: For MDM SSPs, only CAM and DENM PSIDs are authorized.
NOTE 3: MDM SSP are COER encoded.

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12 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.1.6.2 Authorization Authorities certificate
5.1.6.2.1 Authorization Authorities certificate with MRS SSPs
Table 5: Content of the AA certificates with MRS ITS-AID permissions
AA certificate Content To be
installed
on the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AA • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA Yes
• application permissions:
- CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0132
• certificate issuing permissions:
- CAM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003)
- DENM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFFF / 0xFF000000)
- SPATEM with all possible SSP (0x01E0 / 0xFF1F)
- MAPEM with all possible SSP (0x01C0 / 0xFF3F)
- IVIM with all possible SSP (0x01000000FFF8 / 0xFF0000000007)
- SREM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFE0 / 0xFF00001F)
- SSEM with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- GPC with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- MRS with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xC0)
- GN-MGMT without SSP
• validation time for 3 years
• no region restriction
• assurance level 4
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve

5.1.6.2.2 Authorization Authorities certificate without MRS SSPs
Table 6: Content of the AA certificates without MRS ITS-AID permissions
AA certificate Content To be
installed
on the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AA Yes
• signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA
• application permissions:
- CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0132
• certificate issuing permissions:
- CAM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003)
- DENM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFFF / 0xFF000000)
- SPATEM with all possible SSP (0x01E0 / 0xFF1F)
- MAPEM with all possible SSP (0x01C0 / 0xFF3F)
- IVIM with all possible SSP (0x01000000FFF8 / 0xFF0000000007)
- SREM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFE0 / 0xFF00001F)
- SSEM with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- GPC with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF)
- GN-MGMT without SSP
• validation time for 3 years
• no region restriction
• assurance level 4
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve

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13 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.1.6.3 Authorization Tickets
5.1.6.3.1 Authorization Tickets with MRS SSPs
Table 7: Content of the AT certificates with MRS ITS-AID
Authorization ticket Content To be
installed on
the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT • Explicit certificate Yes
• signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_AA
• application permissions:
- CAM with all SSP (0x01FFFC)
- DENM with all SSP (0x01FFFFFF)
- MSR with all SSP (0x01C0)
- GN-MGMT
• validation time for 1 year
• no region restriction
• assurance level 3
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve

5.1.6.3.2 Authorization Tickets without MRS SSPs
Table 8: Content of the AT certificates without MRS ITS-AID
Authorization ticket Content To be
installed on
the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AT Yes
• Explicit certificate
• signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_AA
• application permissions:
- CAM with all SSP (0x01FFFC)
- DENM with all SSP (0x01FFFFFF)
- GN-MGMT
• validation time for 1 year
• no region restriction
• assurance level 3
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve

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14 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.1.6.4 Misbehaviour Authority
Table 9: Content of the MA certificates
MA certificate Content To be installed on
the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_MA • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA Yes
• application permissions:
- CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0102
- MDM with SSP value 0x01010201240125
• validation time for 3 years
• no region restriction
• assurance level ABSENT
• verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve
• valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve
NOTE 1: CERT_REQ SSPs contains only the CA certificate request bit set.
NOTE 2: MDM SSP are COER encoded.

5.2 Misbehaviour Authority
All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:
PICS_IUT_MA = TRUE
TP Id TP_MRS_MA_SEC_BO_01
Test Objective Check that the IUT discards an encrypted MR message when recipientId does not contain MA
certificate
Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clause 7.1
Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_04
PICS Selection PICS_IUT_MA
Initial Conditions
with {
the IUT being in the initial state and
the IUT is authorized with CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT
}
Expected Behaviour
ensure that {
when {
the IUT receives a MR Message containing
protocolVersion indicating value 3,
content containing
encryptedData containing
recipients containing
recipientInfo containing
certRecipInfo containing
recipientId indicating HashedIS8 of CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AA, // instead
of CERT_IUT_A_MA
cyphertext containing
EtsiTs103097Data_Signed containing
signedData containing
hashId indicating value HASH_ALGORITHM,
signer containing
digest indicating HashedId8 of CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT,
tbsData containing
payload containing
version indicating value 2,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
observationLocation corresponding to CURRENT_POS,
report corresponding to AidSpecificReport,
headerInfo containing
psid indicating value PX_MRS_PSID,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
signature indicating value Signature
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
} then {
the IUT discards the message
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15 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
}
}
TP Id TP_MRS_MA_SEC_BO_02
Test Objective
Check that the IUT discards an encrypted MR message signed with a certificate with no MRS
SSPs
Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clause 7.1
Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_04
PICS Selection
PICS_IUT_MA
Initial Conditions
with {
the IUT being in the initial state and
the IUT is authorized with CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AT
}
Expected Behaviour
ensure that {
when {
the IUT receives a MR Message containing
protocolVersion indicating value 3,
content containing
encryptedData containing
recipients containing
recipientInfo containing
certRecipInfo containing
recipientId indicating HashedId8 of CERT_IUT_A_MA,
cyphertext containing
EtsiTs103097Data_Signed containing
signedData containing
hashId indicating value HASH_ALGORITHM,
signer containing
digest indicating HashedId8 of CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AT, // No MRS
SSPs
tbsData containing
payload containing
version indicating value 2,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
observationLocation corresponding to CURRENT_POS,
report corresponding to AidSpecificReport,
headerInfo containing
psid indicating value PX_MRS_PSID,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
signature indicating value Signature
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
} then {
the IUT discards the message
}
}
5.3 ITS-S
5.3.1 Introduction
All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:
PICS_IUT_ITS-S = TRUE
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16 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
5.3.2 CA messages
5.3.2.1 General
TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_BV_01
Test Objective Check that the IUT provides the certificate of the reported ITS-S when the invalid secured
geonetworking packet does not contain the AT certificate
Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A
Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01
PICS Selection PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SPEED
Initial Conditions
with {
the IUT being in the initial state and
the IUT is authorized with CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT
}
Expected Behaviour
ensure that {
when {
the IUT receives a SEC_GN_PACKET containing
content containing
signedData containing
signer containing
digest indicating value HashedId8 of CERT_REMOTE_AT,
toBeSigned containing
unsecuredData containing
CA message containing
StationID indicating value PX_STATION_ID,
Speed indicating value PX_INVALID_SPEED
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
and the IUT is triggered to send a MR message containing
targetId indicating value c_CamTgt_SpeedCommon,
cause indicating value c_ObsSpeed_ValueTooLarge_VehicleType
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
} then {
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103759Data containing
version indicating value 2,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
observationLocation corresponding to CURRENT_POS,
report containing
aid indicating value c_AsrCam,
content corresponding to AsrCam,
content containing
observations,
v2xPduEvidence containing
V2xPduStream containing
item0 containing
type_ indicating value c_ObsPdu_etsiGn,
v2xPdus indicating value SEC_GN_PACKET,
certificate indicating value CERT_REMOTE_AT,
subjectPduIndex indicating value 0,
nonV2xPduEvidence indicating value empty
to the MA entity
}
}
5.3.2.2 Class1
5.3.2.2.1 CAM security detector
TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_SEC_BV_01
Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an encrypted MR message.
Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clause 7.1
Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01
PICS Selection PICS_IUT_ITS_S and PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SECURITY
Initial Conditions
with {
the IUT being in the initial state and
the IUT is authorized with CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT
}
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17 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
Expected Behaviour
ensure that {
when {
the IUT is triggered to send a MR Message
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
} then {
the IUT sends a message EtsiTs103097Data_SignedAndEncrypted containing
protocolVersion indicating value 3,
content containing
encryptedData containing
recipients containing
recipientInfo containing
certRecipInfo containing
recipientId indicating HashedId8 of CERT_IUT_A_MA,
cyphertext containing
EtsiTs103097Data_Signed containing
signedData containing
hashId indicating value HASH_ALGORITHM,
signer containing
digest indicating HashedId8 of CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT,
tbsData containing
payload containing
version indicating value 2,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
observationLocation corresponding to CURRENT_POS,
report corresponding to AidSpecificReport,
headerInfo containing
psid indicating value PX_MRS_PSID,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
signature indicating value Signature
to the MA entity
}
}
TP Id
TP_MRS_ITSS_SEC_MESSAGES_CLASS1_CAM_BV_01
Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a security HeaderInfo with missing fields observation on a CAM MR
message when requested (Class 1) - obs-Security-MessageIdIncWithHeaderInfo
Reference
ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A
Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01
PICS Selection PICS_IUT_ITS_S and PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SECURITY
Initial Conditions
with {
the IUT being in the initial state and
the IUT is authorized with CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT
}
Expected Behaviour
ensure that {
when {
the IUT receives a PDU_IN_ERR containing
CA message containing
StationID indicating value PX_STATION_ID,
HeaderInfo containing
Psid indicating value AID_CAM,
not GenerationTime // Missing field
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
and the IUT is triggered to send a MR message containing
targetId indicating value c_CamTgt_SecurityCommon,
cause indicating value c_ObsSecurity_MessageIdIncWithHeaderInfo
from the TEST_SYSTEM entity
} then {
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103759Data containing
version indicating value 2,
generationTime corresponding to CURRENT_TIME,
observationLocation corresponding to CURRENT_POS,
report containing
aid indicating value c_AsrCam,
content containing
content corresponding to AsrCam,
content containing
observations containing
item0 containing
tgtId indicating value c_CamTgt_SecurityCommon,
observations containing
item0 containing
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18 ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05)
obsId indicating value
c_ObsSecurity_MessageIdIncWithHeaderInfo,
obs indi
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